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In the wake of the celebration of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. Windsor, it seems obvious that the LGBT 
movement is intent on securing marriage. But the relationship 
between LGBT advocacy and marriage was not always so clear. In 
fact, before the movement began to make explicit claims to marriage 
in the 1990s, leading advocates engaged in a vigorous debate about 
whether to seek marriage. This debate went beyond mere strategic 
disagreement and instead focused on ideological differences 
regarding the role of marriage and its relationship to LGBT rights, 
family diversity, and sexual freedom. Those opposing the turn to 
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marriage urged the movement to continue pursuing nonmarital rights 
and recognition, including domestic partnership, as a way to 
decenter marriage for everyone. Critics of today's marriage equality 
advocacy point to this history as a lost alternative past worthy of 
reclamation. Today's marriage-centered movement, they argue, 
channels relationships into traditional forms and marginalizes those 
who fail to fit the marital mold. Instead of continuing down this road, 
these critics contend, movement advocates should recover their 
earlier roots and embrace pluralistic models of family and intimacy 
outside of marriage. 
This Article challenges the assumptions that structure today's 
debate over the role of marriage in LGBT advocacy. It does so by 
uncovering the centrality of marriage even during the time when 
LGBT advocates worked entirely outside of marriage and built 
nonmarital regimes. Through a case study of domestic partnership 
work in California in the I 980s and 1990s, this Article shows that the 
relationship between nonmarital advocacy and marriage was 
dia/ogical. Marriage shaped LGBT advocacy for nonmarital 
recognition, and that advocacy in turn shaped marriage. To gain 
support for nonmarital rights and benefits, advocates cast same-sex 
relationships as marriage-like and built domestic partnership in 
reference to marriage, thus reinscribing-rather than resisting-the 
centrality of marriage. Yet, at the same time, this nonmarital 
advocacy contributed to an ascendant model of marriage 
characterized by adult romantic affiliation, mutual emotional 
support, and economic interdependence-a model of marriage 
capable of including same-sex couples. 
Revisiting this earlier time in LGBT advocacy sheds light on the 
current marriage-centered moment. By uncovering how marriage 
anchored advocacy on nonmarital recognition, the case study 
demonstrates the difficulty in escaping marriage's regulatory pull 
and thereby challenges normative and prescriptive claims pushing 
away from marriage in LGBT advocacy. And by showing how 
advocates shaped marriage's meaning in the space outside marriage, 
it reveals how nonmarital advocacy built the foundation for today's 
marriage equality jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today, it seems as though marriage is synonymous with the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement. 1 As events in the wake of the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Windsor2 and 
I. Although I generally use the term "LGBT' throughout this Article, I am mindful that work 
characterized as "LGBT advocacy'' does not necessarily serve the interests of the entire LGBT 
community. Moreover, I recognize that I am using this common contemporary term to describe work 
in an earlier era. Therefore, at various points in the case study I use the term "lesbian and gay" to 
reflect characterizations at the time. See, e.g., Shannon Price Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay 
Rights? Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 141, 145-46 (Paisley 
Currah et al. eds., 2006). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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Hollingsworth v. Perr/ underscore, LGBT advocates and constituents have 
embraced marriage as a movement priority. But this was not always the case. 
Years earlier-before the Hawaii Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Baehr v. 
Lewin4 launched same-sex marriage to national prominence and compelled 
LGBT leaders to engage marriage directly-advocates debated whether the 
movement should pursue marriage at all. In fact, prominent activists rejected 
marriage and sought to resist and destabilize marriage as a model of family 
recognition and sexual regulation. 
Critics of the movement's current devotion to marriage articulate some of 
the earlier ideological objections to marriage in today's more thoroughly 
marriage-centered moment. They argue that instead of advocating for family 
pluralism and sexual liberty, today's advocates box same-sex couples into the 
confines of marriage and position marriage as the appropriate mechanism for 
the distribution of rights and benefits. Under this view, LGBT advocates 
reinscribe the power and prestige of marriage and marginalize families and 
sexual affiliations that fail to fit the marital mold. 5 
Many of these critical scholars suggest that had advocates remained 
committed to the marriage resistance of the 1980s and early 1990s, the current 
landscape would look drastically different. 6 Instead of marriage mattering more 
for family-based rights and the social meaning _of intimate relationships, it 
would matter significantly less. In making such claims, these scholars 
emphasize the ways in which work in the 1980s and early 1990s pushed against 
3. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). For an account of the Perry litigation, see Douglas NeJaime, The 
Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663 (2012). 
4. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
5. See, e.g., Katherine Franke, Public Sex, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Afterlife of 
Homophobia, in PETITE MORT 156, 158 (Carlos Motta & Jonathan Lubin-Levy eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter Franke, Public Sex, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Afterlife of Homophobia] (arguing that 
the "new ernplotment of gay life, one animated by characters who are kin not hookups, whose 
connection is romantic not sexual, is taken up in the briefs in the marriage equality cases"); Katherine 
M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236,242 (2006) 
[hereinafter Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics] (arguing that in some of the central 
arguments made by proponents of same-sex marriage, "marriage is figured as the ideal social 
formation in which responsible reproduction can and should take place"); Melissa Murray, Marriage 
as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 59 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Marriage as Punishment] 
("Toe self-regulating, disciplined plaintiffs identified by the marriage equality movement suggest 
the ... transformation [ of the space between marriage and crime] from a potential respite from state 
regulation of sex and sexuality into an annexation of that regulatory project."); Melissa Murray, 
What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 387,433 (2012) 
[hereinafter Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?] (arguing that instead of finding 
common ground with "single parent-headed families, families that include or rely upon extended 
families or fictive kin, urban 'tribes' of friends, and polyamorous groups, to name a few," advocates 
have distanced same-sex couples "from the deviant families who have willfully elected to live outside 
of marriage"); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201,203 
(2003) ("By constantly hammering at the injustice of excluding same-sex couples from the benefits 
and obligations of marriage, [the marriage equality] movement, perhaps inadvertently, solidifies the 
differential treatment of the married and unmarried."). 
6. See infra Part IV.A. 
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marriage. More specifically, they point to the proliferation of domestic 
partnership policies before Baehr as evidence of the success of movement 
efforts to destabilize marriage. Under this view, the mid- l 990s marked a 
strikingly normative-more than strategic-shift in LGBT work; advocates did 
not simply change tactics, but rather reshaped movement politics. Some of 
these critics urge today's advocates to reclaim the pre-Baehr past and 
accordingly minimize the role of marriage in contemporary LGBT advocacy. 
This Article challenges the assumptions that structure the ongoing 
scholarly debate over LGBT advocacy and marriage. By revisiting the earlier 
era on which today's critical assessments often rest, it uncovers marriage's 
centrality even before marriage became a formal part of the movement's 
agenda. Through a case study of California-based LGBT advocacy on behalf of 
nonmarital relationships, specifically domestic partnerships, this Article shows 
that in the 1980s and early 1990s-before Baehr and the marriage advocacy 
that would follow-marriage shaped nonmarital recognition and, conversely, 
nonmarital recognition shaped marriage. Ultimately, LGBT work outside of 
marriage in significant ways built, rather than opposed, the case for marriage 
that we see today. 
In this earlier era, marriage anchored advocacy aimed at nonmarital 
recognition. 7 Even if advocates wished to destabilize marriage-and certainly 
some did-they were constrained by a legal, political, and cultural framework 
that prioritized marriage in the recognition of familial and sexual relationships. 
Government actors, employers, insurers, and countermovement forces appealed 
to marriage to understand and frame domestic partnership and other measures 
aimed at nonmarital families. Accordingly, many LGBT advocates willingly 
used marriage to argue for and define nonmarital recognition. And these 
advocates represented constituents who valued marriage as both a legal and 
cultural matter. Ultimately, work often remembered for destabilizing marriage 
accepted and prioritized key elements of marriage. 
Yet marriage did not simply constrain advocates and define nonmarital 
recognition. Instead, by appealing to marital norms to gain nonmarital support, 
LGBT advocates contributed to an ascendant model of marriage capable of 
including same-sex relationships. By stressing adult romantic affiliation, 
mutual emotional support, and economic interdependence over gender 
differentiation, procreative sex, and biological, male-female parenting, 
advocates both shaped the meaning of marriage-which had been shifting 
dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century-and located same-sex 
couples within that shifting meaning. They did so, remarkably, through work 
outside of marriage. 
This Article's account attempts not only to fill in the historical record, but 
also to shed light on the present moment and its relationship to ongoing 
7. I am grateful to Jane Schacter for suggesting the anchoring image. 
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scholarly debates.8 Given the Supreme Court's recent intervention and the 
growing sense that same-sex marriage is inevitable, it is an especially crucial 
time to understand both the forces that constrained paths leading away from 
marriage and the impact that same-sex couples had-and may continue to 
have-on marriage. Viewing earlier nonmarital advocacy through the lens of 
marriage resistance masks both the role of marriage as an anchoring principle 
in work outside marriage and nonmarital advocacy's contribution to the 
contemporary model of marriage advanced by today's advocates and adopted in 
Windsor. Accordingly, this Article's historical account suggests that influential 
critiques of marriage equality work often ascribe too much agency to LGBT 
advocates, implying that advocates can escape marriage's power if only they 
try. And these critiques give advocates too little credit, obscuring the ways in 
which their work influences marriage. Ultimately, this Article's examination of 
LGBT work in nonmarital spaces demonstrates the regulatory reach of 
marriage, while at the same time revealing how the content of marriage itself is 
produced.9 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly sketches the historical 
backdrop against which 1980s LGBT nonmarital advocacy in California 
emerged. It pays particular attention to changes in intimate relationships over 
the second half of the twentieth century, mobilizations around family and 
sexuality on the left and right, and changing legal and political conditions. With 
this context, Part II then lays out the standard account of the trajectory of 
marriage advocacy in the LGBT movement. It focuses on the distinction 
between work outside of marriage in the 1980s and early 1990s and marriage-
centered work beginning in the mid-1990s. It then devotes special attention to 
an articulation of this history, prevalent among critics of contemporary 
marriage equality advocacy, emphasizing the relationship between nonmarital 
recognition in the 1980s and early 1990s and ideological resistance to marriage. 
This reading of the movement's history tends to equate work outside marriage 
with work against marriage. 
Part III constitutes the heart of the Article, furnishing a case study of 
California-based work on nonmarital relationship recognition, and domestic 
partnership in particular, from the early 1980s through the late 1990s. I 0 
8. See Christopher L. Tomlins, Expanding Boundaries: A Century of Legal History, in A 
CENTURY OF AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 78, 89 (James M. Banner Jr. ed., 2010) ("[H]istory's 
promise for law ... lies in bringing that better-understood legal past into an improved conjunction with 
law's present."). 
9. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship and the 
Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 47 (2012); Ariela R Dubler, Wifely 
Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 CouJM. L. REV. 957,961 (2000). 
I 0. Scott Cwnmings and I constructed an account of California marriage equality advocacy 
between 1999 and 2008. See Scott L. Cwnmings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage 
Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010). This Article undertakes similar work, though with different 
normative aims, for the era between 1980 and 1999. The case study employs a social movement lens. 
For scholarship in a similar vein, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
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Through archival sources-including task force reports, local ordinances, 
election materials, municipal studies, meeting minutes, public testimony, state 
legislation, employer policies, insurance determinations, judicial decisions, 
legal briefs, advocates' statements, and media coverage-this Part provides a 
historical account that reveals the centrality of marriage in earlier LGBT 
advocacy. 11 A close analysis of early local activism-missing in most accounts 
of LGBT rights work12 -produces a more accurate understanding of the 
trajectory of nonmarital recognition and its relationship to marriage and, at the 
same time, fills a substantial gap in the literature by providing a genealogy of 
domestic partnership. 
By exposing both the power of marriage over social movements and the 
power of movements to shape marriage, this Article's case study has 
implications for several conversations. It speaks to the place of marriage 
advocacy in the LGBT movement, the relationship between law and social 
change, and the history of marriage itself. Accordingly, Parts IV and V analyze 
the California case study's implications for extant scholarly debates, exploring 
first the case against marriage and then the case for it. Part IV shows that the 
case study challenges the historical assumptions underlying critiques of 
contemporary marriage equality work. By uncovering marriage's powerful 
regulatory pull on nonmarital advocacy, it complicates normative and 
prescriptive claims pushing away from marriage in current LGBT organizing. 
Part V shows that in mining the space outside marriage, LGBT advocates in the 
1980s and 1990s both constructed same-sex relationships as marriage-like and 
contributed to emerging marital norms capable of accommodating same-sex 
couples. By doing so, advocates built the foundation for today's claims to 
marriage, as contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence, including the 
recent Windsor decision, demonstrates. While this Article does not directly 
engage the implications of the case study for debates on law and social change, 
the Conclusion briefly points to questions raised for those debates. 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2065-66 
(2002); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 545, 570 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1323, 1329 (2006). 
11. In a few instances, interviews were necessary to supplement relevant archival sources. 
12. Work by David Chambers and Barbara Cox represent important exceptions. Both 
Chambers and Cox analyzed local efforts to support nonrnarital same-sex relationships. See David L. 
Chambers, Tales of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships in San 
Francisco and New York, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 181, 182-99 (1992); Barbara J. Cox, Alternative 
Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation, and Collective 
Bargaining, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 33-39 (1986). 
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I. 
SETTING THE STAGE: DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS, LEGAL RESPONSES, AND 
MOBILIZATIONS AROUND MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND SEXUALITY 
LGBT advocacy on nonmarital recognition did not write on a blank slate. 
To understand the context in which the 1980s campaign for domestic 
partnership in California emerged, this Part situates us in an earlier time, covers 
developments that are national in scope, and includes mobilizations beyond the 
LGBT movement. Shifting demographic patterns, corresponding legal 
developments, and powerful mobilizations reshaped norms around family and 
sexuality over the second half of the twentieth century. Profound changes in 
intimate relationships challenged tradition and fueled social movements on the 
left, but were eventually met with a powerful rejoinder that sought to restore 
traditional forms of family and sexuality. Rather than provide a detailed 
account of these developments, the following discussion merely attempts to 
furnish the necessary context for the domestic partnership work at the heart of 
this Article. It allows us to see both the opportunities that LGBT advocates 
enjoyed and the constraints that they, like others on the left, faced. Clearly, the 
relationship between domestic partnership advocacy and the broader 
developments described below would benefit from further excavation. 
The modem LGBT movement is commonly traced to the close of the 
l 960s-a decade that witnessed powerful challenges to authority by 
movements on the left organized around race, gender, sexual expression, 
antiwar politics, and economic justice. More specifically, increased 
mobilization around gender equality and sexual liberty both seized on and 
furthered dramatic changes in Americans' intimate lives. Advances in the 
pharmaceutical industry, namely the commercialization of the birth control pill 
in the early 1960s, contributed to some of these developments. 13 Access to oral 
contraceptives provided vast numbers of women greater control over 
reproduction, which translated into greater freedom in both their sexual lives 
and their work lives. 14 After leaders from Planned Parenthood joined medical 
authorities to challenge laws prohibiting contraception, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1965 struck down such a law as applied to married couples15 --effectively 
bestowing on married couples a right to have nonprocreative sex. And in 1972, 
the Court extended these privacy protections to unmarried individuals in ways 
that challenged marriage as a marker of state-sanctioned sexual morality. 16 As 
13. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 249 (2005). 
14. See id; NANCY F. Corr, PUBLIC Vows 202 (2000). 
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
16. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see COIT, supra note 14, at 199; Melissa 
Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1298 (2009); see also Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on 
Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REY. 1313, 1325 (1997). West, however, argued 
that by deriving "individual sexual liberty" from rights rooted in "familial authority and autonomy," 
the Court "obscured what would otherwise be meritorious implications of the only true principle 
2014] BEFORE MARRIAGE 95 
nonmarital sex became more common and less stigmatized, the number of 
unmarried, cohabiting, different-sex couples rose dramatically. 17 
The modern LGBT movement emerged against this backdrop of 
increasing sexual freedom in heterosexual life. Most accounts trace the modem 
movement to the 1969 Stonewall Riots, even though the pre-Stonewall 
movement experienced internal radical challenges in the 1960s that laid the 
groundwork for its post-Stonewall counterpart. 18 After Stonewall, the radical 
politics of gay liberation became a widespread animating principle of LGBT 
mobilization as lesbians and gay men found common cause with other New 
Left movements. 19 
The Gay Liberation Front ("GLF"), which was founded in Stonewall' s 
wake, argued in its 1971 Manifesto against traditional notions of gender and 
sexuality rooted in the marital family: "The oppression of gay people starts in 
the most basic unit of society, the family[,] consisting of the man in charge, a 
slave as his wife, and their children on whom they force themselves as the ideal 
models. The very form of the family works against homosexuality."20 
Accordingly, GLF activist Ralph Hall declared that instead of embracing 
marriage, lesbians and gay men should "attack the marriage system."21 Lesbian 
feminists also articulated radical critiques of marriage and the heterosexual 
family. 22 The 1970 Radicalesbians statement, The Woman-Identified Woman, 
argued that marriage, and heterosexuality more generally, constituted a 
relationship that defined women through their subordination. 23 
behind Griswold and Eisenstadt-the principle that married and single people have a constitutionally 
protected right to engage in affectionate non-reproductive sex." West, supra at 1325. For another 
perspective casting doubt on the progressive nature of these decisions, see MARC STEIN, SEXUAL 
INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOW TO ROE 48-49 (2010). For an additional 
critical examination of the "right to sex" reading of these cases, see David B. Cruz, "The Sexual 
Freedom Cases"?: Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 299 (2000). 
17. See CYNTinA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 93-97 
(2010). 
18. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 158-75 (1983). While 
Stonewall is often credited with sparking the movement, lesbian and gay mobilization emerged after 
World War II, with the 1950s formation of the Mattachine Society and Daughters ofBilitis. 
19. On Stonewall, see id. at 231-32; see also LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT 
GAY REVOLUTION 107--08 (2012); Elizabeth A. Armstrong & Suzanna M. Crage, Movements and 
Memory: The Making of the Stonewall Myth, 71 AM. Soc. REV. 724, 744 (2006). On the transition 
from pre- to post-Stonewall legal organizing, see Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1558-89 (1993). 
20. GAY LIBERATION FRONT, MANIFESTO 1 (1971, rev. 1978), available at http://www 
.fordham.edu/halsalUpwh/glf-london.asp. 
21. Ralph Hall, The Church, State and Homosexuality: A Radical Analysis, GA y POWER, no. 
14, 1970. 
22. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 19 (2008). 
23. See RADICALESBIANS, THE WOMAN-IDENTIFIED WOMAN, reprinted in GAY FLAMES 
PAMPHLET No. 2 (1970) ("In exchange for our psychic servicing and for performing society's non-
profit-making functions, the man confers on us just one thing: the slave status which makes us 
legitimate in the eyes tthe society in which we live."). 
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Yet some same-sex couples began to challenge their exclusion from 
marriage in a series of lawsuits in the early l 970s24-before the LGBT 
movement had a robust public interest law infrastructure.25 Jack Baker and 
Michael McConnell, a Minnesota same-sex couple, pushed their marriage 
lawsuit to the U.S. Supreme Court.26 The high court of Minnesota had rejected 
their claim, reasoning that "[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and 
woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a 
family, is as old as the book of Genesis. "27 In a one-line order in 1972, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the couple's appeal "for want of a substantial federal 
question. "28 
Although these marriage lawsuits traditionally have been understood as 
orthogonal to gay liberation,29 mobilization around marriage in some ways 
grew out of post-Stonewall activism. As William Eskridge and Darren Spedale 
have recounted, in 1970 the Reverend Troy Perry married same-sex couples in 
religious ceremonies in Los Angeles.30 And in 1972 the National Coalition of 
Gay Organizations protested laws "restrict[ing] the sex or number of persons" 
24. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 
1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). William Eskridge has devoted substantial attention to same-sex 
couples' claims to marriage throughout the second half of the twentieth century, including the 
marriage lawsuits in the 1970s. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE 6-9 (2002) 
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, 
GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 16-I 7 (2006); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE 
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 44-49, 54-57 
(1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]. Jane Schacter has also noted 
that "[w]hile history will record 1993 as the key start date ... it was, in fact, only a few years after the 
Stonewall uprising ... that the first marriage-equality lawsuits were launched." Jane S. Schacter, 
Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2013) (reviewing MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALT AR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE (2013)); see also Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage 
Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1153, 1212-13 (2009) [hereinafter Schacter, 
Courts and the Politics of Backlash]. 
25. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 1248. Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund fonned in 1973. History, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://wwwJambdalegal.org/about-us/history (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013). Other leading LGBT legal organizations sprung up throughout the late 1970s 
and 1980s. 
26. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). For an insightful recounting, see Mary Anne 
Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REY. 1758, 1761--64 (2005). 
27. SeeBakerv. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186(Minn.1971). 
28. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. 
29. As historian George Chauncey explains: 
From the earliest days of gay liberation, some activists demanded the right to marry. This 
may surprise some, who imagine that gay liberationists were united in denouncing marriage 
as a discredited patriarchal institution. But the messy complexity as well as the fervent 
politicization of the gay liberation years is part of what made them so generative and 
influential. 
GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY 
EQUALITY 89 (2004). 
30. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 24, at 16. 
2014) BEFORE MARRIAGE 97 
allowed to marry.31 Moreover, in the communities where marriage lawsuits 
emerged, many understood them as consistent with both radical gay politics 
and critiques of marriage.32 In fact, Baker and McConnell suggested that their 
lawsuit might tum marriage "upside down."33 Given the highly gendered 
concept of marriage under attack by feminists at the time, claims to marriage by 
same-sex couples posed a powerful challenge to marriage's sex-differentiated 
content.34 
Some lawmakers responded to the threat of same-sex marriage by 
explicitly codifying marriage's different-sex requirement. In California, same-
sex couples sought marriage licenses from county clerks based on a 1971 
statutory change deleting the marriage law's sex-specific language. These 
attempts prompted a 1977 statutory revision clarifying that "[m]arriage is a 
personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman."35 
Like LGBT activists, feminists also took different approaches toward 
marriage and its role in mobilization. The Redstockings, a radical feminist 
group formed the same year as the Stonewall Riots, claimed that marriage 
made women "domestic servants" and "breeders."36 Yet while radical activists 
lodged forceful critiques of marriage, other second-wave feminists connected 
more equal relationships between women and men in marriage, family, and 
work to sex equality more generally.37 Demographic and economic shifts had 
contributed to changes in the relationships between women and men in 
marriage. By the 1970s, the majority of newly employed women were 
31. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 24, at 54 ( quoting demands 
by the National Coalition of Gay Organizations (State Demand Number 8) in February 1972). 
32. See Michael Boucai, When Gay Marriage Was Radical, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 
2013, 4: 17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-boucai/when-gay-marriage-was-radical_ b _ 
3636437.html. 
33. See id. 
34. See id.; see also Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 721, 771-72 (2012). 
35. Cal. Civ. Code§ 4100 (West 1977) (repealed in 1993 to move definition of marriages to 
Family Code Section 300). 
36. See REDSTOCKINGS, REDSTOCKINGS MANIFESTO (1969), available at http://www 
.redstockings.org/index.php?option=com _ content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=59; see also Rebecca 
M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 J.L. & Soc. lNQ. 941, 
975 (1995). 
37. See COTT, supra note 14, at 204--05; POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 19. These reformers, 
including prominent African American feminists, drew on the civil rights movement's struggle, both 
legally and culturally, to frame sex discrimination. See SERENA MA YER!, REASONING FROM RACE 3, 
22-24 (2011); Siegel supra note 10, at 1376. The civil rights movement, of course, had also engaged 
marriage. The California Supreme Court had ruled its state's interracial marriage ban unconstitutional 
in I 948. See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). Legislatures in other states had repealed their 
restrictions. See RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE & 
ROMANCE 84 (2001). But it was not until 1967 that lawyers achieved a nationwide victory with the 
Supreme Court's Loving v. Virginia decision. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). As Rachel Moran has explained, 
"Loving capitalized not just on changing ideology about race but also on shifting mores about sexual 
and marital freedom." Rachel F. Moran, Love with a Proper Stranger: What Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
Can Tell Us About the Meaning of Race, Sex, and Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1663, 1678 (2004). 
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married, 38 and two-earner marriages became increasingly common. 39 Yet 
women continued to carry the burden of household and parenting 
responsibilities.40 In 1970, the National Organization of Women ("NOW") 
organized a forty-city strike in which activists demanded ratification of the 
federal Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), abortion rights, and free childcare 
centers, thus connecting gender equality to both reproductive rights and the 
ability to participate equally in the labor force.41 
Feminist advocates enjoyed considerable success at the start of the 
1970s,42 but they were eventually met with intense opposition that formed 
around the battle over the ERA. As Reva Siegel's work shows, this powerful 
conservative countermobilization influenced how far activism on the left would 
reach into the family. ERA opponents in the l 970s, most notably Phyllis 
Schlafly's STOP ERA campaign, argued that the ERA threatened the family by 
upending traditional gender roles.43 The proposed amendment, Schlafly 
insisted, was "anti-family" and would harm women by devaluing their 
important caregiver role.44 Countering feminists' centering of working women, 
Schlafly focused on women as "wives and mothers."45 
Anti-ERA forces not only framed the Amendment as a threat to women's 
roles in the family, but also linked the ERA to same-sex marriage and abortion 
in ways that mobilized social conservatives to oppose all three as related 
evils.46 For their part, many feminists responded by denying these connections. 
At the 1977 International Women's Day conference in Houston, ERA 
advocates adopted a plank urging ratification but including a declaration that 
the "ERA will NOT have any impact on abortion laws.',47 And they forcefully 
disclaimed any connection between the ERA and same-sex marriage even as 
38. See COONTZ, supra note 13, at 259. 
39. See id at 262. 
40. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANN MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT 2-3 (1989). 
41. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 13 75. 
42. See id. at 1377-79. 
43. See id. at 1391-92. 
44. See id. These activists found a voice inside the federal government. William Rehnquist, 
then a lawyer in the Justice Department, saw in ERA proponents a "dislike and distaste for the 
traditional difference between men and women in the family unit." See id at 1379 (quoting 
Memorandum from William Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, to Leonard Garment, Special 
Counsel to the President (1970)). As conservative activists increasingly mobilized around the family, 
the Nixon administration shifted toward positions opposing and cutting back on feminist advances. See 
id at 1388--89. In 1971, Nixon vetoed legislation that would have created a national day care network. 
Leo P. Ribuffo, Family Policy Past as Prologue: Jimmy Carter, the White House Conference on 
Families, and the Mobilization of the New Christian Right, 23 REV. POL'YREs. 311,318 (2006). 
45. Siegel, supra note 10, at 1391. 
46. See id at 1390-93. 
41. See NAT'L COMM'N ON 1HE OBSERVANCE OF INT'L WOMEN'S YEAR, THE SPIRIT OF 
HOUSTON: THE FIRST NATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE, AN OFFICIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 
THE CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE OF 1HE UNITED ST A TES 51 ( 1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT]; see also Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical 
Dynamics of Chonge, 92 CAUF. L. REv. 755, 792 (2004). 
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they adopted another plank supporting legislation to eliminate discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.48 ERA advocates argued that the "ERA will NOT 
require the States to permit homosexual marriage .... [It] has nothing to do 
with sexual behavior or with relationships between people of the same sex.',49 
While Schlafly led a well-attended and highly publicized counterrally 
across town, 50 some of her followers served as delegates at the International 
Women's Conference. They produced a minority report declaring "that the 
definition of a family should never be extended to in any way include 
homosexuals or biologically unrelated, unmarried couples or otherwise accord 
to them the dignity which properly belongs to husbands and wives."51 For 
social-conservative activists, lesbian and gay rights constituted part of a 
broader attack on the primacy of the marital family in a time when divorce, 
nonmarital cohabitation, and nonmarital parenting were becoming more 
common and acceptable. After California initiated no-fault divorce in 1969,52 
the no-fault regime spread across the country in the 1970s, contributing to a 
view of marriage rooted in romantic affiliation and personal fulfillment. 53 
48. See OFFICIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 47, at 51, 89. 
49. Id. at 51. In 1969 and 1970, NOW's leadership had opposed lesbian rights as part of the 
organization's agenda, but the organization became more receptive in the early 1970s under pressure 
from lesbian activists. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 19. Lesbian feminists challenged the 
homophobia of some feminist organizations both through protest and by forming their own 
organizations. See HIRSHMAN, supra note 19, at 113; Nan D. Hunter, Contextualizing the Sexuality 
Debates: A Chronology 1966-2005, in SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITTCAL CULTURE 15, 
18 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 2006). 
50. See Judy Klemesrud, Equal Rights Plan and Abortion Are Opposed by 15,000 at Rally, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1977, at 32. 
51. See OFFICIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 47, at 271 (1978). 1n linking sex 
equality to same-sex marriage in her writings, Schlafly acknowledged changes to marriage that made it 
more conducive to same-sex couples. Because procreative, heterosexual sex no longer enjoyed a 
"close relationship" with "the institution of legal marriage as it is now permitted," Schlafly argued, the 
state could not justify the exclusion of same-sex couples in a post-ERA world. Phyllis Schlafly, ERA 
and Homosexual "Marriages," 8 PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP. 2 § 2 (Sept. 1974). Moreover, Schlafly 
claimed, "the belief that two persons having the same primary sexual characteristics cannot benefit 
from many of the emotional, social and legal consequences of the legal status of marriage is factually 
untrue." Id. Even as Schlafly believed that "the expansion of marriage to encompass homosexual 
couples would alter the nature of a fundamental institution as traditionally conceived," her reasoning 
about the ERA and same-sex marriage reflected shifts in the meaning of marriage itself. Schlafly 
suggested that even if the courts ultimately recognized a "quasi-marital" status for same-sex couples 
by extending to them some of the legal benefits of marriage, such a status would maintain the "stigma 
of deviance." Id. Courts, she feared, would reject that stigma if the ERA were passed. See id. 
52. See COTT, supra note 14, at 205. Before the twentieth century, separations allowed spouses 
to leave marriages. Formal divorce rates began to rise throughout the twentieth century. See HENDRIK 
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 277 (2000). On divorce before the no-fault 
regime, see Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000). 
53. See Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 848, 852 (2004); see also ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 3 (2007) 
("That I can leave a marriage, relatively costlessly, directly implies that the ongoing value of the 
marriage-is this still a good deal for me?-is always a live question, always on the table, always 
something I can, and should, negotiate, and reevaluate, again and again, with my spouse or without."); 
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Around the same time, courts began to enforce prenuptial agreements, 54 which 
signaled both the increasing acceptance of divorce and the emergence of a more 
privatized, personal, contractual model of marriage.55 Meanwhile, rates of 
nonmarital cohabitation rose, 56 as did the number of births outside marriage. 57 
A series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s struck down 
distinctions based on "illegitimacy,"58 and in some ways weakened the legal 
relationship between marriage and parenting.59 State legislatures in turn 
revamped their family codes to remove distinctions between marital and 
nonmarital children. 60 
While the ERA initially appeared likely to succeed, Schlafly's campaign 
against it contributed to its defeat. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's equality 
jurisprudence came to embody significant sex-equality principles that the 
Amendment sought to advance.61 Women's rights advocates convinced the 
Court to remove many formal sex-based distinctions in marriage and the 
family. 62 Yet, as Siegel has shown, the resulting law of sex equality also 
included the limitations on reproduction and sexuality pressed by ERA 
opponents. 63 Constitutional equal protection doctrine did not remedy pregnancy 
discrimination, and abortion rights were protected under the rubric of privacy. 64 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Defaults, and 
Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1955 (2012) ("[N]o-fault divorce has changed the fundamental 
nature of maniage---not only undermining the aspiration that maniage is 'until death do we part' but 
also recasting maniage as a choice-based relationship."). 
54. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 
2d 381 (Fla. 1970). 
55. See Corr, supra note 14, at 209; see also Andrew J. Cherlin, The Growing Diversity of 
Two-Parent Families: Challenges for Family Law, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, 
POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TwENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 287, 289 (Marsha 
Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012); Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1251, 1257 (1998). 
56. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1128-29 (1981). 
57. See Corr, supra note 14, at 202-03. 
58. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Olona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); 
see also COONTZ, supra note 13, at 257. On the implications of illegitimacy in the LGBT context, see 
generally Nancy D. Polikoff, The New "11/egitimacy": Winning Backward in the Protection of the 
Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 721 (2012). 
59. Though, as Melissa Murray has shown, the decisions privileged maniage-like relationships 
in ways that may have propped up maniage. See Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 
supra note 5, at 393-99. 
60. Yet legal and social distinctions based on nonmarital birth continue. See Solange! 
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 345, 350-78 (2011). 
6 I. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1404-06. 
62. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); 
see also Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions 
Than Answers, 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1864 (2012). 
63. See Siegel, supra note IO, at 1407. 
64. SeeGeduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Moreover, gender equality in the 1970s did not extend to same-sex marriage, as 
the Supreme Court's dismissal of Baker made clear.65 
Of course, the defeat of the ERA did not settle the battle over legal and 
cultural norms governing family and sexuality. By the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the "traditional family values" movement had become a powerful 
political and cultural force.66 And rather than merely draw on fears of same-sex 
marriage to defeat feminist efforts, a growing segment of the movement 
focused specifically on rolling back gay rights advances.67 In 1977, Anita 
Bryant's "Save Our Children" campaign recorded a major victory with the 
repeal of a sexual orientation antidiscrimination ordinance in Dade County, 
Florida. 68 The day after the Dade County vote, Florida's governor signed a ban 
on lesbian and gay adoption.69 From there, Bryant fueled successful campaigns 
to repeal pro-gay ordinances in Saint Paul, Minnesota; Eugene, Oregon; and 
Wichita, Kansas.70 
As the 1980s began, the White House Conference on Families illustrated 
the fierce cultural and political battle being waged around the family. 71 "Pro-
family" conservatives feared that the planned conference would provide 
another occasion for activists on the left to push their agenda. 72 Yet rather than 
boycott the conference, many conservatives participated. 73 The conference 
report, issued in November 1980, evidenced the impact of Christian Right 
mobilization. The report declared that for those "concern[ ed] for traditional 
families," "[t]heir voices and votes were heard": a "traditional definition of a 
family was the only definition adopted."74 
Around the same time, former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who 
had become the leading candidate of the New Right,75 won the presidential 
65. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972) (dismissing for want ofa substantial federal question). 
66. See Matthew D. Lassiter, Inventing Family Values, in RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING 
AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 13 (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008). 
67. See id. at 23-24; see also Morton Kondracke, Anita Bryant Is Mad About Gays, NEW 
REPUBLIC, May 7, 1977, at 13. While Bryant did not attend Schlafly's 1977 Houston rally, she sent a 
videotaped message that was played at the event. See Klemesrud, supra note 50. 
68. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 40. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. at 42. 
71. In 1976, then-presidential candidate Jimmy Carter vowed to convene a White House 
Conference on the American Family, but the (relabeled) conference did not occur until 1980. See 
Ribuffo, supra note 44, at 311. 
72. Beverly LaHaye, who founded Concerned Women of America in 1979, worried that the 
conference was "geared up toward changing the definition of the family." Id. at 325. 
73. The three national meetings-in Baltimore, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles-included 
many conservative Christian delegates. See id. at 326. 
74. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES, LISTENING TO AMERICA'S FAMILIES: ACTION 
FOR THE 80's, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND FAMILIES OF THE NATION 11 (Nov. 
1980). 
75. See Ribuffo, supra note 44, at 330. 
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election.76 At that year's Republican National Convention, the party adopted a 
platfonn that, to Christian Right leaders' delight, vowed to "protect[] and 
defend[] the traditional American family" 77 and to appoint judges "who respect 
traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life."78 In 1984, 
when Reagan was reelected, the platform maintained this "pro-family" flavor. 79 
Marrying "traditional family values" with economic policy, New Right leaders 
continued to chip away at the welfare state and emphasized the family's private 
welfare function. 80 
Yet during the Reagan administration, LGBT advocates were confronted 
with a devastating health crisis that would require strong government 
intervention. In 1981, doctors began to see gay men with what would come to 
be known as HIV/AIDS.81 By 1983 the Centers for Disease Control reported 
deaths of "1,112 and Counting."82 The federal government did little in 
response,83 and Reagan did not give a speech on HIV/AIDS until it had claimed 
the lives of 20,000 Americans.84 
The HIV/ AIDS epidemic brought countless gay men out of the closet, 
united lesbians and gay men behind a common cause, and profoundly shaped 
the organization of the LGBT movement. 85 On one hand, the epidemic brought 
76. As Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel have shown, Republican leaders successfully united 
Protestant Evangelicals and Catholic abortion opponents under the party's "pro-family" banner. 
Republican strategists, along with Paul W eyrich, a Catholic conservative who co-founded the Heritage 
Foundation, lent their support to Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, founded in 1979. See Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 
YALE L.J. 2028, 2065----66 (20 I I); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 420-21 (2007). 
77. See Ribuffo, supra note 44, at 330. 
78. See Post & Siegel, supra note 76, at 420 n.221. 
79. See id. 
80. See Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, supra note 5, at 431. Scholars 
have also linked Republican policy in the 1980s, and particularly the attack on welfare, to a revival of 
the 1965 Moynihan Report's pathologization of Afiican American families. See Maxine Baca Zinn, 
Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties, 14 SIGNS 856 (1989). The controversial Moynihan Report, 
which civil rights and women's rights activists forcefully criticized, had attributed economic disparities 
between Afiican Americans and other groups to "family structure" that failed to map onto the 
patriarchal, marital form. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE 
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (Mar. 1965), available at www.dol.gov/oasam 
/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htrn. 
81. SeeHIRSHMAN,supranote 19, at 189. 
82. Id. 
83. Reagan held two meetings on AIDS in 1983, one of which was with representatives from 
the Moral Majority. See id. at 176. Religious conservatives blocked safer-sex efforts. See id. at 178. 
And some situated AIDS as a sign of, in Newt Gingrich's words, "the cost of violating traditional 
values." See URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY & LESBIAN 
LIBERATION 69 (1995). 
84. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 29, at 41. Even as the federal government did little to address 
HN/AIDS in the early years of the epidemic, support emerged at the state and local levels as both San 
Francisco and the state of California devoted funds to the emerging crisis. See HIRSHMAN, supra note 
19,at 185. 
85. SeeHIRSHMAN,supranote 19,atl83. 
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into question the politics of sexual liberation. As Ginny Apuzzo, the executive 
director of the National Gay Task Force put it, "AIDS robbed us of the sexual 
liberation piece, because everybody in the world said, 'That killed you. You're 
crazy to want to continue along those lines. "'86 Indeed, Eskridge has argued 
that the AIDS crisis supported the impulse toward long-term, committed 
relationships.87 On the other hand, some activists challenged the turn away 
from liberation and the tacit acceptance of sexual shame. They related HIV 
prevention to the celebration of same-sex sex, 88 even as the Supreme Court 
upheld its criminalization. While many states had repealed their antisodomy 
laws over the previous two decades,89 in 1986 the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick 
ruled that such laws were constitutional.90 Both Bowers and governmental 
inaction on HIV/AIDS elicited powerful protests from LGBT activists.91 
Sympathetic lawmakers and officials began to channel more funding and 
support to HIV/AIDS research and treatment.92 
As gay men were treated as legal strangers to their partners, the AIDS 
crisis made painfully clear the consequences of the lack of recognition for 
same-sex relationships.93 At the same time, the dramatic increase in the number 
of lesbian couples having children in the 1980s also brought a greater sense of 
urgency to legal issues surrounding family formation and recognition.94 
Reproductive technology in general presented new challenges to legal 
determinations of parentage,95 but lesbian mothers in particular faced barriers 
to securing parental rights. LGBT advocates pressed legal concepts, such as 
second-parent adoption, to achieve parental rights for non-biological lesbian 
co-parents. 96 
86. See VAID, supra note 83, at 68. 
87. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 24, at 58. 
88. See VAID, supra note 83, at 85; see also MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH 
NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE Ennes OF QUEER LIFE 50-51 (1999). 
89. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced"' 
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 106 & n.8 (2000). In the mid-1970s, California's 
consenting adult law removed the state's criminal prohibition on same-sex sex. 1975 Cal. Stat. 131-36. 
90. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). On the ways in which antisodomy laws legitimated discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men in this era, see generally Leslie, supra note 89, 135-68. 
91. See HIRSHMAN, supra note 19, at 188; Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 941, 985-86 (2011). 
92. See HIRSHMAN, supra note 19, at 192, 204. 
93. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 29, at 96-102. 
94. See id. at 105-09; see also CARLOS A. BALL, THE RIGHT To BE PARENTS: LGBT 
FAMILIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD 6-7 (2012); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child 
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother 
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 465-66 (1990). 
95. See Courtney G. Joslin, The Evolution of the American Family, 36 HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2009). 
Without legislation addressing these developments, courts struggled to develop rules for families 
formed through reproductive technology. While the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1986 famously 
refused to enforce surrogacy agreements as against public policy, California courts eventually upheld 
such agreements and made intent, rather than biology, central to determinations of parentage. Compare 
In re Baby M. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), with Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993). 
96. See Polikoff, supra note 94, at 466-67; see also CHAUNCEY, supra note 29, at 109-10. 
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It is with this historical backdrop in mind that I turn to LGBT advocacy on 
relationship recognition in the 1980s and 1990s. As this brief exploration 
makes clear, laws regulating family and sexuality grew increasingly conducive 
to LGBT life because of changing norms, demographics, and legal reforms 
relating to both marital and nonmarital heterosexual relationships.97 LGBT 
advocates leveraged those changes as best they could to advance their cause. At 
the same time, advocates were limited by the same countermobilizations that 
pushed back against feminism, sexual liberty, and reproductive rights. And 
soon after the LGBT movement rolled into the 1980s, it faced a health crisis 
that required a swift and powerful response. How exactly LGBT advocacy on 
nonmarital recognition fits within this broader trajectory is in many ways at the 
core of this Article. 
II. 
THE LGBT MOVEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE TURN Tow ARD MARRIAGE 
The standard account of marriage's trajectory in LGBT legal advocacy 
traces today's marriage claims to the mid-1990s, specifically to shifts, both 
inside and outside the movement, related to the Baehr litigation in Hawaii. 
Before Baehr, some advocates declined to pursue marriage for strategic and 
pragmatic reasons. Others refused to pursue marriage because of ideological 
objections. Therefore, LGBT leaders in the 1980s and early 1990s debated 
whether the movement should view marriage as a long-term goal. Even as they 
did, they pursued rights and recognition for nonmarital relationships, including 
through domestic partnership. Eventually, the impact of Baehr largely cut off 
the intra-movement marriage debate as advocates were forced to devote 
attention and resources to the marriage issue. 
This Part first outlines this standard account of marriage in the LGBT 
movement. It then discusses how some scholars, particularly prominent critics 
of contemporary marriage equality advocacy, articulate an influential reading 
of this history that emphasizes ideological, rather than pragmatic, objections to 
marriage in LGBT advocacy before Baehr. Accordingly, they generally 
conceptualize the work outside marriage in the 1980s and early 1990s as 
contributing to the case against marriage. 
A. The Path Toward Marriage 
While social movements on both the left and right directly engaged 
marriage over the second half of the twentieth century,98 the organized LGBT 
movement did not officially seek marriage rights until the 1990s. Instead, 
advocates pursued nonmarital recognition, including domestic partnership, 
97. See Cherlin, supra note 55, at 298; cf Suz.anne B. Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in 
MARRIAGE AT TIIE CROSSROADS, supra note 55, at 224, 237. 
98. See supra Part I. 
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throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.99 And during that time lawyers at the 
leading LGBT legal organizations warned against litigation challenging 
marriage laws. 100 
While some movement leaders resisted marriage for pragmatic reasons, 
others opposed marriage on ideological grounds. 101 Accordingly, advocates 
vigorously debated the normative position of marriage on the LGBT agenda. 
The seminal 1989 exchange between Paula Ettelbrick, then the legal director of 
Lambda Legal, and Tom Stoddard, the organization's executive director, 
framed the issue. 102 Stoddard argued that the movement should pursue access to 
marriage as a route to true equality. 103 Ettelbrick, on the other hand, rejected 
marriage as a goal. She claimed that the turn to marriage would focus the 
movement on assimilationist objectives, hitch the cause to an institution 
steeped in gender hierarchy, and marginalize vulnerable LGBT families. 104 
Ettelbrick urged advocates to continue down the path of domestic partnership 
as an alternative to marriage. 105 
The intra-movement debate over marriage's normative significance 
continued even as same-sex couples challenged Hawaii's marriage law in the 
early 1990s, 106 explicitly against the advice of movement leaders. 107 Lawyers 
from Lambda Legal and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") had 
urged the plaintiffs to resist the temptation to litigate. Only when the case 
99. Eskridge and Darren Speciale explain that while "gay-radicals supported or acquiesced in 
[domestic partnerships] because they represented a novel, nonmarriage family form," "most gay-
liberals supported [them] because they reduced the formal inequality of lesbian and gay couples." 
ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 24, at 18. 
100. On this point, see id at 15--18; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 5; 
David L. Chambers, Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership, in CREATING 
CHANGE 271, 282-89 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2000); Carlos A. Ball, Symposium: Updating the 
LGBT Intracommunity Debate over Same-Sex Marriage: Introduction, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 
495--97 (2009); William N. Eskridge Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1489 
(1993); Arthur S. Leonard, Going/or the Brass Ring: The Case/or Same-Sex Marriage, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 572, 579 (1997) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 
24.); Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CH!.-KENT L. REV. 379,394 (2009). 
IO I. See CARLOS A BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM 164 (20 I 0) ("There were 
two main reasons for the unwillingness to pursue same-sex marriage . . . . The first reason was 
pragmatic .... A second objection ... was ideological rather than pragmatic."); see also Eskridge, 
supra note 53, at 1936 ("In the early 1980s, gay marriage was not politically viable, but gay rights 
leaders devised another strategy to secure legal recognition of their relationships, namely, domestic-
partnership ordinances adopted at the municipal level, where lesbian and gay political power was 
greatest."). 
102. Eskridge and Speciale link this debate to Denmark's 1989 Registered Partnership Act, 
which gave same-sex couples most of the rights of marriage. "American gay rights leaders," they 
explain, "started to rethink their priorities." ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 24, at 18. 
103. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, 
Fall 1989, at 9. 
104. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 
1989, at 14. 
105. See id. 
106. See Hunter, supra note 49, at 11-12. 
107. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 1250. 
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moved up the appellate chain did Lambda Legal assume a formal role by filing 
an amicus brief. 108 
The Hawaii Supreme Court's surprising 1993 Baehr decision is 
considered the opening shot in the modem battle for same-sex marriage. 109 
Finding that the marriage law constituted a sex-based classification, the court 
remanded the case with instructions to apply the most rigorous standard of state 
constitutional review. 110 The ruling transformed marriage into an increasingly 
realistic goal. Lambda Legal established its Marriage Project the following 
year.Ill 
Outside the LGBT movement, Baehr activated a powerful 
countermobilization that sought to prevent same-sex couples from accessing 
marriage. 112 In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act. 113 The 
following year, the Hawaii legislature voted to put on the November 1998 
ballot a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to limit marriage 
to different-sex couples. At the same time, the legislature enacted a 
"[r]eciprocal [b]eneficiary" regime extending limited rights and benefits to 
same-sex couples and other pairs, such as blood relatives, legally excluded 
from marriage. 114 Hawaii voters ultimately passed the constitutional 
amendment. 115 While the trial court on remand had found the marriage law 
unconstitutional, 116 the state supreme court vacated that ruling in light of the 
. . d 111 mtervenmg amen ment. 
Baehr looms large in leading accounts of the LGBT movement's path to 
marriage. The post-Baehr landscape of the mid-1990s crystallized the 
distinction between the movement's pro- and anti-marriage paths. As Carlos 
Ball explains: 
108. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 55 (2013). After the Hawaii Supreme Court's 
decision, Lambda Legal, and specifically Evan Wolfson, became co-counsel in the case. See ELLEN 
ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND 
GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 179 (2005). Wolfson, an early marriage proponent, had informally assisted 
in the earlier phase of the litigation. 
109. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 100, at 380. The couples sought marriage licenses in 
December 1990 and filed suit in May 1991. The trial court ruled in the state's favor in October 1991. 
See Michael D. Sant' Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the Long Road to Marriage 
Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 705, 705-10 (201 I). A same-sex couple in Washington, D.C., also 
challenged their exclusion from marriage in the early 1990s. Eskridge served as counsel. See Leonard, 
supra note 100, at 575. A fractured appellate court ultimately rejected the claim. Dean v. District of 
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,309 (D.C. 1995). 
110. Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
111. See KLARMAN, supra note l 08, at 176. 
112. See Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash, supra note 24, at 1183--85. 
113. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) and 
I U.S.C. § 7). 
I 14. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 572C (LexisNexis 2005). 
I 15. HAW. CONST. art. I.,§ 23. 
116. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
I 17. Baehrv. Miike, 994P.2d566(Haw. 1999). 
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[B]y the mid-1990s, the gay rights movement reached a paradigmatic 
"fork in the road" moment. On one side of the fork was the possibility 
of expanding the institution of marriage by including same-sex couples 
within its ambit. On the other side was the possibility of reducing the 
importance of marriage by seeking alternative forms of legal 
recognition for a wide variety of familial arrangements, including 
those of LGBT people. 118 
107 
Under this view, the new path toward marriage that Baehr opened stood in 
contrast, at least in part, to work on nonmarital recognition that had been 
pushing against marriage. 
As the 1990s wore on, marriage gained traction in the LGBT movement, 
and activists who opposed marriage on ideological grounds found the 
environment increasingly inhospitable. As Jane Schacter explains, Baehr cast 
marriage as a "showdown issue" between pro- and anti-gay forces such that 
"the option to continue critiquing marriage became distinctly unpalatable to 
pro-equality marriage skeptics within the LGBT movement."119 Indeed, at the 
time, Nancy Polikoff, a prominent marriage critic, LGBT advocate, and 
scholar, worried that the Hawaii marriage fight was stifling ideological 
arguments against marriage. 120 Seeking to articulate common ground and resist 
the tum toward marriage, she argued that"[ o ]ne thing our community can stand 
for ... is a principle that expands the definition of family and does not place a 
monogamous relationship with one partner at the pinnacle of all human 
relationships."121 She hoped that Baehr would "not wipe out the arguments for 
working towards different goals and towards a different vision of lesbian and 
l.b . ,,122 gay 1 erat10n. 
118. Ball, supra note 100, at 493; cf Schacter, supra note 100, at 395 ("[A)t an early point, 
LGBT political forces might have chosen to set their sights on some version of domestic partnership, 
expand it to the state and/or federal level, and put its energies into deciding who should be protected 
(same-sex couples only or opposite sex couples as well? Romantically-attached couples only or other 
relationships in need of legal protection?). This course might have been charted before or after 
Baehr."). 
119. Schacter, supra note 100, at 394; see also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Marriage ls Not the 
Answer, 4 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 34, 35 (1997) ("Those who 'oppose' the current strategy have 
been marginalized as a few radical lesbian-feminist-leftists-and we know how far those labels get 
you in the current political climate."). 
120. As Evan Wolfson framed it, "[t]he question at this point ... is not, 'Should we fight for 
our freedom to marry?' but instead, 'How can we best reach out to the non-gay public ... to support 
our equality in marriage ... ?"' Evan Wolfson, How To Win the Freedom To Marry, 4 HARV. GAY & 
LESBIAN REV. 29, 30 (1997). Andrew Sullivan, who consistently made a more conservative case for 
same-sex marriage, played a prominent role in pro-marriage argumentation in the 1990s. When asked 
in 1997 about Polikoff's critique, Sullivan responded that opposition existed "in the early 80's or mid-
80's, but not now." Andrew Sullivan, Interview, 'We're Talking About the Right To Choose,' 4 HARV. 
GAY & LESBIAN REV. 25, 26 (1997). 
121. See David W. Dunlap, Some Gay Rights Advocates Question Effort to Defend Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1996, at Al2. 
122. Nancy D. Polikoff, Marriage as Choice? Since When?, 21 GAY COMM'Y NEWS 26 
(1996). 
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By the late 1990s, however, the organized movement began to 
affirmatively push for marriage and moved forward with carefully orchestrated 
litigation. Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders ("GLAD") participated in a 
marriage challenge in Vermont, resulting in civil unions that provided the state-
law rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. 123 In neighboring 
Massachusetts in 2003, GLAD lawyers secured full marriage rights under state 
law. 124 By this point, advocates increasingly framed civil unions and domestic 
partnerships as inadequate substitutes for marriage. 125 By the early 2000s, the 
movement for marriage equality was well underway, and the following decade 
would witness a series of battles-both in and out of court-over same-sex 
couples' right to marry. 126 
B. Emphasizing the Case Against Marriage 
The standard account described above devotes relatively scant attention to 
the content and meaning of domestic partnership advocacy before Baehr. 127 
Therefore, it does little to specify the substantive, as opposed to strategic, 
relationship between nonmarital advocacy and marriage. 128 
In contrast, a variation of this account emphasizes ideological marriage 
resistance in earlier LGBT advocacy and therefore stakes out a more 
oppositional relationship between marriage and nonmarital recognition. While 
acknowledging the intra-movement debate that occurred, this view nonetheless 
relates domestic partnership in the 1980s and early 1990s to a movement vision 
pushing away from, rather than toward, claims to marriage. Critics of 
contemporary marriage equality advocacy have most forcefully and extensively 
articulated this reading of the LGBT movement's trajectory. Yet elements of 
this view appear across a range of scholarly treatments. Indeed, Ball's 
summation of the post-Baehr moment, described above, suggests how this 
123. Bakerv. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 23 (1999). 
124. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The court clarified that 
only marriage would remedy the constitutional violation. See In re Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
125. See Douglas NeJairne, Framing In(Equa/ity) for Same-Sex Couples, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 184 (2013); cf Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went.from 
Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE291 (2013). 
126. See Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash,supra note 24, at 1187-93. 
127. For work on nonrnarital advocacy, see Chambers, supra note 12; Cox, supra note 12; 
William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian 
and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. & POL. 89, 93-94 (1991). 
128. Eskridge and Nan Hunter, however, explicitly relate movement advocates' push for 
nonmarital recognition to burgeoning claims to marriage in the 1990s. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY 
PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 12-15; ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 24, 
at 58-60; Eskridge, supra note 53, at 1936-37; Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A 
Feminist Inquiry, in SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 105, 106 (Lisa Duggan 
& Nan D. Hunter eds., 2006); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 
LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 23-25 (1991). 
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conceptualization of pre-Baehr nonmarital advocacy structures discussions of 
the LGBT movement and its relationship to marriage. 129 
Through this more radical lens, advocacy outside marriage in the 1980s 
grew out of the post-Stonewall marriage critique of the 1970s.130 As "advocates 
for lesbian and gay families" headed into the 1980s, "[t]he overarching goal 
was facilitating social, legal, and economic support for diverse family forms 
outside the patriarchal family; less marriage, not marriage, was consistent with 
that vision."131 Accordingly, advocates translated their ideological views into 
legal and political claims made outside the register of marriage. 132 As Kath 
Weston recounts, "during the 1980s . . . lesbians and gay men . . . began to 
speak widely of chosen families" and to seek "legal protections" for those 
families. 133 LBGT advocates worked, in Angela Harris's description, to "queer 
the family." 134 
Understood through the lens of marriage resistance, domestic partnership 
in the 1980s constituted an important step to destabilize marriage by creating an 
alternative available regardless of sexual orientation.135 According to Melissa 
Murray, who has powerfully critiqued the prioritization of marriage in the 
domains of both family recognition and sexual regulation, local domestic 
129. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
130. Nancy D. Polikoff, Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 
61 RUTGERS L. REV. 529, 530 (2009) (situating nonmarital advocacy as part of marriage resistance 
and explaining that in the post-Stonewall years LGBT activists argued that marriage "channeled 
everyone into only one approved relationship, ... regulated the lives of men and women along gender 
lines, and ... policed the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable sexual expression"); see also 
Shannon Gilreath, Montana Case Shows Split in Gay Rights Movement, JURIST- FORUM (Dec. 14, 
2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/shannon-gilreath-gay-liberation.php; Mary Ziegler, Defining the 
Parental Rights of Same-Sex Spouses, JURIST- FORUM (Jan. '14, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012 
/01/mary-ziegler-parental-rights.php. 
131. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 48; see also WARNER, supra note 88, at 132. 
132. See Chai R. Feldblum, Keep the Sex in Same-Sex Marriage, 4 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN 
REV. 23, 24 (1997) (explaining the "broad-based story" that before the mid-1990s "most of the gay 
leadership considered marriage irredeemably 'heterosexist' and incompatible with freedom from 
sexual and social oppression"). As Cain explains, the liberationist groups emerging from Stonewall 
"did not tum immediately to the courts, but rather turned out into the streets." Cain, supra note 19, at 
1582. 
13 3. Kath Wes ton, Families in Queer States: The Rule of Law and the Politics of Recognition, 
93 RADICAL HIST. REV. 122, 130 (2005); see also KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, 
GAYS, KINSHIP 107 (1991). 
134. Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of 
Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL. RTS. J. 1539, 1568 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Ettelbrick, supra note 119, at 35 ("Lesbians and gay men have long challenged normative 
definitions of the institution of the family. Through our success creating different kinds of families, we 
have shown that groups of people can constitute a family without being heterosexual, biologically 
related, married, or functioning under a male head-of-household."). 
135. See Leonard, supra note 100, at 580 ("Those who opposed same-sex marriage from 
within the lesbian and gay movement on theoretical grounds advocate( d] domestic partnership, a form 
ofnonmarital legal recognition .... ") (footnote omitted); see also Eskridge, supra note 100, at 1491 
("Our emphasis on families we choose fuels the gaylegal interest in domestic partnership . . . as a 
better way of protecting many of our relationships than same-sex marriage."). 
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partnership ordinances in the 1980s "were not intent on mimicking marriage" 
but instead were "consciously framed as distinct from-and less than-
marriage. "136 Similarly, Polikoff, who has articulated highly influential 
critiques of both marriage and contemporary LGBT advocacy, suggests that 
"[t]he early 1980s ... push for a status called 'domestic partnership' ... 
available to both same-sex and different-sex couples" made marriage "matter 
less."137 She claims that throughout that decade "[a]dvocates and employers 
alike did not distinguish between those who could not marry and those who 
chose not to marry," 138 such that recognition of unmarried different-sex couples 
and same-sex couples were "two sides of the same coin."139 
Those who emphasize the more destabilizing dimensions of nonmarital 
recognition point to the inclusion of non-intimate relationships to show that 
activists successfully resisted the marriage paradigm. Polikoff, for example, 
notes that the Los Angeles Task Force on Family Diversity recommended 
domestic partnership without a requirement of romantic affiliation 140: "The Los 
Angeles report urged government to define families to reflect the way people 
actually live. . . . It recommended flexible definitions of family, a ban on 
marital-status discrimination, and domestic partnership status for two people 
who lived together and shared the 'common necessities of life. "'141 
In sum, this emphasis on marriage resistance in earlier LGBT advocacy 
suggests that, to a significant degree, activism in the 1980s and early 1990s 
destabilized marriage. Ettelbrick, for instance, argued in the 1990s that 
movement advocates did "not challenge[] the underlying assumptions of family 
136. Murray, supra note 125, at 301; see also Ettelbrick, supra note 119, at 35 ("We have 
confronted and begun to change a marriage-centered family ideology, one that denied us basic 
economic and social benefits, such as health benefits and bereavement leave."). 
137. Polikoff, supra note 130, at 530,532; see also Julie Shapiro, Reflections on Complicity, 8 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 657,663 (2005). 
138. See Nancy D. Polikoff, "Two Parts of the Landscape of Family in America": 
Maintaining Both Spousal and Domestic Partner Employee Benefits for Both Same-Sex and Different-
Sex Couples, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 738 (2012). 
139. Polikoff, supra note 130, at 532. 
140. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 55. She also notes that ordinances in Madison, 
Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C., included "nonconjugal relationships." Id. at 51. 
141. See Polikoff, supra note 130, at 533 (footnote omitted). For Polikoff, movement litigation 
during the 1980s reflected the same impulse as domestic partnership work and contributed to 
"coalition advocacy on behalf of diverse family structures." See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 55. In 
New York, for example, lawyers convinced the state's highest court to adopt a functional, rather than 
formal, model of "family'' for purposes of the rent control law. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). This victory "came under the banner of support for diverse families." See 
Polikoff, supra note 130, at 553. Murray, however, notes that the Braschi court "used the normative 
concept of marriage to inform its understanding of family." See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1256 n.89 (2010); see also Melissa Murray, 
Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
357, 394 (2009). On this point, see Dubler, supra note 9, at 1020. For additional analysis of Braschi, 
see Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of 
Litigating/or Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1664-65. 
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just to build toward the holy grail of marriage."142 Instead, movement leaders' 
work had "been charged by [their] conviction that it is unjust, irrational, and 
injurious to privilege marital families over non-marital ones."143 Under this 
view, domestic partnership and other measures to support nonmarital families 
constituted significant achievements that resisted, rather than accepted, the 
privileging of marriage. 
Stressing marriage resistance in earlier nonmarital work situates Baehr as 
contributing to a dramatic normative-much more than strategic-shift in 
LGBT advocacy. 144 Under this view, when advocates pivoted toward marriage, 
they changed the meaning of domestic partnership itself. According to Lisa 
Duggan and Richard Kim, domestic partnership---once a goal for an LGBT 
movement "committed to household diversity"-transformed into a "second-
class substitute[] for marriage equality."145 For Murray, who ascribes less 
influence specifically to Baehr, the late-1990s shift from local to state-level 
advocacy for nonmarital relationship recognition contributed to this shift in 
domestic partnership's meaning. 146 
To a large extent, the emphasis on marriage resistance in earlier LGBT 
advocacy, most forcefully articulated by critics of contemporary marriage 
equality work, structures current scholarly debates over marriage and its role in 
LGBT rights. But as the case study in the next Part shows, this reading of the 
movement's past underestimates the centrality of marriage as an anchoring 
principle for domestic partnership in the 1980s and early 1990s and obscures 
the dialogical relationship between nonmarital recognition and marriage. As the 
next Part demonstrates, by looking closely at how domestic partnership 
emerged, succeeded, and gained meaning, we can appreciate the influence of 
marriage on nonmarital advocacy in the 1980s and 1990s as well as the impact 
of that work on marriage. 
Before moving on, it is important to note that even the more radical 
rendering of the movement's past includes many accurate claims about the 
movement's trajectory, including some of the strategic moves occurring in 
Baehr' s wake. But by overemphasizing the way in which movement advocates 
142. Ettelbrick, supra note 119, at 35. 
143. Id 
144. Polikoff has argued that "the increased prominence of the right to marry as a goal of our 
movement is attributable entirely to the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision." See Polikoff, supra 
note 122, at 26. Other scholars do not state the claim this strongly, and in more recent work Polikoff 
herself pairs Baehr with the rise of conservative gay thought in the early 1990s and the 
contemporaneous emergence of domestic partnership policies limited to same-sex couples. See 
POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 61, 83. Nonetheless, this constellation of related developments in the 
1990s "shift[ed] [the] framework of legal arguments concerning LGBT families." Id at 83. Polikoff 
also points to external political developments, including the spread of conservative family policy and 
rhetoric in the 1990s. See id at 63-70. 
145. Richard Kim & Lisa Duggan, Beyond Gay Marriage, THE NATION (June 29, 2005), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/beyond-gay-marriage?page=full. 
146. See Murray, supra note 125, at 296-97. 
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resisted and rejected marriage, this reading of the movement mistakes some of 
those strategic moves for normative shifts. Moreover, it fails to fully appreciate 
the constraints that confronted advocates who sought to challenge a system that 
privileged marriage. In doing so, it obscures the prominence of the more pro-
marriage positions that many advocates took, both for normative and strategic 
reasons, and overestimates the destabilizing impact of early nonmarital 
initiatives. Consequently, viewing earlier LGBT advocacy primarily through 
the lens of marriage resistance tends to situate more recent marriage advocacy 
as a new phenomenon that defied, rather than sprung from, earlier work. In 
reality, today's marriage claims in many ways grew out of, rather than 
contradicted, the earliest claims to nonmarital recognition. 
III. 
THE CALIFORNIA CASE STUDY: NONMARITAL RECOGNITION, MARRIAGE, AND 
SAME-SEX COUPLES 
The following case study looks closely at work on behalf of same-sex 
couples in the 1980s and 1990s in California. California constituted a 
significant front in the LGBT movement, and advocates there were incredibly 
successful as compared to those in other states. Indeed, the concept of domestic 
partnership traces its roots to California. Developments in the state influenced 
events across the country, as lawmakers attempted to replicate California's 
innovations. Of course, California continued to serve as a central site for LGBT 
activism into the twenty-first century. Recently, the Supreme Court's decision 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry resolved the battle over marriage by effectively 
restoring marriage equality to California.147 Now, same-sex couples in the most 
populous state possess the right to marry. 
This Part's case study traces advocacy across a range of institutional 
domains, at multiple levels of policymaking, and influenced by a number of 
relevant actors, to understand the role of marriage in LGBT organizing. It 
begins with local domestic partnership efforts in the early l 980s-well before 
marriage occupied an official position on the LGBT movement agenda-and 
ends with the achievement of domestic partnership on the state level in 1999, 
years after Baehr launched marriage to national prominence. 
The case study demonstrates that, because of both internal movement 
dynamics and external legal, political, and cultural constraints, marriage 
anchored nonmarital advocacy in the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout that time, 
advocates did not speak in one voice, nor did they occupy a position that was 
clearly pro- or anti-marriage. Different frames and arguments informed 
domestic partnership work. For example, the notion of domestic partnership as 
14 7. The Court held that the proponents of Proposition 8---Califomia' s constitutional ban on 
marriage for same-sex couples-lacked standing to appeal the district court's ruling invalidating the 
ban. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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a distributive mechanism, which emphasized equal access to benefits, 
dovetailed with a recognition frame, which stressed the status that domestic 
partnership conferred specifically on same-sex couples. Ultimately, the 
centrality of marriage influenced the resonance of each frame and the types of 
relationships domestic partnership would cover. 
Non-movement actors, who generally prioritized marriage, significantly 
shaped the legal and political context that simultaneously offered opportunities 
and imposed constraints on LGBT advocates. Employers, insurers, and local 
officials used marital norms to conceptualize and define the terms of 
nonmarital recognition. State-level actors, including judges and legislators, 
looked to marriage to justify maintaining legal distinctions between different-
sex and same-sex couples. And social-conservative activists located domestic 
partnership within a broader attack on marriage and the family. 
Accordingly, to achieve nonmarital recognition, advocates appealed to 
marriage's conventions, pointed to the unique exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage, and stressed same-sex couples' commonality with married 
couples. In building domestic partnership, they emphasized marital norms-
such as adult romantic affiliation, mutual emotional commitment, and 
economic interdependence-capable of including same-sex couples. By 
challenging marriage's primacy while arguing for recognition in terms defined 
by marital norms, advocates contested, accepted, and ultimately shaped the 
institution of marriage while simultaneously portraying same-sex relationships 
as marriage-like. 
Much of the activity covered in the case study occurred during the Reagan 
administration, when the New Right was particularly influential. Certainly the 
powerful conservative ideology shaping the national political scene had 
implications for the contest over nonmarital recognition. Yet much of the work 
relating to domestic partnership in the 1980s occurred at the local level and 
tended to arise either in progressive towns and cities or in large metropolises 
with strong Democratic leadership and sizable LGBT populations. Therefore, 
even as social-conservative activists limited some local advances, LGBT 
advocates enjoyed considerable room at the municipal level in California to 
push forward the cause. But at the state level, where the New Right exerted 
greater influence, advocates enjoyed less room for affirmative work. 
Overall, it is important to keep in mind the larger political and cultural 
backdrop against which LGBT work on nonmarital recognition operated while 
still appreciating that the influence of that backdrop varied geographically. Of 
course, even if conservative forces did not directly curtail LGBT work in 
specific cities, the influence of those forces may have shaped the claims and 
arguments of LGBT advocates and their allies in subtle ways. That is, the 
national shift to the right over the 1980s and into the 1990s may have limited 
the horizons of possible arguments by forces on the left, including LGBT 
advocates. 
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A. The Origins of Domestic Partnership-Marriage Equivalence and 
Sexual-Orientation Equality 
In its earliest iteration, domestic partnership harnessed sexual-orientation 
nondiscrimination principles to offer a pragmatic solution to the problem posed 
by same-sex couples' lack of access to marriage. Rather than purporting to 
unsettle marriage, domestic partnership advocates tended to emphasize a 
practical route for same-sex couples to obtain benefits. And from its inception, 
domestic partnership's terms were suggested by comparison to marriage. 
Domestic partnership advocacy sprang from municipalities' 
nondiscrimination policies. While Anita Bryant's "Save Our Children" 
campaign was rolling back gay rights ordinances in Florida, Minnesota, 
Oregon, and Kansas, 148 progressive cities in California adopted 
antidiscrimination provisions that provided a basis to seek rights for same-sex 
couples. Nonetheless, even in San Francisco, religious opposition to gay rights 
proved powerful. 
In 1978, San Francisco enacted a sexual orientation nondiscrimination 
ordinance that included employment, housing, and public accommodations. 149 
Berkeley passed a similar ordinance later that year. 150 Matt Coles, who would 
eventually head the ACLU's LGBT Project,151 was the primary drafter of both 
laws. 152 The following year, in response to Berkeley's ordinance, city employee 
and gay activist Tom Brougham urged the city to provide healthcare coverage 
to his same-sex partner. 153 Brougham argued it was unfair to use marriage as 
the sole criterion for benefits eligibility and suggested that the city create a 
"domestic partnership" designation to remedy the inequity. 154 
In San Francisco, Harry Britt, an openly gay city supervisor, picked up 
Brougham's proposal. 155 In 1981 and 1982, Britt worked with Coles to draft a 
domestic partnership ordinance; Brougham also participated in the San 
148. See supra Part I. 
149. S.F., CAL., ORD. No. 178-78 art. 33, § 3301-10 (1978); see also Les Ledbetter, Bill on 
Homosexual Rights Advances in San Francisco, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1978, at A2 l. 
150. Berkeley City Code §13.28.010-13.28.040 (1978); see also Berkeley Council Approves 
Strong Gay Rights Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1978, at B28. 
151. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note I 0, at 1254. 
152. Telephone Interview with Matt Coles (Apr. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Coles Interview]. 
153. See Leland Traiman, A Brief History of Domestic Partnerships, 15 GAY & LESBIAN REV. 
23, 23 (2008). From 1979 to 1981, Brougham and others had pressed----unsuccessfully-for domestic 
partner health insurance coverage at the University of California at Berkeley. See 1 KAREN 
MOULDING, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TilE LAW§ 5:50 n.l (Roberta Achtenberg orig. ed., 2010). 
Brougham belonged to, and at one point led, the East Bay Lesbian/Gay Democratic Club. See CITY 
AND CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO, HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, INVESTIGATION INTO DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIP, MARITAL STATUS, AND EXTENDED FAMILY POLICIES: FINDINGS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND APPENDICES 9 (Aug. 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter HRC 
INVESTIGATION]. 
154. SeeTraiman,supranote 153,at23. 
155. See Wallace Turner, Couple Law Asked/or San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1982, 
at 31. 
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Francisco effort. 156 The earliest draft defined domestic partners as "two 
individuals" who "reside together," "share the common necessaries of life," and 
"declare that they are each other's sole domestic partners."157 The language 
explicitly invoked the California common-law duty making spouses responsible 
for the "common necessaries of life."158 This language was particularly 
important to insurance carriers, who resisted adding domestic partnership 
coverage without assurances that this new relationship status would be 
characterized by a marriage-like level of commitment. 159 
The draft ordinance also included rights subject to municipal authority: 
hospital and jail visitation, sick and bereavement leave, and public housing 
eligibility. 160 In a separate section aimed at securing health coverage for city 
employees' domestic partners, the drafters provided that a "City employee who 
has enrolled a domestic partner may not enroll a different domestic partner until 
six months after notifying the Health Service System that the first domestic 
partner is no longer to be enrolled."161 This length of time deliberately tracked 
the time between an interlocutory and final decree of divorce in the marriage 
context. 162 
In submitting a subsequent, revised draft ordinance to the Board of 
Supervisors in October 1982, San Francisco's city attorneys expressed 
"uncertainty regarding its full scope and impact."163 Beyond city facilities, such 
as hospitals and jails, they were unsure about "the effect of domestic 
partnerships."164 Accordingly, questions would "have to be resolved on a case 
by case basis as claims that the domestic partner is entitled to the same status as 
the spouse are made."165 Despite these reservations, the Board of Supervisors 
adopted the ordinance, which defined domestic partners as "[t]wo individuals," 
a. "not related by blood," 
b. "[n]either is married, nor are they related by marriage," 
c. who "share the common necessaries oflife," 
d. "declare that they are each other's principal domestic partner," 
and 
156. Coles Interview, supra note 152. 
157. An Ordinance to Create a Record of Domestic Partnerships (Draft) (1982) ( on file with 
author) [hereinafter 1982 Draft]. 
158. Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 265 P.2d 183, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). 
159. Coles Interview, supra note 152. 
160. 1982 Draft, supra note 157, at 3. 
161. An Ordinance to Extend Coverage of Health Plans to Domestic Partners of City 
Employees (Draft) (1982) (on file with author). 
162. Coles Interview, supra note 152. Based on the same logic, Berkeley's ordinance used 
similar timing. See HRC INVESTIGATION, supra note 153, at 11. 
163. Memorandum from Burk E. Delventhal & Thomas J. Owen, Deputy City Attorneys, to 
John L. Taylor, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors l (Oct. 28, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Delventhal 
Memo] ( on file with author). 
164. Id 
165. Id 
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e. "[n]either has, within the last six months[,] declared to any 
City department that he or she has a different domestic 
partner."166 
Even though the proposed language included both same-sex and different-
sex couples, Coles drew distinctions between the two in his own efforts to build 
support for the ordinance. To counter opposition, he emphasized that "opposite-
gender couples may marry if and when they choose. Their temporary. voluntary 
exclusion when they do not choose to marry is not equal to [same-sex couples'] 
pennanent, involuntary, and categorical exclusion."167 Moreover, Coles 
stressed that the ordinance worked with, not against, marriage. Those proposing 
the ordinance, he maintained, sought "to obtain equal rights and benefits-not 
to attack marriage." 168 "[T]he problem," he noted, "is not marriage ~ se, but 
the unfair use of marriage as the sole criterion for eligibility."169 
Both supporters and opponents of the ordinance framed domestic 
partnership in relation to marriage. The Catholic leadership in San Francisco 
situated its opposition to the ordinance in more generalized objections to 
recognition of nonmarital families. Writing to Mayor Dianne Feinstein, San 
Francisco Archbishop John Quinn claimed that "to reduce the sacred covenant 
of marriage and family by inference or analogy to a domestic partnership is 
offensive to reasonable persons and injurious to our legal, cultural, moral and 
societal heritage."170 After the Board of Supervisors passed the ordinance in 
1982, Feinstein vetoed it. 171 She complained that the provision requiring 
domestic partners to be treated like spouses was "inconclusive and unclear" and 
potentially "subject to various interpretations."172 For his part, Britt 
characterized that element as "the heart of the legislation."173 The battle lines 
over domestic partnership had been drawn through marriage. A domestic 
partner was not any family member; she was a spousal equivalent. 
Fresh off defeat, Coles and Britt attempted to rework the ordinance to 
satisfy Feinstein. In January 1983, the city attorneys approved the draft 
166. Domestic Partnerships, Amending San Francisco Administrative Code by Adding 
Chapter 45 Thereto, Establishing Domestic Partnerships and Requiring Boards, Commissions and 
Departments of the City and County of San Francisco to Afford to Domestic Partners the Same Rights 
and Privileges as Spouses, at I (1982) (on file with author); see also 1982 Delventhal Memo, supra 
note 163. 
167. Personal Notes of Matt Coles, Points to Remember when Countering Opposition or 
Criticism(l982) (on file with author). 
168. Id 
169. Id 
170. David Morris, SF Mayor Vetoes Domestic Partners Bill, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Dec. 
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legislation and made additional revisions. 174 They included a definition of 
"'common necessaries of life' drawn from California case law"175 -"those 
things which are commonly required by persons for the sustenance of life 
regardless of their employment or status."176 This reflected continuing efforts to 
make the responsibilities of domestic partners track those of spouses, thereby 
ensuring a commensurate level of commitment. Responding to the mayor's 
concerns about uncertain scope, the ordinance explicitly provided only for 
hospital and jail visitation. 177 And it addressed the fact that, under the city 
charter, the Board of Supervisors did not possess authority over important 
public employment benefits. Accordingly, the ordinance simply "request[ ed] 
that the Mayor urge the Health Service System Board to develop a plan, or 
plans, as necessary, for the health insurance coverage of domestic partners of 
city employees."178 Similarly, it "urg[ed] the Civil Service Commission to 
submit for adoption certain rules and regulations regarding sick and 
bereavement leave for city employees and their domestic partners."179 When it 
became clear that Feinstein intended to veto the revised ordinance, Britt and 
Coles abandoned attempts to advance it. 180 It would be several years before San 
Francisco would enact a domestic partnership law. 
Meanwhile, efforts in Berkeley gained steam as advocates learned from 
the San Francisco experience. Their work focused exclusively on city 
employees, first targeting the school board and eventually the city. 181 In 1983, 
representatives from Berkeley's LGBT community made a presentation to the 
city's Human Relations and Welfare Commission ("HRWC"), showing that the 
"marriage criterion" used for employment benefits had a discriminatory effect 
on lesbians and gay men. 182 Later that 'year, HRWC held a public hearing at 
which Brougham, Coles, and representatives from various LGBT groups 
voiced their support for a domestic partnership policy. 183 Their comments 
framed the issue around sexual orientation discrimination inherent in a system 
that uses marriage for social provisioning, and yet categorically excludes same-
sex couples from marriage. Accordingly, they asked that "lesbian/gay couples 
receive [their] fair share and not be excluded from 'spousal benefits."'184 The 
174. Memorandum from Burk E. Delventhal & Thomas J. Owen, Deputy City Attorneys, to 
Dana Van Gorder, Sup. Harry Britt's Office (Jan. 17, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Delventhal Memo] (on 
file with author). 
175. Id. at 1. 
176. Id at 3 (attachment ofa draft ordinance). 
177. Id. at 9 (attachment ofa draft ordinance). 
178. Id. at 11 (attachment ofa draft resolution). 
179. Id at 13 (attachment ofa draft resolution). 
180. Coles Interview, supra note 152. 
181. Id 
182. Memorandum from Human Relations and Welfare Commission to Hon. Mayor and 
Members of the City Council I (July 17, 1984) [hereinafter HRWC Memo] (on file with author). 
183. See id. at 4--6. 
184. Id at 4. 
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public hearing revealed overwhelmingly positive responses to domestic 
partnership, as thirteen of the fourteen speakers favored a domestic partnership 
policy. 185 
The following year, HRWC recommended the adoption of a domestic 
partnership policy to the mayor and City Council. 186 Leland Traiman, a gay 
activist who sat on HRWC, chaired the Domestic Partner Task Force that 
produced the policy. 187 Coles helped draft it, 188 using the language from the San 
Francisco ordinance as a starting point. 189 
In making its recommendation, HRWC framed the problem that domestic 
partnership sought to solve primarily as one posed by marriage laws' different-
sex requirement. Its "Description of the General Situation" opened by 
declaring: "In All States, Only Opposite-Gender Couples are Permitted to 
Marry."190 It explained that while "[s]ome same-gender couples have 
performed private ceremonies and described themselves as married ... these 
marriages are not recognized by the law." 191 Accordingly, HRWC focused on 
sexual-orientation equality and marriage access, explaining that while "(a]ll 
unmarried opposite-gender couples are able to move voluntarily across the 
'marriage barrier[,]' [a]ll same-gender couples are unable to move across the 
'marriage barrier'-forever, and regardless of their will."192 
Rather than contesting the basic logic of the benefits system, HRWC 
merely sought to extend benefits to more "bona fide couple[s]."193 In fact, it 
urged the City Council to defer any broader consideration of whether need, 
rather than coupled status, should govern benefits. 194 Since the proposal 
responded "to a particular set of complaints" from "members of the lesbian/gay 
community," HRWC explained that its "role should be ... to make the benefits 
program specifically more equal," not "generally better." 195 
Unsurprisingly, then, HRWC recommended that domestic partnership 
"approximate the current marriage criterion."196 Indeed, it explained that even 
as it left open the option of including both same-sex and different-sex couples, 
it was "rejecting the possibility of creating a new criterion which is 
substantially easier than the marriage criterion."197 Similar to the language used 
in San Francisco, HRWC suggested a domestic partnership definition that 
185. Id 
186. See id. at 20. 
187. SeeTraiman,supranote 153, at 23. 
188. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 1254. 
189. Coleslnterview,supranote 152. 
190. HRWC Memo, supra note 182, at I. 
191. Id 
192. Idat9. 
193. Id at 12. 
I 94. See id. at JO. 
195. Id at 18. 
196. Id. 
197. Id 
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included two people "not related by blood closer than would bar marriage" who 
"reside[] together and share the common necessities of life" and are 
"responsible for [each other's] common welfare."198 
After defeat in San Francisco, advocates succeeded in Berkeley. In 1984, 
the city adopted HRWC's proposed domestic partnership policy, making it 
applicable to city employees in same-sex and different-sex nonmarital 
relationships. After some initial hurdles, employees' domestic partners became 
eligible for dental and health benefits. 199 
In Southern California, Los Angeles lawmakers also considered domestic 
partner benefits. Councilman Zev Yaroslavsky pushed the issue in 1985, and 
concerns over cost soon shaped the internal debate among city officials.200 The 
city administrative officer estimated that "[f]or health insurance alone, the 
additional costs would be between $1.7-$3.4 million."201 Insurance carriers' 
reluctance to provide coverage further clouded the debate. An earlier inquiry by 
the city attorney in 1980 revealed that some insurers would refuse to provide 
domestic partner coverage while others would only do so "if an adequate 
definition of the relationship could be developed."202 Neither the 1980 nor 1985 
discussions produced a domestic partnership policy, but they laid the 
groundwork for the Los Angeles Task Force on Family Diversity, discussed 
below, which formed in 1986 as an attempt to advance such a policy. 
Meanwhile, in 1985, the newly incorporated city of West Hollywood 
passed a domestic partnership ordinance, allowing both same-sex and different-
sex couples to register with the city.203 A relatively small, urban, and 
progressive community, West Hollywood had a sizable lesbian and gay 
population. And the city leadership included prominent LGBT activists. In fact, 
Valerie Terrigno, the mayor at the time, was the first openly lesbian mayor of 
an American city.204 Unsurprisingly, then, few signs of opposition emerged 
within the city to a domestic partnership policy. 
Unlike the Berkeley policy, which was initially limited to city employees, 
the West Hollywood ordinance provided an open registry. This broader 
coverage aimed to allow domestic partners to lobby any employer for benefits 
198. Id at 20. 
199. Kaiser Permanente offered insurance. See Milt Freudenheim, Rising Worry on "Partner" 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1989, at Dl. Berkeley offered registration to the public in 1991. See 
City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, CITY OF BERKELEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us 
/Clerk/Home/Domestic_partnership.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
200. See Memorandum from Keith Comrie, City Administrative Officer, to Zev Yaroslavsky, 
Councilman, Fifth District (Mar. 4, 1985) (on file with author). 
201. Id at 1. 
202. Id 
203. West Hollywood, Cal., Ordinance 22 (Feb. 21, 1985) [hereinafter West Hollywood Ord 
22] ( on file with author). 
204. See Ex-Mayor is Convicted in West Hollywood Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1986, at 27. 
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coverage.205 Nonetheless, as in Berkeley, the West Hollywood status was 
limited to couples "not related by blood closer than would bar marriage" who 
"share the common necessities of life" and are "responsible for each other's 
welfare."206 These requirements satisfied councilmembers who demanded 
"some kind of commitment" to avoid the provision of benefits "to anyone who 
is not a true dependent."207 Thus, at this early stage, advocates in both Northern 
and Southern California constructed domestic partnership in a way that mapped 
onto a model of marriage characterized by exclusive adult coupling, mutual 
support and obligations, and economic interdependence. 
While open to same-sex and different-sex couples, the West Hollywood 
domestic partnership registry was intended to provide legal and social 
validation for the relationships specifically formed by lesbians and gay men-a 
powerful constituency in the small city. In this way, the West Hollywood 
registry framed domestic partnership around recognition-specifically for 
same-sex couples. As Mayor Terrigno explained, "[a]llowing domestic partners 
to register is a way of saying that the relationship is equal to marriage in the 
eyes of the city."208 In fact, city officials developed an official domestic 
partnership certificate "suitable for framing."209 In this sense, for most couples, 
the law offered more symbolic than substantive significance. 
The ordinance initially provided only hospital and jail visitation rights.210 
Hospital visitation addressed an issue raised directly by the growing HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Terrigno explained: "I've heard all kinds of horror stories about 
people who were not allowed in to visit their partners because they were not 
immediate family .... [The ordinance] would give domestic partners the same 
visitation rights that married couples get."211 Yet given that West Hollywood 
contained no major hospitals, Terrigno anticipated using the domestic 
partnership ordinance to negotiate with nearby Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.212 
Not until 1989 did West Hollywood extend healthcare coverage to the 
(same-sex and different-sex) unmarried partners of city employees.213 After 
several unsuccessful attempts to convince private insurers to include coverage 
205. See Arthur S. Lazere, Update on the Status of Domestic Partnerships Legislation, EQUAL 
TIME, July 24, 1985, at 14. 
206. Id at I. 
207. Stephen Braun, West Hollywood Law Would Expand Rights of Unmarried Couples, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1985, at WI (internal quotation marks omitted). 
208. Id In 1993, a West Hollywood couple unsuccessfully challenged California's marriage 
law. See Kathleen Kelleher, Gay Couple Challenge State Laws on Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
1993, at B3; West Hollywood: Court Denies Gay Couple's Marriage License Petition, L.A. TIMES, 
May 22, 1993, at B2. 
209. Stephen Braun, Law lists Rights, lacks Teeth, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1985, at W14. 
210. West Hollywood Ord. 22, supra note 203, at 3. 
211. Braun, supra note 207. 
212. See Braun, supra note 209. 
213. See West Hollywood City Council Meeting, Minutes 3 (Feb. 6, 1989); see also Ron 
Russell, W Hollywood Will Insure Partners of Single Employees, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at B3. 
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for domestic partners, the city self-insured.214 When extending health coverage 
to domestic partners, city officials added criteria to "most closely parallel a 
legally recognized marriage."215 Domestic partners would now "sign an 
affidavit that they share a mutual obligation of support for the common 
necessities of life."216 The assistant city manager noted that "[t]his is the 
portion of obligation to each other that a married couple cannot give away 
through contracts or agreements during the relationship."217 The marriage 
statute itself provided that "[h ]us band and wife contract toward each other 
obligations of mutual ... support."218 The West Hollywood affidavit converted 
that obligation into gender-neutral language. Even in domestic partnership's 
earliest iterations, marriage provided the terms with which to understand and 
define the new status. 
B. Early Domestic Partnership Litigation-Framing Same-Sex Relationships as 
Marriage-Like 
At the same time that advocates advanced rights for unmarried couples at 
the local level, the California courts considered extending rights at the state 
level. In litigation challenging the denial of rights to unmarried couples, 
marriage furnished the norms that defined the claims. State law privileged 
marriage, and accordingly LGBT advocates attempted to paint same-sex 
relationships as marriage-like. Ultimately, though, marriage's status provided 
the basis for denying same-sex couples' claims to recognition outside marriage. 
Litigation on behalf of same-sex couples operated against the backdrop of 
the courts' increasing attention to unmarried different-sex couples. In the 
1970s, the California Supreme Court had become a leader in accommodating 
the rise of nonmarital cohabitation. In its groundbreaking 1976 Marvin v. 
Marvin decision, the court held that upon dissolution of unmarried 
relationships, courts could enforce cohabitation agreements, whether express or 
implied.219 Nevertheless, as Grace Blumberg has shown, Marvin's contractual 
lens ultimately limited the extension of rights to unmarried couples.220 In 
214. Letter from Kevin M. Fridlington, Human Res. Off., City of West Hollywood, to Thomas 
F. Coleman, Spectrum Institute (Nov. 12, 1992), in REPORT OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION TASK 
FORCE OF THE CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, A CALL TO END UNFAIR INSURANCE 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UNMARRIED CONSUMERS 57 (July 1993) [hereinafter ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION TASK FORCE REPORT] (on file with author). 
215. West Hollywood, Cal., Consent Calendar: Domestic Partner Medical Coverage 1 (Feb. 6, 
1989). 
216. Id at 2. 
217. Id 
218. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 5100 (1970). 
219. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
220. See Blumberg, supra note 56, at 1159-70; see also Grace Ganz Blumberg, The 
Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare 
State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1293-99 (2001) (explaining criticism of Marvin's contractual 
approach and documenting the American Law Institute's status-based alternative). The Marvin court's 
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particular, the contract theory restricted unmarried couples' ability to assert 
rights against third parties. In its 1988 Elden v. Sheldon decision, the California 
Supreme Court held that a man in a cohabiting, unmarried relationship who 
witnessed the death of his female partner could not recover for loss of 
consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress.221 Distinguishing 
Marvin, which announced rights inter se, the court concluded that allowing 
recovery against a third party would "[inhibit] the state's interest in promoting 
marriage."222 The litigation detailed in this Section occurred after Marvin but 
before Elden, at a time when the California courts were working out the 
relationship between unmarried cohabitants' rights and the state's interest in 
marriage. 223 
In 1982, the California Department of Personnel Administration refused to 
provide dental benefits for the same-sex partner of Boyce Hinman, a state 
employee. 224 In response, Hinman sued and was represented by Roberta 
Achtenberg of the Lesbian Rights Project (the predecessor to the National 
Center for Lesbian Rights).225 Marriage framed Hinman's claim, as he argued 
that his marriage-like relationship with his partner, Larry Beatty, should qualify 
them for benefits. 226 Indeed, Hinman and Beatty stated they "would marry if 
they were not prohibited from doing so by state law."227 
Achtenberg stressed Hinman and Beatty's commonality with married 
couples: 
They share a home, combine their incomes and assets, and jointly own 
real and personal property. They enjoy meals together, attend church 
and social occasions together, and enjoy vacations and recreation 
together. They have friends together, have a feeling of belonging 
together, and are looked upon by themselves and by friends and family 
space for theories of implied contract, however, can be read as a quasi-status concept. See Eskridge, 
supra note 53, at 1930. As Charlotte Goldberg has argued, "couples whose relationship is most like a 
traditional marriage are likeliest to exhibit an implied agreement to share property." Charlotte K. 
Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 488 (2007). 
221. 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988). 
222. Id 
223. LGBT advocates hoped that same-sex couples could capitalize on the Marvin doctrine. 
See Big Ruling on Unmarried Couples, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 28, 1976, at I. But results in court were 
mixed. Compare Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that plaintiff, who 
performed household duties, could not recover after his same-sex, cohabiting partner's death because 
any agreement was "explicitly and inseparably based upon his services as a paramour"), with Whorton 
v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447,454 (1988) (allowing recovery by a man who provided chauffeur 
and secretarial services to his same-sex, cohabiting partner). 
224. Hinman v. Dep'tof Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
225. Id Two other lawsuits in California challenged the lack of benefits for same-sex couples. 
See Brinkin v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 572 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Chamberlin v. Frontier 
Airlines, Inc., No. 310989 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 22, 1983). For a description of these cases, see 
Cox, supra note 12, at 36-37. 
226. See Brief for Appellants at 18, Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (No. 3-23749). 
227. Id at I. 
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as having a responsibility for each other in case of accident or illness. 
They are the beneficiaries of each other's wills and life insurance 
policies, and have made mutual commitments of emotional support 
and legally enforceable commitments of economic support. 228 
123 
This, of course, is a particular model of marriage-one rooted in adult 
affiliation, emotional commitment, and financial interdependence. And it 
recasts the gender-specific "mutual support" language of the marriage statute in 
gender-neutral terms. Achtenberg claimed that "[t]he only difference between 
Petitioner Hinman and his fellow state employees with spouses is that 
Petitioner Hinman is a homosexual," and therefore he and his partner "are 
forbidden by California law to marry."229 Achtenberg, then, did not reject 
marriage; instead, she argued that even if same-sex couples were excluded from 
marriage as a legal matter, they were sufficiently like married couples to be 
granted some of the same benefits. 
At the same time, Achtenberg distanced her client from different-sex 
unmarried couples, portraying different-sex nonmarital relationships outside the 
norms of commitment, mutual support, and financial interdependence that 
characterized the relationships of both married couples and Hinman and 
Beatty.230 She claimed that "many unmarried heterosexual couples do not take 
on the total economic integration and permanent commitment manifested in 
Appellant Hinman' s relationship and the relationship of married couples. "231 
This suggests that Achtenberg and her clients were not seeking to unsettle 
marriage; rather, their primary goal was to address the discriminatory treatment 
of same-sex couples who functioned like married couples. Of course, to make 
that claim, Achtenberg articulated a particular model of marriage that fit same-
sex couples' lives. At this early stage, we see both the construction of same-sex 
relationships as marriage-like and the articulation of a model of marriage 
capable of including same-sex couples. 
Rather than contest marital-status distinctions generally, Achtenberg 
argued that the benefits policy discriminated "against homosexuals by use of 
the status 'spouse. "'232 This focus on sexual orientation, rather than marital 
status, reflected constraints imposed by the relevant doctrinal landscape. In its 
1983 Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board decision, the 
California Supreme Court limited employment claims alleging marital-status 
228. Id at 9. 
229. Id 
230. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 3-4, Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(No. 3-23749). 
231. Brief for Appellants, supra note 226, at I 0. 
232. Id at 45. At the same time that governing case law and executive orders favored sexual-
orientation claims, constitutional norms created greater opportunities for arguments focused on sexual 
orientation rather than marital status. Achtenberg attempted to map the factors that governed suspect-
class status onto same-sex couples. See id. at 13-28. 
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discrimination.233 Relying on "the state's legitimate interest in promoting 
marriage," the court upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman 
who had left her job to accompany her fiance to another state.234 In doing so, 
the court erected a substantial barrier to the claim that tying benefits to 
marriage was legally impermissible and constructed a doctrinal framework 
forcing LGBT rights lawyers to distinguish their claims from those based more 
generally on marital status. For its part, the state attempted to leverage Norman 
so as to group lesbian and gay employees with the larger (unprotected) class of 
unmarried employees.235 
Accordingly, LGBT advocates' best prospect relied on showing that, 
because of marriage access, same-sex and different-sex couples were not 
similarly situated. Achtenberg, therefore, argued that while 
[t]he state's legitimate interest in promoting marriage may warrant the 
denial of family dental benefits to heterosexual state employees who 
choose, for whatever reasons, not to marry their partners, ... [i]t does 
not warrant denial of such benefits to Appellant Hinman who would 
marry his partner if legally allowed to do so.236 
Achtenberg's claim was not that marriage should cease to be the relevant 
dividing line; rather, marriage may be the dividing line, but same-sex couples 
were more like married couples than unmarried (different-sex) couples and thus 
should be included on the side of marriage. 
The ACLU's amicus brief supported Achtenberg's sexual orientation-
based focus on marriage access over marriage choice. Coles, who represented 
the ACLU as a private civil rights attorney at the time, argued that since 
"California prohibits marriage between individuals of the same gender," the 
regulation at issue divides state employees into three groups: 
(1) those who are married and qualify for the family partner benefit if 
they wish it; 
(2) those who are not married, but are legally able to marry and qualify 
for the benefit if they wish it; [and] 
(3) those who are not married, and are legally unable to marry and 
qualify for the benefit. 237 
Since "[a]ll members of the first two groups are heterosexual, and ... [a]ll 
members of the third group are homosexual, ... the regulation creates a 'pure' 
233. 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983). 
234. Id at 908. Toe following year, the court found that an unmarried woman established 
"good cause" for leaving her job when she moved to accompany her unmarried partner and their child 
The existence of the child, however, was a crucial distinguishing factor. See MacGregor v. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd, 689 P.2d 453,458 (Cal. 1984). 
235. See Respondents' Brief at 6, 27-28, 42, Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (No. 3-23749). 
236. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 226, at 34. 
237. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellants at 3, Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (No. 3-23749)(alteration in original). 
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distinction between heterosexual state employees and gay state employees."238 
In the eyes of the ACLU, the relevant distinction was not "between those who 
do and those who do not receive the benefits," but rather "between those who 
may, if they wish, receive the benefits, and those who may not."239 
The California Court of Appeal accurately described the plaintiffs' 
argument that marriage's sexual-orientation-based exclusion distinguished 
lesbian and gay employees from other unmarried state employees.240 
Nevertheless, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, finding there was no 
classification on the basis of sexual orientation and instead grouping lesbians 
and gay men with all other unmarried individuals: "Homosexuals are simply 
part of the larger class of unmarried persons, to which also belong the 
employees' filial relations and parents, for example . . . . Rather than 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, therefore, the dental plans 
distinguish eligibility on the basis of marriage."241 Consequently, the court 
found that "plaintiffs are not similarly situated to heterosexual state employees 
with spouses."242 Even as the marriage-like nature of Hinman and Beatty's 
relationship formed the basis of their claim, their exclusion from marriage 
rendered them more like siblings than spouses in the eyes of the law, and 
therefore ineligible for benefits. 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint was with the 
marriage statute,243 which they had not formally challenged.244 Marriage 
constituted the dividing line that kept benefits from same-sex couples; yet, in 
litigation that did not directly contest same-sex couples' exclusion from 
marriage, the Hinman court could justify the denial of benefits by resorting to 
the marriage law.245 As the concurrence noted, marriage both distinguished the 
plaintiffs' claims from those of other unmarried individuals and "compel[led] 
the result. "246 
C. Task Force Work-Making the Case For and Against Marriage 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, LGBT advocates in California 
focused their attention on both municipal policy and state-level legislative 
reform. A series of task forces, led by LGBT rights lawyers, contextualized the 
needs of lesbians and gay men within broader attempts to accommodate the 
238. Id at 3-4. 
239. Id at 4. As Eskridge has argued, "The structure of American public law played a role in a 
process by which marriage became the situs for cutting-edge gaylegal reform." ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY 
PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 5. 
240. Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12. 
241. Id at 416. 
242. Id 
243. Id at 419-20. 
244. Id at 415. 
245. Id at419-20. 
246. Id at 420 (Blease, J., concurring). 
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shifting shape of the family. In significant ways, task force leaders attempted to 
resist marriage as a relevant reference point for the distribution of rights and 
benefits. Yet, at the same time, the results of the task force efforts show that 
marriage both distinguished same-sex couples from their different-sex 
unmarried counterparts and constructed the terms of nonmarital recognition. 
That is, competing and often inconsistent frames characterized the position of 
marriage as it related to same-sex couples. In fact, the now-familiar frame of 
domestic partnership as an inferior stopgap measure specifically for same-sex 
couples emerged at this early juncture-even though domestic partnership 
included different-sex couples and provided a much more limited bundle of 
rights. 
This Section details task force efforts at both the local and state levels. 
Los Angeles led the way with its Task Force on Family Diversity. Advocates 
built on this work through subsequent initiatives in Los Angeles, as well as 
similar efforts in San Francisco and the state legislative arena. Local efforts 
evidenced more substantial attempts to address the needs of lesbian and gay 
families. In contrast, the state-level body, which included religious leaders 
opposed to LGBT rights, resisted accommodating same-sex couples. Even in 
San Francisco, though, efforts to roll back gains for unmarried couples 
demonstrated the impact of the "pro-family" movement's mobilization against 
LGBT rights. 
1. Los Angeles 
a. Task Force on Family Diversity 
While domestic partnership efforts fizzled in the early 1980s,247 Los 
Angeles had become a leader on family-policy reform by the later part of the 
decade. In 1986, Councilmember Michael Woo convened the Los Angeles 
Task Force on Family Diversity ("Family Diversity Task Force").248 Thomas 
Coleman, a gay lawyer who advocated for the rights of unmarried individuals, 
had urged Woo to form the task force in an effort to extend employee benefits 
to domestic partners.249 Coleman conceptualized LGBT family recognition as 
part of a broader framework of family-based reform. 
The Family Diversity Task Force, which included Coleman as a special 
consultant, issued its final report in 1988.250 The report reflected a functional 
vision, adopting a definition of family that focused on "mutual 
24 7. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text. 
248. See Letter from Michael Woo, Councilman, to Thomas F. Coleman, Dir., Domestic 
Partner Equity Fund (Mar. 5, 1986) (on file with author). 
249. See THOMAS F. COLEMAN, THE DoMJNO EFFECT 77-78 (2009). 
250. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY DNERSITY, Cm OF Los ANGELES, FINAL REPORT: 
"STRENGTIIENING FAMILIES: A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY ACTION" (1988) [hereinafter L.A. TASK 
FORCE REPORT] (on file with author). 
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interdependency" and included "unmarried persons not related by blood, but 
who are living together and who have some obligation, either legal or moral, 
for the care and welfare of one another."251 Indeed, it noted that a majority of 
Los Angeles adults were unmarried. 252 
When the Family Diversity Task Force turned more comprehensively to 
unmarried, cohabiting couples-what it termed "domestic partnership 
families"253 -it both grouped same-sex couples with other unmarried couples 
and distinguished such couples by their lack of marriage access: 
There are a variety of reasons why couples decide to live together 
outside of marriage. For same-sex couples, there are legal obstacles to 
marriage. For young opposite-sex couples, "trial marriages" may be 
prompted by fear of making a wrong decision, a fear perhaps justified 
by the high divorce rates. Long periods, sometimes years, of 
cohabitation may provide an answer for divorcees trying to avoid 
renewing old mistakes. For elderly widows or widowers, unmarried 
cohabitation may be a matter of economic survival, since remarriage 
can trigger the loss of marital survivor benefits. Economic 
disincentives or so-called "marriage penalties" prevent many disabled 
couples from marrying. 254 
While the task force situated many different-sex couples' unmarried 
cohabitation as either a precursor to marriage or a solution to failed marriage, 
same-sex couples, along with older and disabled couples, experienced their 
unmarried status based on their lack of meaningful access to marriage. More 
specifically, the report explained that "[n]o matter how long they live together, 
same-sex couples are excluded from marital benefits because the law 
specifically defines marriage in terms of opposite-sex relationships."255 
Leaders from the LGBT community also focused on the relationship 
between sexual orientation and marriage. In testimony regarding employee 
benefits, Joyce Nordquist, from Los Angeles Lawyers for Human Rights, a 
lesbian and gay bar association, explained: 
If I were a married woman with a husband, my employer would pay 
about $650 more a year for my benefits, providing insurance for my 
husband[,] than they do for me as a single person. As a lesbian I don't 
expect to get married in the near future so I'm stuck without this and 
that's my focus.256 
25 I. Id at 18-19 ( endnote omitted). 
252. See id. at 24. 
253. Id. at 79. 
254. Id. (endnote omitted). 
255. Id (endnote omitted). 
256. Testimony of William Weinberger & Joyce Nordquist on Employee Benefits for 
Domestic Partners, Los Angeles Lawyers for Human Rights, in TASK FORCE ON FAMILY DIVERSITY, 
TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC HEARINGS 185, 185 (1987) [hereinafter L.A. TRANSCRIPT] (on file with 
author). 
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Marriage both offered a route to benefits for non-gay employees and 
represented an unrealistic hope for their gay colleagues. For Nordquist, 
domestic partner benefits constituted a remedy to the sexual-orientation 
discrimination inherent in using marriage to determine benefits. 
The Family Diversity Task Force's own research reflected the importance 
of marriage access and situated domestic partnership as a stopgap measure 
specifically for same-sex couples. The Research Team on Gay and Lesbian 
Couples noted that while the problem of marital-status discrimination "can be 
overcome in the case of heterosexual couples by getting married ... no such 
formal option exists for homosexual couples, since marriage is prohibited to 
them."257 In one report, it explained that "marriage does not need to be the 
primary interest here, since public recognition of marriage as a heterosexual 
stronghold is so fierce. But there are benefits and a status that marriage bestows 
on a couple that homosexuals must eventually achieve."258 This reasoning 
reflected both distributive and recognition frames for understanding domestic 
partnership. 
The research team positioned nonmarital recognition as a practical 
measure to aid same-sex couples in a time when marriage recognition seemed 
unrealistic. It explained that even though "[t]he obvious solution ... would 
seem to be a relaxing of the marriage laws[,] ... it is likely that the public 
debate would be, at the very least, heated and divisive."259 Therefore, the team 
recommended 
a middle course, which provides recognition of gay and lesbian 
relationships, documents and binds their commitment in a manner that 
can satisfy the courts, or any agencies which might have a genuine 
interest in the existence and legitimacy of such relationships, and yet 
does not encroach on the sensitive territory of heterosexual 
· 260 mamage. 
Same-sex couples' lack of recognition was framed in part by their lack of 
access to marriage; domestic partnership-even when open to same-sex and 
different-sex couples-constituted a moderate, compromise position that 
sounded more in the register of sexual-orientation equality than family 
diversity.261 Even at this early point, domestic partnership seemed like an 
inferior status carved out for same-sex couples to avoid recognizing same-sex 
marriage and yet offer some form of recognition. 
257. Task Force on Family Diversity, Research Team on Gay and Lesbian Couples, City of 
Los Angeles, in CITY OF Los ANGELES, TASK FORCE ON FAMILY DIVERSITY, SUPPLEMENT (PART 
ONE), REPORTS OF REsEARCH TEAMS, at S-192, S-216 (I 987) (on file with author). 
258. Id at S-209. 
259. Id at S-216. 
260. Id 
261. See Memorandum from David Link, to Los Angeles City Task Force on Family Diversity 
3 (Dec. I, 1986), in CITY OF Los ANGELES, TASK FORCE ON FAMILY DIVERSITY, SUPPLEMENT 
(PART Two), REPoRTS OF REsEARCH TEAMS, at S-832, S-834 (1987) ( on tile with author). 
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In some ways, the reports reflected Coleman's own views on domestic 
partnership and marriage for same-sex couples. The research team was 
composed of University of Southern California law students working under the 
direction of Coleman, who served as an adjunct professor.262 Coleman began 
advocating for unmarried individuals after he discovered he could not marry his 
same-sex partner. They held a wedding in 1981 while emphasizing its lack of 
legal effect. 263 
While Coleman remained committed to a vision that made marriage less 
important to the distribution of rights and benefits, he also wanted same-sex 
couples to have access to marriage.264 To the media and the public, Coleman 
framed his efforts as a supplement to, rather than denigration of, marriage.265 
Domestic partnership constituted both an alternative to marriage for all couples 
and an expedient solution for same-sex couples. Coleman took a long view of 
marriage as an LGBT goal. In 1989, he called a proposal by the California State 
Bar Conference of Delegates to open marriage to same-sex couples a "nice 
academic exercise ... too far ahead of its time."266 Indeed, in Baehr's 
aftermath, Coleman traveled to Hawaii to urge lawmakers to pass an inclusive 
domestic partnership law as a way to both decrease the importance of marriage 
and sidestep the question of same-sex marriage. 267 
After receiving wide-ranging public testimony and extensive research 
reports,268 the Family Diversity Task Force recommended providing domestic 
partner benefits for unmarried couples. In addressing problems of definition 
and authentication, its leaders felt pressure to make domestic partnership 
sufficiently marriage-like to encourage officials and employers to adopt the 
concept. The task force recommended a definition that included two individuals 
262. See Prof. Thomas F. Coleman, University of Southern California Law Center, Rights of 
Domestic Partners, Syllabus I (1988) (on file with author). 
263. See COLEMAN, supra note 249, at 100----02. In 2008, the couple legally married in 
California. See id. at 116. 
264. See id. at 106--07. 
265. See Michael D' Antonio, Unmarital Bliss, L.A. TIMES MAG., Apr. 9, 2000, at 20; Philip S. 
Gutis, Small Steps Toward Acceptance Renew Debate on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1989, at 
E24. 
266. See COLEMAN, supra note 249, at 106. Lesbian and gay bar associations "expressed 
surprise and excitement over passage of the resolution," which had been proposed by a heterosexual 
member. Pamela Wilson, Marital Rights for Same-Sex Couples Pushed, SAN DIEGO DAILY 
TRANSCRIPT, Sept. 20, 1989, at 37. Ettelbrick explained, ''Nobody was even pushing that issue in the 
gay community in California .... It was well meaning straight people who took the debate away from 
us." Gutis, supra note 265. 
267. See COLEMAN, supra note 249, at 108-10; Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature 
Has Compelling Reasons To Adopt a Comprehensive Domestic Partnerships Act, 5 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 541, 544--45 (1995); see also David Link, Marriage Wars 6 (1995) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that Coleman believed "public support for gay marriage 
[was] a good ten years off' and "want[ed] to use domestic partnership in the interim to keep the 
political temperature down"). 
268. See generally L.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 250; L.A. TRANSCRIPT, supra note 
256. 
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who "reside in the same household," "share the common necessities of life," 
"have a mutual obligation of support," are at least 18, unmarried, and 
unrelated.269 The definition did not require an intimate relationship, but the 
restriction on blood relatives and the adoption of language in the California 
marriage law evidence contemplation of the marriage-like couple. 
Furthermore, the supporting arguments and underlying testimony 
demonstrate that the Family Diversity Task Force had in mind intimate, 
coupled relationships. Achtenberg, the Lesbian Rights Project's directing 
attorney, 270 supplied influential testimony that hewed to the marital model. In 
providing recommendations on eligibility and authentication that shaped the 
guidance issued by the Family Diversity Task Force,271 Achtenberg explained: 
If Susie lives with Aunt Maud and Aunt Maud is somebody who 
should be eligible for this kind of benefit-we are talking about the 
truth of most peoples [sic] living situations, we're talking about their 
mated relationships and we are talking about the ability of an adult to 
provide for his or her mate and in that respect, I don't believe that the 
argument about Aunt Maud is a valid one. We would have to figure 
out how people can provide for extended families in order to answer 
this particular question. I don't think that's a viable solution. Including 
Aunt Maud basically would guarantee that the price tag would be so 
high that there's no way that you could extend the benefit to those for 
whom I believe it should be intended.272 
To make her case convincing both to officials dealing with city budgets 
and employers and insurers considering costs, Achtenberg drew a line between 
those unmarried families that looked like married couples ("mated 
relationships") and those that did not (such as the aunt/niece pair). Even if 
Achtenberg held more capacious views on family policy, she provided 
testimony to accommodate concerns by influential stakeholders. Focusing on 
marriage-like relationships provided the best way of doing so. Following 
Achtenberg's advice, the Family Diversity Task Force recommended domestic 
partner benefits for city employees, whether in "same-sex or opposite-sex 
relationships. "273 
b. Consumer Task Force on Marital Status Discrimination 
Following up on recommendations by the Family Diversity Task Force, 
the Los Angeles city attorney convened the Consumer Task Force on Marital 
269. L.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 250, at XXV. 
270. Testimony of Roberta Achtenberg, Directing Attorney, Lesbian Rights Project, Gay and 
Lesbian Couples/Families, in L.A. TRANSCRIPT, supra note 256, at 253. 
271. See L.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 250, at 79. 
272. Testimony of Roberta Achtenberg, supra note 270, at 257. 
273. L.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 250, at 100. In 1992, the city implemented the 
recommendation for family leave when an employee's domestic partner is ill or dies. L.A., CAL. 
ORDINANCE 168,238 (Oct. 17, 1992). 
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Status Discrimination ("Consumer Task Force"), which Coleman chaired.274 
Rights of unmarried individuals and couples, one of many areas addressed by 
the earlier body, became the sole charge of the new group. 
The Consumer Task Force mission and its subsequent report reflected 
resistance to marriage's special status. As the Family Diversity Task Force had 
done, the Consumer Task Force opened its Final Report, issued in 1990, by 
announcing that "[t]he majority (55%) of adults in the City of Los Angeles are 
not married."275 Thus, lesbians and gay men were understood as part of a 
broader group of unmarried individuals who were harmed by the public and 
private privileging of marriage.276 
The report also explained the various ways in which many individuals 
were channeled away from marriage: "Economic disincentives and so-called 
'marriage penalties' discourage many elderly or disabled adults from marrying. 
Gay men and lesbians, of course, can't marry their partners because the law 
does not recognize same-sex marriage."277 Even as lesbian and gay singleness 
was defined by exclusion from marriage, lesbians and gay men were seen as 
part of a broader constituency lacking meaningful access to marriage. 
Public testimony received by the Consumer Task Force revealed a 
competing perspective-one that viewed marriage access as a meaningful 
distinction that both harmed same-sex couples and distinguished them from 
their different-sex unmarried counterparts. LGBT community representatives 
highlighted the unique plight of same-sex couples and the salience of sexual 
orientation. William Bartlett of AIDS Project Los Angeles testified that while 
marital status discrimination may "pose serious problems for unmarried 
heterosexual couples affected by AIDS, ... there is a distinct difference. For 
heterosexuals, marital status is a matter of choice .... For a gay or lesbian 
couple, marital status is not a matter of choice but a matter of restriction."278 
The HIV/ AIDS epidemic demonstrated the need for family recognition for gay 
male couples by highlighting the punitive effects of the state's restrictive 
marriage law.279 Bartlett explained that many individuals living with 
274. OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Los ANGELES, CA, CONSUMER TASK FORCE ON 
MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION, FINAL REPORT: "UNMARRJED ADULTS: A NEW MAJORITY 
SEEKS CONSUMER PROTECTION" 1 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter CONSUMER TASK FORCE ON MARITAL 
STATUS DISCRIMINATION, FINAL REPORT] ( on file with author). 
275. Id at vi. 
276. At the state level, Coleman urged families to register as "unincorporated nonprofit 
associations," but this did not produce tax or legal benefits. Laurie Becklund, The Word "Family" 
Gains New Meaning, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at A3. 
2 77. CONSUMER TASK FORCE ON MARITAL ST A TUS DISCRIMINATION, FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 274, at 9. 
278. William Bartlett, Asst. Prog. Mgr., Case Mgmt., AIDS Project Los Angeles, Testimony 
to the Consumer Task Force on Marital Status Discrimination (Jan. 29, 1990), in CONSUMER TASK 
FORCE ON MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION, SUPPLEMENT TO FINAL REPORT (SOURCE 
MATERIALS) 256, 256 (Mar. 1990) (on file with author). 
279. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 29, at 104. 
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HIV/ AIDS bear "the burden of discrimination for not partaking in an institution 
from which by law they are excluded."280 Even as the Consumer Task Force 
attempted to define the primary injury in terms of marital-status discrimination, 
other movement activists considered sexual-orientation discrimination to be at 
the heart of a regime organized around marriage. 
2. State-Level Work: The Legislature's Joint Select Task Force on the 
Changing Family 
While local Los Angeles stakeholders noted their lack of power to remedy 
many inequalities experienced by same-sex couples, including legal exclusion 
from marriage,281 state-level efforts largely skirted issues related to same-sex 
couples and did not contemplate including them in the marriage law. Such 
silence, however, should not be read as building the case against marriage. 
Rather, despite LGBT advocates' efforts, work at the state level largely sought 
to channel more different-sex couples into marriage while continuing to 
exclude same-sex couples. 282 
In 1987, the California legislature established the Joint Select Task Force 
on the Changing Family ("Joint Select Task Force").283 The Joint Select Task 
Force issued its First Year Report in April 1989.284 Before the First Year 
Report was issued, the task force's Couples Workgroup submitted its own 1988 
report to the larger body.285 The Couples Workgroup included only three 
members: Democratic state senator David Roberti, Coleman, and William 
Wood, the executive director of the California Catholic Conference.286 At the 
outset, the report included a disclaimer explaining that "[t]he views contained 
[in the report] are not necessarily shared by all Task Force members."287 
The Couples Report focused mostly on channeling different-sex couples 
into marriage. After an extensive discussion of the importance of married 
couples, the report made recommendations for strengthening marriage.288 To 
push different-sex couples into marriage, it urged recognition of common law 
280. Bartlett, supra note 278, at 256. 
281. L.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 250, at 82. 
282. See COLEMAN, supra note 249, at 81-82. This resonates with Margot Canaday's concept 
of the "legal regime of heterosexuality," in which the state "punish[es] homosexuality and reward[s] 
marriage." Margot Canaday, Heterosexuality as a Legal Regime, in 3 nm CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LAW IN AMERICA 442, 443 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
283. JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY, COUPLES WORKGROUP, 
PRELIMINARY REPORT: "CALIFORNIA COUPLES: RECOGNIZING DIVERSITY AND STRENGTHENING 
FlJNDAMENT AL RELA TIONSIDPS" (1988) [hereinafter COUPLES REPORT] ( on file with author). 
284. JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY, FIRST YEAR REPORT: 
PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY FOR CALIFORNIA (April 1989) [hereinafter PLANNING A FAMILY 
POLICY] (on file with author). 
285. COUPLES REPORT, supra note 283. 
286. See id. at first unnumbered text page. 
287. See id. 
288. See id. at 10-25. 
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marriage. It argued that rather than "channel people into formal, ceremonial 
marriages," the "abolition of common law marriage"_ allowed couples "to 
cohabit without the obligations and benefits of formal marriage. "289 
Accordingly, "legalizing common law marriage would discourage 
cohabitation."290 The Couples Workgroup thus prioritized marriage and 
denigrated unmarried cohabitation as it recommended a way to legally marry 
more different-sex couples. 
For those who could marry, the message was clear: they should. The 
report recommended a "Vesper Marriage Act" for older couples, for whom 
"remarriage may be economically unfeasible because of legal rules that end 
survivor benefits upon remarriage."291 This "form of marriage" would be 
"limited to persons age 60 and older" and would allow them to be treated as 
single for tax and pension purposes.292 Similarly, the report recommended 
removing the "marriage barrier" experienced by disabled (different-sex) 
couples by virtue of "deeming."293 Normally, the entirety of a non-disabled 
spouse's income is presumed available to the disabled spouse for purposes of 
determining the disabled spouse's public benefits eligibility. This, of course, 
could discourage marriage because of its potential for drastically reducing the 
amount of public benefits provided.294 
While the workgroup also explained problems same-sex couples faced 
because they lacked marriage access, it did not recommend such access.295 
Instead, it merely attempted to show that same-sex couples form "family 
relationships."296 Still, the workgroup recommended that "domestic partners," 
which included both same-sex and different-sex couples, be included in laws 
governing wrongful death actions-a right denied by Elden-and insurance 
discrimination. 297 
When the Joint Select Task Force itself eventually issued its own report, it 
acknowledged that "[t]he profile of California's families has changed 
dramatically in the last three decades," and that "[f]ewer than one in ten 
families presently fits the 'traditional family' model-breadwinner father, 
homemaker mother, and two or more children."298 Accordingly, the report 
made numerous recommendations regarding work-life balance, aiming 
289. Id at 27. For an exploration of the abolition of common law marriage in California and its 
potential revival through recognition of cohabitation agreements, see generally Goldberg, supra note 
220. 
290. COUPLES REPORT, supra note 283, at 27. 
291. /dat3I. 
292 .. Id; see also PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY, supra note 284, at 80, 83. 
293. COUPLES REPORT, supra note 283, at 32-33. 
294. Id; see also PLANNING AF AMILY POLICY, supra note 284, at 80, 83-84. 
295. COUPLES REPORT, supra note 283, at 33-34. 
296. Id at 34. 
297. See id at 40-44. 
298. See PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY, supra note 284, at 3 (endnote omitted). 
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specifically to support working mothers.299 And it sought to improve access to 
healthcare for families across the state.300 
Yet the Joint Select Task Force made no recommendations explicitly 
aimed at "domestic partners" or same-sex couples, even though it declared that 
couples in "long-term domestic partnerships outside of marriage ... whether 
opposite sex or same sex ... benefit from clarity and agreement regarding their 
relationship and the commitment it implies."301 The task force focused only on 
recommendations aimed at strengthening marriage and channeling more 
different-sex couples into marriage.302 It specifically recommended the removal 
of barriers to marriage for "disabled, elderly, and poor couples"303 - but not for 
same-sex couples. In fact, it failed to route the needs of same-sex couples 
through government action, instead encouraging them to "utilize legal contracts 
such as wills, the durable power of attorney, and express written or verbal 
cohabitation agreements. "304 
Ultimately, the Joint Select Task Force resisted a vision that either 
protected unmarried couples qua unmarried couples or meaningfully included 
same-sex couples as part of family-law reform. 305 In contrast to local efforts in 
Los Angeles, pro-marriage politics-which both denigrated nonmarital 
relationships and excluded same-sex couples-powerfully shaped state-based 
work. 306 This may reflect the influence of social-conservative advocates at the 
state, as opposed to local, level. In fact, the Joint Select Task Force heard 
testimony from James Dobson, head of the national Christian Right 
organization Focus on the Family, and Beverly Sheldon, the wife of Traditional 
Values Coalition founder Louis Sheldon.307 And Dobson, along with David 
Blankenhorn, founder of the social-conservative Institute for American Values, 
sat on the task force's National Advisory Committee.308 As compared to local 
task force work, social-conservative advocacy-specifically on the position of 
299. See id. at 26-28. 
300. See id. at 71. 
301. See id. at 79. 
302. See id. at 83--84. 
303. See id. 
304. See id. at 80. 
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PERSONAL PRIVACY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 89 (Dec. 1982) (on file with author). 
306. It is worth noting that the New Right had gained influence in California. See Mary 
Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Judicial Activism Arguments, the Abortion Debate, and the Politics 
of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U. LoUISVILLE L. REV. 201, 210 (2013) (linking former California 
Governor Ronald Reagan to the New Right). Although Jerry Brown succeeded Ronald Reagan and 
served as governor of California from 1975 to 1983, the Republican administrations of George 
Deukmejian and Pete Wilson covered 1983 to 1999. 
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marriage and the relationship of same-sex couples to family policy-
meaningfully contributed to state-level work. 
3. San Francisco 
Meanwhile, local work in San Francisco offered more hope to LGBT 
advocates. Domestic partnership efforts, which had emerged in San Francisco 
in the early 1980s, gained steam again by the close of the decade. As it had 
before, the centrality of marriage both provided the reference point for those 
pushing the concept and animated the objections of those opposed. And while 
domestic partnership proposals included all unmarried couples, much 
attention-both supportive and hostile-focused on same-sex couples. 
a. Reviving Domestic Partnership 
In 1988, Supervisor Britt announced his intention to introduce domestic 
partnership legislation once again. 309 In response, the San Francisco Human 
Rights Commission ("HRC") held a public hearing on the topic on March 8, 
1989.310 The testimony, which was overwhelmingly supportive, revealed 
potentially competing arguments and goals. While some speakers focused 
specifically on rights and recognition for same-sex couples, others 
conceptualized such couples as part of a broader group of families harmed by a 
system organized around marriage. 
In his testimony, Britt emphasized the importance of "primary 
relationships" and claimed that "the major force of discrimination against Gays 
and Lesbians has been the denial of . . . legal recognition. "311 Yet Cynthia 
Goldstein, an attorney with National Gay Rights Advocates in San Francisco, 
stressed that "this issue goes beyond just the Lesbian and Gay community."312 
Like some of her counterparts in Los Angeles, Goldstein grouped same-sex 
couples with elderly couples and single parents living with another adult. "Most 
of these people," she claimed, "are unable to marry under California law, 
regardless of their commitment to each other, or how financially and 
emotionally bound they are."313 In this sense, Goldstein conceptualized the 
ability to marry not simply in legal terms, but also in practical and economic 
ones. She also included families defined by mutual support but not romantic 
affiliation. Achtenberg, the Lesbian Rights Project attorney who delivered 
influential testimony in Los Angeles, explained how nonmarital families in 
general are harmed by their exclusion from marital benefits. Yet her examples 
focused specifically on discrimination against same-sex couples, including 
309. See HRC INVEsTIGATION, supra note 153, at iii. 
310. See id. at Appendix C. 
31 1. Id. at 4. 
312. Id. at 5. 
313. Id. at 6. 
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Hinman and his partner.314 Brougham and Coles, the pioneers of domestic 
partnership legislation, also testified.315 While Brougham detailed the process 
and results in Berkeley, Coles covered the range of domestic partnership 
policies that cities and employers had adopted. Coles explained that some 
policies referred to "spouse equivalents" while others, like Berkeley's and West 
Hollywood's, "define[d] criteria in considerable detai!."316 
Even as LGBT advocates desired protections for same-sex couples, many 
of them urged a relatively inclusive version of family reform. Yet 
representatives from the healthcare and insurance industries voiced concerns 
that suggested limiting domestic partnership to intimate, coupled relationships. 
Kaiser Permanente's Robert Zimmerman testified that "when the restriction, 
'not related by blood or marriage,' is taken out, carriers ... lose interest."317 
When Mayor Art Agnos asked "why including blood relatives would destroy 
the program," Zimmerman explained that allowing "parents, grandparents, 
elderly uncles, nieces, etc .... [to] enter, ... actuarially throws it off."318 That 
is, "[t]he selection element-adding relatives who have the greatest need for 
health coverage-would drive up the costs" in a way that counseled in favor of 
limiting domestic partnership coverage to intimate, coupled relationships.319 
As it had earlier in the decade, the Catholic leadership registered its 
opposition. In fact, the only recorded opposition to domestic partnership at the 
public hearing came from the Archdiocese of San Francisco. Its representative 
worried that "putting Domestic Partnership on a par with marriage would erode 
marriage" and could "legitimize temporary or transient relationships."320 Once 
again, the church's position situated domestic partnership within more general 
attacks on marriage. The church's opposition, however, was relatively 
measured. In response to questions, the Archdiocese's representative explained 
that the church was more concerned with the "recognition" provided by 
domestic partnership registration than with the provision of employment 
benefits to nonmarital families. 321 In other words, from the official Catholic 
perspective, the recognition frame was more troubling than the distributive, 
social provisioning frame. 
In its subsequent report, HRC took a relatively capacious view of reform, 
making clear that the "alternative family situations" in need of protection 
included both domestic partnerships and units "consist[ing] of siblings, or an 
aunt, or other blood relative[s]."322 Nonetheless, HRC referred to a "domestic 
314. See id. at 7. 
315. Id. at 9, 15. 
316. Id. at 15. 
317. Id. at 14. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 34. 
321. Id. at 37. 
322. Id. at iii. 
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partner" as a "significant other," showing that domestic partnership specifically 
signaled intimate couples.323 The report invoked both distributive and 
recognition frames, explaining that domestic partners "share the commitment 
and necessities of life of any couple, but the lack of a marriage license stands in 
the way of equality of benefits and recognition of their relationships."324 Still, 
this conceptualization included both same-sex and different-sex couples. In its 
findings, HRC explained that "although domestic partnerships affect Lesbians 
and Gay men, many different family units and family needs can be addressed 
by changes in legislation."325 
In 1989, pursuant to the HRC recommendation, the Board of Supervisors 
again passed a domestic partnership ordinance-seven years after Mayor 
Feinstein vetoed the city's first attempt.326 The legislation would have enabled 
unmarried same-sex and different-sex couples to register with the city. It 
defined domestic partners as "two people who have chosen to share one 
another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring, who 
live together and have signed a Declaration of Domestic Partnership in which 
they have agreed to be jointly responsible for basic living expenses."327 
Even as the ordinance embraced a relatively inclusive notion of 
nonmarital recognition, it targeted intimate couples in a way that reflected 
insurers' concerns. The ordinance provided that "the two may not be related to 
each other in a way which would bar marriage in California."328 Furthermore, 
marriage helped to define the contours of domestic partnership. The six-month 
post-termination waiting period contained in the original 1982 proposal 
appeared in the 1989 ordinance.329 An exception making clear that the period 
"does not apply if the earlier domestic partnership ended because of the death 
of one of its members" only further cemented the analogy to marriage and 
divorce. 330 
The largely symbolic ordinance would have provided few substantive 
rights. Without meaningful benefits, the public conversation around the 
ordinance focused on recognition specifically for same-sex couples and 
ascribed marital tropes to domestic partnership. Journalists reporting on the 
new ordinance noted that same-sex couples entering domestic partnerships 
were seeking "to get married."331 The ordinance itself allowed couples to file 
323. Id (internal quotation marks omitted). 
324. Id 
325. Id at 48. 
326. Morris, supra note 170, at 1; S.F., CAL., ORD.§ 4001 (1989)(repealed Nov. 7, 1989). 
327. S.F., CAL., ORD. 176-89, § 4002(a) (approved June 5, 1989) (repealed Nov. 7, 1989) (on 
file with author). 
328. Id § 4002(b). 
329. Id 
330. Id 
331. Elaine Herscher, New Trend for Gays-Getting Married, S.F. CJ-IRON., June 24, 1989, at 
Al. 
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their "Declaration of Domestic Partnership" with the county clerk. 332 The San 
Francisco Chronicle announced that "[s]cores of gay couples, who see the 
opportunity for a symbolic marriage, plan to register en masse at City Hall and 
follow the event with a giant wedding reception."333 
Still, officials hoped to pave the way for health insurance and 
bereavement leave for city employees in domestic partnerships. To that end, the 
Board of Supervisors simultaneously passed a resolution urging the mayor to 
form a "task force to examine [the] feasibility of extending health benefits to 
domestic partners of city employees."334 Echoing Britt's earlier testimony, the 
resolution focused on same-sex couples and their right to form "primary 
relationships."335 It announced that "[t]he right of every person to form private 
relationships of mutual caring and economic interdependence ... continues to 
be denied to lesbian and gay couples."336 Accordingly, the Board of 
Supervisors urged the city "to end discrimination against people whose 
relationships are not socially sanctioned, particularly lesbian and gay couples 
who are denied recognition given to other couples."337 It asked that the task 
force be charged with developing a plan "for adoption by the Health Services 
System, under which lesbian and gay couples and other nonmarital couples 
may be accorded the benefit of the City's Health Benefits Plan."338 It also asked 
that the task force "[s]ystematically examine all policies and practices of the 
City, identify those which disadvantage lesbian and gay couples and other 
nonmarital couples, and propose changes to end that discrimination. "339 
While LGBT advocates celebrated the domestic partnership ordinance, 
social conservatives, who objected to the perceived endorsement of same-sex 
relationships, led an initiative campaign against it.340 The Orange County-based 
Traditional Values Coalition, a conservative Christian organization, drove the 
San Francisco referendum effort. 341 While proponents of the ordinance stressed 
that it provided rights for gay male couples in the midst of the AIDS crisis, 
opponents raised the specter of increased insurance costs, implying that the 
332. S.F., CAL., ORD. 176-89, § 4002(e). 
333. Herscher, supra note 331. 
334. S.F. RESOLUTION 385-89, Task Force to Examine Extension of Health Benefits 
(approved May 25, 1989) [hereinafter S.F. REsOLUTION] (on file with author); see also Miranda 
Kolbe, Domestic Partners Law Imminent in S.F., GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, May 21-27, 1989, at I. 
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341. Victor F. Zonana, Gay Agenda Takes Beating-Even in San Francisco, L.A. nMES, Nov. 
9, 1989, at Al. 
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public would bear the costs of medical care needed specifically by gay men. 342 
In November 1989, voters narrowly defeated the law.343 
The San Francisco campaign constituted part of the Traditional Values 
Coalition's broader push across the state to repeal local pro-gay legislation. On 
the same day that voters rolled back San Francisco's domestic partnership 
ordinance, Irvine voters excluded sexual orientation from the city's human 
rights law and Concord voters repealed an ordinance that protected individuals 
with AIDS from discrimination.344 As one activist put it, "there is an entity as 
strong as or stronger than the gay voting block in San Francisco: conservatives 
and religious people who believe in traditional family values."345 
LGBT activists, who had recently fended off a series of anti-gay AIDS 
initiatives at the state level,346 were surprised by the defeats.347 For his part, 
Coleman saw the San Francisco results as an indication that '"gay advocates of 
domestic partnership should try to build coalitions with other groups who 
would benefit from such measures. "'348 In other words, Coleman thought a 
more inclusive policy and strategy would improve advocates' chances for 
success. 
The San Francisco task force, which had been initiated through an 
independent resolution and would come to be called the Mayor's Task Force on 
Family Policy, remained in place even after the domestic partnership defeat in 
San Francisco.349 Like its counterpart in Los Angeles, the San Francisco task 
force emerged from LGBT advocates' domestic partnership activism within 
local government channels.350 Supervisor Britt had ushered domestic 
partnership and the related task force resolution through the Board of 
Supervisors. And Achtenberg, a prominent LGBT rights lawyer, would chair 
the task force itself. 
b. The Mayor's Task Force on Family Policy 
The Mayor's Task Force on Family Policy ("Mayor's Task Force") issued 
its report in 1990, a few months after the domestic partnership ordinance's 
342. See Chambers, supra note 12, at 188. 
343. Zonana, supra note 341. 
344. See id. 
345. Id. at A34. 
346. See VAID, supra note 83, at 83 (describing the defeat of three statewide initiatives from 
I 986 to 1989). 
34 7. See Zonana, supra note 341, at A I. 
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Al. 
350. Letter of Transmittal from Roberta Achtenberg, Esq., to Art Agnos, Mayor, and People of 
San Francisco (June 13, 1990), in APPROACHING 2000: MEETING THE CHALLENGES TO SAN 
FRANCISCO'S FAMILIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE MAYOR'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY POLICY 
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defeat at the polls.351 The report presented a family-diversity vision that 
accommodated San Francisco's non-traditional families while recognizing the 
enduring legacy of the conventional, married family. 352 As its predecessor in 
Los Angeles had, the Mayor's Task Force defined "family" broadly as 
a unit of interdependent and interacting persons, related together over 
time by strong social and emotional bonds and/or by ties of marriage, 
birth, and adoption, whose central purpose is to create, maintain, and 
promote the social, mental, physical and emotional development and 
well being of each of its members. 353 
The task force advanced a concept of family that stressed mutual support and 
blurred the lines between marital and nonmarital families. All such families 
were seen to serve similar socially significant purposes. 
While the Mayor's Task Force concluded that "it is not feasible for the 
City to provide health care benefits to all extended family members at this 
time," it recommended providing health insurance benefits to the partners and 
children of city workers.354 The workers would be eligible for domestic partner 
benefits if they could provide a sworn affidavit attesting that they "live[ d] in 
the same household," "share[d] the common necessities of life," and were not 
"related by blood to one another closer than would bar marriage."355 The 
Mayor's Task Force declared that "[t]he obligations and financial 
responsibilities embodied in the affidavit are exactly the same as those assumed 
by husbands and wives under California law."356 Indeed, "in order to enroll a 
domestic partner for health insurance, a City employee [ would] have to assume 
the same financial obligations assumed by married couples. "357 The terms of 
the proposed affidavit thus described family and dependency in relation to 
marriage. As it had in Los Angeles, marriage made domestic partnership 
legible. 
These requirements sought to ensure a committed relationship and prevent 
presumably more casual relationships from obtaining costly benefits. In doing 
so, they situated the concept of domestic partnership as marriage-like rather 
than a more expansive model of recognition. Not only were those outside of 
intimate, coupled relationships beyond the scope of the proposed domestic 
partnership scheme, but the relationships within the ambit of domestic 
partnership were expected to act like married couples. In fact, the task force 
report assured the mayor that since city employees "will become liable for 
food, shelter and medical care for the domestic partner[,] employees will be 
351. Id. 
352. See id. at I. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. at 27-29. 
355. Id. at 30-31. 
356. Id. at 31. 
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unwilling to assume this obligation for mere friends, just as they would be 
unwilling to marry a mere friend in order to provide health insurance."358 
Of course, the appeal to marriage as a benchmark addressed the reluctance 
of insurers to provide domestic partner coverage, particularly in light of the 
HIV/AIDS epidernic.359 On one hand, the AIDS crisis highlighted the need for 
the rights conferred by domestic partnership;360 healthcare coverage, medical 
decision making, hospital visitation, and survivors' rights for same-sex couples 
took on a new sense ofurgency.361 On the other hand, HIV/AIDS complicated 
the demand for domestic partner coverage by heightening the financial 
concerns voiced by insurance carriers and employers. Some employers worried 
that domestic partnership provisions would allow individuals to cover ailing 
friends. As a benefits manager at a San Francisco company put it, "An 
employee could say to a friend who was dying of AIDS, 'Yes, you'll be my 
partner for the remainder of your life. "'362 
Members of the Mayor's Task Force responded to these concerns by 
expressing their willingness "to set the rules of what a domestic partner is so 
close to a spouse that [insurers and employers] don't really expand [their] risk 
very much."363 Proponents thought the marriage-like domestic partnership 
standard would minimize some of the risk assumed by insurers and reduce the 
number of individuals fraudulently claiming domestic partnership status to 
obtain health insurance.364 Even then, insurance carriers expressed concern 
over healthcare costs for gay couples who met the domestic partnership 
qualifications.365 As a compromise, the task force reached agreement with an 
insurer to include an increased premium for domestic partners and require the 
annual reporting of HIV-related costs to the city.366 
Once released, the recommendations of the Mayor's Task Force quickly 
drew opposition from social conservatives. As the San Francisco Chronicle 
observed, "Several of the proposals are nearly identical to elements of the 
landmark domestic partners law that was rejected by voters in November, 
358. Id. 
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eliciting immediate criticism from opponents."367 Echoing the position of 
social-conservative groups, one activist objected: "The voters have spoken .... 
I see no reason why those people would change their minds. As far as I'm 
concerned, [domestic partnership] undermines traditional marriage because it 
brings other relations on par. " 368 Nonetheless, Mayor Agnos defended the 
recommendations by reappropriating social conservatives' language to describe 
the results as "progressive, pro-family policy. " 369 
Overall, the task force efforts at both the local level in Los Angeles and 
San Francisco and at the state level reveal competing logics and considerations 
in the push for rights for same-sex couples. For those supporting rights and 
recognition for unmarried couples, same-sex couples occupied two positions 
that could lead in different directions. LGBT advocates frequently situated 
lesbians and gay men within a much larger population harmed by the special 
treatment of marriage. Through this lens, the government should distribute 
rights and benefits without regard to marital status. At the same time, LGBT 
leaders also distinguished lesbians and gay men from other unmarried 
individuals by stressing same-sex couples' unique exclusion from marriage and 
their inability to obtain the status conferred by state recognition. Under this 
view, delivering rights and recognition to same-sex couples constituted a 
primary goal. Of course, these positions were not mutually exclusive. 
Advocates sought to minimize the importance of marriage even as they drew on 
marital norms, invoked same-sex couples' categorical exclusion from marriage, 
and emphasized the importance of recognition to advance and define domestic 
partnership. 
Actors outside the LGBT movement influenced the shape of nonmarital 
recognition. Forces that would support domestic partnership in some form also 
sought to limit the reach and impact of domestic partnership. Accordingly, they 
embraced the position that viewed domestic partnership as reflecting, rather 
than rejecting, marriage. Insurance carriers, for instance, resisted terms that 
broadly opened benefits to nonmarital families and thereby constrained the 
potential of domestic partnership to unseat marriage. All the while, "traditional 
family values" activists limited the space for LGBT gains of any sort. 
D. Bridging Marital and Nonmarital Norms: The Enactment of Domestic 
Partnership in San Francisco and Los Angeles 
While domestic partnership gained traction in smaller, progressive cities 
during the 1980s, the task force work in Los Angeles and San Francisco laid 
the foundation for breakthroughs in these cities in the early 1990s. As domestic 
partnership finally became a reality, marital norms furnished important 
367. Marc Sandalow, Cost Estimate on Domestic Partners Policy, S.F. Om.ON., June 13, 
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guideposts for both local officials and insurance carriers. And within LGBT 
constituencies, marriage provided resonant symbols with which to understand 
and celebrate domestic partnership. The major developments detailed in this 
Section occurred throughout the 1990s, both before and after marriage became 
an explicit priority of LGBT movement leaders. It is telling that during this 
time little changed in terms of how both supporters and opponents of domestic 
partnership deployed marital norms. 
1. San Francisco 
News that Supervisor Britt planned to bring the issue of domestic 
partnership back to voters in November 1990 surfaced the same day the 
Mayor's Task Force released its report.370 Voters eventually approved domestic 
partnership just one year after they rolled it back.371 Proposition K, which 
embodied a key proposal of the Task Force, provided for domestic partnerships 
between "two unmarried, unrelated people over the age of 18 who live together 
and agree to be jointly responsible for their basic living expenses. "372 
While both same-sex and different-sex couples would be able to register 
under Proposition K, the public discussion prior to its passage focused on the 
city's lesbian and gay population and same-sex couples' specific exclusion 
from marriage. Deploying a recognition frame, the official voter information 
pamphlet noted that "[t]here is no process for lesbians and gay men to formally 
establish and record their relationships."373 The proponents' official arguments 
explained that "lesbian and gay couples cannot get married," yet "[l]ike all 
couples, they want visible recognition from their friends, families and 
neighbors."374 Social-conservative opponents, who argued that domestic 
partnership "places even the most temporary of human relationships on the 
same level as marriage and family," failed to convince a majority of voters. 375 
370. Marc Sandalow, Britt Wants New Vote in November on Gay Couples Issue, S.F. CHRON., 
June 14, 1990, at B8. Even before voters weighed in again, the Civil Service Commission adopted a 
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By the end of the year, the Health Services Board voted to extend health 
benefits to domestic partners.376 
On February 14, 1991, the first day that couples could register their 
domestic partnerships, the scene mirrored many of marriage's ceremonial 
elements. Reflecting the recognition frame used to win domestic partnership, 
same-sex couples walked alongside different-sex couples who had come to City 
Hall to get married on Valentine's Day.377 Over the years, this marriage 
symbolism continued as government-sponsored ceremonies incorporated both 
legal and cultural elements. In 1996, under an ordinance authorizing public 
officials to perform domestic partnership ceremonies, Mayor Willie Brown 
presided over a mass ceremony in which couples took vows of partnership as 
the mayor declared them "lawfully recognized domestic partners. "378 
Supervisor Carole Migden, the ordinance's openly gay author, explained, "It's 
a joyful occasion that can be celebrated by family and loved ones. It's fair to 
say it's a wedding of sorts."379 Even as domestic partnership included all 
unmarried couples, the ceremonial and cultural aspects focused on recognition 
specifically for same-sex couples. In fact, only one different-sex couple 
participated in the 1996 ceremony. 380 
2. Los Angeles 
Task force work in San Francisco had removed many of the insurance 
barriers to a meaningful domestic partnership policy, such that the ordinance 
adopted in 1990 could be implemented with relative ease. But the Los Angeles 
struggle for domestic partnership in the early 1990s reveals the ongoing 
significance of insurance carriers' resistance to the concept and the resulting 
difficulties with implementation. The centrality of marriage both informed such 
resistance and provided the arguments used to overcome it. 
City officials in Los Angeles began exploring domestic partner benefits 
soon after the Family Diversity Task Force issued its report. But it was not until 
1993 that the City Council passed a resolution, pushed by openly gay 
Councilmember Jackie Goldberg, providing health and dental benefits to city 
employees' unmarried (same-sex or different-sex) partners.381 Then, in 1995, 
the County Board of Supervisors voted to extend healthcare benefits to its 
376. Chambers, supra note 12, at 191. 
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TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at Al6. 
378. Richard C. Paddock, 165 Gay Couples Exchange Vows in S.F. Ceremony, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 1996, at Al. 
379. Richard C. Paddock, S.F. to Allow Civil Ceremonies for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 1996, at A3. 
380. They commented: "We've thought about [getting married], but one ofus always chickens 
out." Paddock, supra note 378. 
381. Benefits for Unmarried Partners OKd by Council, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at B2. 
2014] BEFORE MARRIAGE 145 
employees' unmarried (same-sex or different-sex) partners.382 It had previously 
voted to extend dental benefits in 1992.383 
Despite these eventual victories, insurance carriers-vital participants in 
employment-based domestic partnership schemes-had long resisted coverage 
that departed from a model rooted in the marital family. Accordingly, the city 
and county had struggled to find insurers willing to offer coverage. Indeed, a 
1993 report of the Anti-Discrimination Task Force of the California Insurance 
Commissioner, chaired by Coleman, documented the repeated refusal of 
insurers to provide domestic partner coverage. 384 A representative from Cigna 
informed the county in 1992 that it would "not expand or customize the 
definition of eligible dependents" unless required by law.385 Kaiser Permanente 
of Southern California, which formed a Domestic Partners Task Force to 
consider the issue, concluded in 1992 that it would "not expand or customize 
the definition of eligible dependents."386 It grouped domestic partners with 
other "dependent relationships that do not fall into our current definition of an 
eligible dependent," including "parents and other relatives, some children and 
. .6 h ,,387 s1gn1 1cant ot ers. 
In response, those seeking to convince insurers to offer coverage 
compared domestic partnerships to covered relationships-marital families-
and distinguished them from other excluded relationships. As a union 
representative argued to Kaiser Permanente's division manager in 1991, "the 
nuclear family is the basis for the current definition of dependent . . . [,] 
[which] includ[es] a subscriber's legal spouse and dependent children."388 But 
the "nature of the nuclear family in the United States has changed dramatically 
in the last two decades, creating many households comprised of domestic 
partners and the children of one or both partners."389 Accordingly, expanding 
"the definition of dependent to include domestic partners would . . . be 
consistent with the traditional focus on employer-supported health insurance 
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for an employee and his/her nuclear family."390 Under this reasoning, Kaiser 
Pennanente could provide coverage for domestic partners "without extending it 
even further to include a subscriber's parents, for example."391 
As these arguments demonstrate, even before LGBT advocates made 
claims to marriage, dialogue among union representatives, government 
officials, and insurance carriers cast domestic partners as like spouses-and as 
unlike other family relationships. To overcome financial objections raised by 
insurers and employers, domestic partners gained support by distinguishing 
themselves from other dependency relationships that could also have benefited 
from expanded coverage. 
E. Domestic Partnership in the Private Sector-Same-Sex Couples and 
Marriage Equivalence 
Advocates and local officials anticipated that domestic partnership 
recognition, while providing few governmental rights, would help unmarried 
individuals access employer-sponsored healthcare coverage for their families. 
Private companies, they hoped, would recognize their employees' domestic 
partnerships. In this way, the interaction between legal recognition and 
employer-sponsored healthcare coverage created a mutually constitutive 
relationship between public and private nonns.392 Proof of local domestic 
partnership registration could pressure employers to provide benefits, and some 
employers required an official domestic partnership registration. 
For their part, private companies, colleges, and universities led the way on 
domestic partner benefits. 393 Because family healthcare-an expensive 
proposition-was tied to employment, lesbians and gay men had concrete 
incentives to push for employer recognition of their relationships. Meanwhile, 
employers had financial incentives to limit recognition. 394 The United States' 
privatized, employer-centered healthcare regime created a system in which both 
private and public employers attempted to balance equity and retention 
concerns with cost management. 395 Limiting recognition to same-sex couples-
and thereby bolstering the priority of marriage as the relevant criterion-
constituted a workable (and increasingly popular) strategy. 
390. Id 
391. Id 
392. See Blwnberg, supra note 220, at 1267 (explaining how "the family acts as a conduit for 
benefits from the employee welfare state"). 
393. See generally Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A 
Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Pe,fect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
R.Ev. 337 (1998). 
394. See Blwnberg, supra note 220, at 1267-69 (noting the disproportionate impact same-sex 
couples have had on the phenomenon of extending rights and benefits to nonmarital couples 
generally). 
395. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 29, at 74-75. 
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The developments detailed in this Section occurred throughout the 1990s. 
The emerging focus on same-sex couples in pre-1993 workplace policies 
suggests little change in the relevance of marriage once the LGBT movement 
turned more explicitly toward marriage after Baehr. In fact, the focus on same-
sex couples appears to reflect the impact of specific arguments in earlier 
domestic partnership work at the municipal level. While local ordinances 
included both same-sex and different-sex couples, the work that produced those 
ordinances relied on arguments regarding same-sex couples' unique lack of 
access to marriage. Workplace policies increasingly followed this argument to 
its logical conclusion-policies geared exclusively to same-sex couples. 
In 1982, New York's Village Voice became the first employer in the 
country to offer domestic partner benefits, and it included all unmarried 
partners. 396 In 1991, Lotus Development Corporation in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, became the first company to offer same-sex-only benefits. 397 
This tension between inclusive and limited policies also played out in 
California. In Los Angeles in 1992, MCA became the first Hollywood studio to 
offer benefits to employees' same-sex partners.398 The following year, MCA 
president Sidney Sheinberg and media mogul Barry Diller campaigned for the 
benefits industry-wide. In a letter to studio executives, they situated marriage 
access, rather than choice, as central: "Basing benefits on marriage is not 
mandated by law and a benefit that recognizes marriage as the only vehicle for 
extending benefits to the partners of employees is a criterion that not all can 
meet."399 Other studios followed MCA's lead, with Paramount, Sony, Warner 
Bros., Walt Disney, and MGM providing same-sex partner benefits by 1996.400 
Some studios made benefits available to all unmarried couples, but most 
provided coverage only to same-sex partners.401 
High-tech companies in Northern California also became leaders in 
providing domestic partner benefits. While some adopted inclusive policies,402 
others limited benefits to same-sex couples.403 When in 1996 IBM became the 
largest U.S. company to do so, a spokesperson explained that the company 
excluded unmarried different-sex partners because those couples had the option 
396. POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 49. 
397. Polikoff notes the significance of this move. See id. at 61. 
398. Scott Collins, Companies Offer Benefits to Same-Sex Partners of Employees, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 1995, at B8; Better Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at BS. 
399. Collins, supra note 398. 
400. See id. 
401. Better Benefits, supra note 398; Chris Kraul, Workplace ls Key to Push for Lesbian, Gay 
Rights, Activists Say, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at D1; Warner Bros. Extends Medical Coverage to 
Same-Sex Partners, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1993, at D2. 
402. See Software Maker Extends Benefits to Unmarried Spouses, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1992, 
atD2. 
403. See Genentech Inc. Offers Benefits to Gay Domestic Partners, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 
1994, at B2. 
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to get married.404 To obtain benefits, same-sex couples were required to sign an 
affidavit declaring that their relationship approximated marriage-that they 
were in a long-term, committed relationship in a shared household.405 
In constructing domestic partnership as a substitute status-rather than a 
true alternative to marriage-employers suggested that marriage and domestic 
partnership shared central features grounded in mutual support and 
commitment. Indeed, extension of benefits to same-sex couples via domestic 
partnership policies encouraged the same type of economically interdependent 
relationships that employer policies incentivized for different-sex married 
couples.406 
Even before LGBT movement advocates made explicit claims to 
marriage, many colleges and universities adopted domestic partnership policies 
that emphasized lack of access to marriage over individual choice and used 
marriage as the relevant comparator for determining which relationships should 
be eligible. In 1992, Stanford became one of the first major universities in the 
country to offer domestic partner benefits. Its policy, which went into effect in 
1993, covered 
[t]wo individuals of the same gender who live together in a long-term 
relationship of indefinite duration, with an exclusive commitment 
similar to that of marriage, in which the partners agree to be financially 
responsible for each other's well-being and each others' debts to third 
· 407 parties. 
Securing domestic partner coverage at public universities represented a 
different struggle, since the battles were heavily influenced by state law and 
government officials. 408 Conservative leaders at the state level attempted to 
404. Raj iv Chandrasekaran, IBM To Offer Benefits Plan to Gays' Partners, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 1996, at B 1. 
405. Id. 
406. See Widiss, supra note 34, at 737-38. 
407. M.V. Lee Badgett, Equal Pay for Equal Families, ACADEME, May-June 1994, at 26, 29 
(quoting the Stanford policy). Though, as Blumberg has pointed out, these employer policies granted 
benefits "without any corresponding [legal] obligation running from one cohabitant to the other." See 
Blumberg, supra note 220, at 1274. 
408. In 1988, the University of California at Irvine rejected proposals, pushed by the 
university's Advisory Committee on the Status of Lesbians and Gays, to open married student housing 
to unmarried couples. UC! Rejects Married Units Use by Gays, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1988, at 16. 
After it became clear that some unmarried couples had received "family'' campus housing, the 
university faced pressure regarding its stated policy and ultimately reiterated its marriage requirement. 
Dianne Klein, University Sweeps Away UCI's Domestic Revolution, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at Bl. 
Campus activists objected, noting that students in same-sex relationships could never qualify for such 
housing because they lacked access to marriage. See Eric Lichtblau, UC! Acts To Clarify Gay Housing 
Issue, L.A. TIMES, Feb. I, 1990, at B2. Chancellor Jack Peltason fell back on state law: "I understand 
your desire to have domestic partnerships be incorporated into the benefits and housing policy, but that 
cannot happen at this time .... Your lobbying efforts need to be directed at changing the state law to 
recognize these partnerships." Danica K.irka, Homosexual Activists To Rebuild UC/ Shanties, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990, at B6. Similarly, in 1989, the chancellor of the University of California at 
Berkeley rejected a proposal to provide married student housing to unmarried couples. See Housing 
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block domestic partnership advances by situating objections within broader 
attempts to protect the marital family. Yet even as Republican Governor Pete 
Wilson objected that domestic partner benefits "devalu[ ed] the institution of 
marriage and the family," the University of California Board of Regents in 
1997 voted to extend healthcare benefits to an employee's same-sex domestic 
partner or blood relative-both pairs legally excluded from marriage.409 In 
1999, the California State University trustees extended healthcare benefits to 
same-sex partners of employees and different-sex partners sixty-two or older-
couples either completely excluded from, or facing significant financial barriers 
to, marriage.410 · 
The expansion of domestic partnership policies by private employers 
began before same-sex marriage captured national attention and continued in 
earnest after LGBT advocates explicitly pursued marriage. While it is tempting 
to link the growing preference for same-sex-only policies to the impact of 
Baehr and the resulting focus on same-sex marriage, the timing of coverage in 
California shows that the shift toward more restrictive policies predates these 
developments. Indeed, arguments that influenced the adoption of inclusive 
policies by local governments may have supported the shift to restrictive 
policies in the private sector. Even inclusive policies-adopted before marriage 
constituted an express movement goal-reflected both the salience of marriage 
access for same-sex couples and the centrality of marriage in constructing 
domestic partnership. 
F. State Domestic Partnership in a Post-Baehr World 
Progress on domestic partnership at the state level did not begin until the 
mid-1990s. Thus, even after same-sex marriage became a national policy issue, 
LGBT advocates continued to press for nonmarital recognition for both same-
and different-sex couples. Yet in these efforts, marriage shaped the fight for 
domestic partnership, and domestic partnership shaped the fight for marriage. 
Proponents and opponents of LGBT rights waged battle over domestic 
partnership, even as it was conceptualized as part of a broader attempt to 
devalue marriage. Moving from the local to the state level again meant greater 
influence by Christian Right organizations and leaders in California. 
Eventually, even some Democratic leaders supportive of domestic partnership 
credited social-conservative concerns regarding the marginalization of 
Closed to Gay Couples at UC Berkeley, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1989, at 26. Chancellor I. Michael 
Heyman defended his decision: "I am aware of no legal authority for the university to create a new 
class of personal or familial relationships or the sanctioning or recognition of committed personal 
relationships outside of our existing marriage laws." Id. 
409. Kenneth R. Weiss, Partner Benefits for Gay UC Staff Advance, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
1997, at A3; see also Blumberg, supra note 220, at 1288-89 (documenting the same-sex domestic 
partner and adult dependent relative policies adopted by the Regents of the University of California). 
410. See Kenneth R. Weiss, Cal State Panel OKs Giving Health Benefits to Partners, L.A. 
TIMES,Nov.17, 1999,atA3. 
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marriage. Ultimately, the nonnative weight of marriage-and its role in 
movement-countermovement conflict---constructed the terms of domestic 
partnership and limited the inclusion of different-sex couples. 411 
1. Coupling Issues-Marriage and Domestic Partnership 
In 1994, the California legislature narrowly passed Assembly Bill ("AB") 
2810, a domestic partnership bill that would extend rights to both same-sex and 
different-sex couples.412 The bill defined domestic partners as "two adults who 
have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed 
relationship of mutual caring.',413 By focusing on intimate couples committed 
to mutual care and support, the proposed law constructed domestic partners as 
idealized versions of a modern concept of marriage. Though the marriage law 
did not contain the specific elements imposed on domestic partners, the 
domestic partnership language translated marriage's social attributes into legal 
. ti . d 1 414 reqmrements or unmarr1e coup es. 
Opposition quickly focused on the inclusion of same-sex couples. 
Assemblymember Bernie Richter complained that "[t]he real purpose of this 
bill is to establish a state-sanctioned relationship for all people, but particularly 
for the homosexual community, that is equal to marriage.',415 Supporters 
countered that the bill was "not even close" to "a same-sex marriage bill.''416 
And they marketed the bill's impact on older different-sex couples.417 
Opponents also connected the domestic partnership bill to a broader attack 
on marriage. Christian Right leaders in California conceptualized domestic 
partnership for same-sex couples as detracting from the heterosexual, married 
family. They argued that the inclusion of different-sex couples denigrated 
marriage by providing an alternative for those who could (and presumably 
should) get married. Sheldon, the head of the Traditional Values Coalition that 
had successfully defeated LGBT gains at the local level in the late 1980s, 
411. To the extent that this Section demonstrates the intense state-level opposition to domestic 
partnership and the concessions required to pass even a meager statewide domestic partnership law, it 
is in some ways consistent with Murray's focus on the significance of domestic partnership's shift 
from the local to the state level. See Murray, supra note 125. Nonetheless, the analysis here posits 
more commonality between local and state level claims, objections, and constraints. 
412. Assem. B. 2810, 1994-95 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). In 1991, a California legislator 
introduced a bill to legalize same-sex marriage, but it did not garner support in the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee. See Assem. B. 167, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991). 
413. Assem. B. 2810, supra note 412. 
414. As Mary Anne Case has argued, the functional definition that nonmarital recognition 
requires of unmarried couples is not mandated in marriage. See Case, supra note 141, at 1774. 
Therefore, even as popular understandings of marriage may have become more functional, marriage 
itself requires none of the indicia of functionality explicitly covered in nonmarital schemes. 
415. Jerry Gillam, Assembly OKs Rights Bil/for Unwed Couples, L.A. TIMES, June I, 1994, at 
A3. 
416. Id (quoting Assemblymember John Burton). 
417. Carl Ingram, Senate OKs Bill on Rights for Unwed Couples, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, 
at A21. 
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claimed that domestic partnership "infringe[d]" on the principle of "the man-
woman relationship in the context of marriage.',418 Through this lens, the 
domestic partnership proposal blurred the line between marriage and 
nonmarriage and, by replicating marital norms in a nonmarital status open to 
same-sex couples, threatened to supplant the gendered definition of marriage 
itself. Ultimately, Governor Wilson vetoed the legislation, declaring: 
"Government policy ought not to discount marriage by offering a substitute 
relationship that demands much less.',419 
In 1996, in response to Baehr, Republican Assemblymember William 
"Pete" Knight introduced AB 1982, which would prohibit California from 
recognizing same-sex marriages from other states.420 The Hawaii marriage fight 
had ignited an intense and successful countermobilization at both the federal 
and state levels. In California, Knight led the anti-same-sex-marriage effort in 
the state legislature. In response, Democratic opponents implemented a "poison 
pill" strategy, amending the bill to recognize limited domestic partnership 
rights for same-sex and different-sex couples.421 
Knight, who opposed domestic partnership on the ground that it would 
"redefine marriage,',422 complained that "[t]he amendments make this a terrible 
bill.',423 Objections merged concerns over the devaluation of marriage with 
those over recognition of LGBT rights. Republican Senator Ray Haynes 
remarked: "A piece of garbage by any other name still smells. All you are 
doing is calling a same-sex marriage something else.',424 Social-conservative 
activists echoed those remarks. The Campaign for California Families' Randy 
Thomasson declared, "Either you believe marriage should be between a man 
and a woman or you don't .... Domestic partnership is tantamount to pseudo-
gay marriage.',425 Through this lens, domestic partnership constructed a 
different kind of marriage--one that made gender differentiation irrelevant and 
could therefore accommodate same-sex couples. Social-conservative opponents 
believed that the creation of domestic partnership-even in a very limited 
form-implicated the very constitution of marriage. 
418. Daniel M. Weintraub & Bettina Boxall, Ballot Fallout Expected from Wilson's Veto, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at A3. 
419. Gov. PETE WILSON, AB 2810 VETO MESSAGE (Sept. 12, 1994); see also Weintraub & 
Boxall, supra note 418, at A3. 
420. Assem. B. 1982, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); see also Ed Bond, Irreconcilable 
Differences on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at B3. 
421. See Assem. B. 1982; see also Carl Ingram, Bill Opposing Gay Marriages Weakened, 
L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at A3. 
422. Carl Ingram, Senate Panel OKs Bill Targeting Gay Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
1996, at A3. 
423. Ingram, supra note 421 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
424. Carl Ingram, Same-Sex Nuptials Prohibition Stalls, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1996, at A3 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
425. Andrew D. Blechman, Area Lawmaker Rejects Same-Sex Marriages but Backs 
Partnership Role, L.A. TIMEs, July 10, 1996, at B4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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At the same time, the bill did not have the consistent support of LGBT 
leaders, who objected to a separate designation for same-sex couples. The 
legislature's first openly lesbian member, Assemblymember Sheila Kuehl, 
voiced her complaint with the combined bill: "The message of this bill, as far 
as I'm concerned, is: 'Well, there are the real people, the human beings, and 
they get to get married. And then there is you guys. Instead of letting you get 
married, we'll give you something a little bit less. "'426 
With marriage on the political radar after Baehr, the lines drawn around 
domestic partnership reflected broader positions specifically regarding same-
sex couples' access to marriage. By putting domestic partnership side-by-side 
with a prohibition on same-sex marriage, the legislation framed domestic 
partnership through the lens of sexual-orientation equality (and inequality). 
Republicans opposed the new version of AB 1982, and after it narrowly passed, 
Knight withdrew it to avoid enacting domestic partnership. 427 
2. Domestic Partnership Breakthrough {for Some) 
California eventually enacted a domestic partnership law in 1999, and it 
took effect on January 1, 2000.428 The law, AB 26, provided only two 
benefits-hospital visitation and health insurance coverage for state 
employees. 429 Migden, who had been elected to the state assembly, attempted 
to include both same-sex and different-sex couples. 430 At the time, advocates 
had not reached consensus on whether to attempt to build domestic partnership 
to replicate marriage for same-sex couples or to maintain it as an alternative 
open to everyone. 431 
Once Democratic Governor Gray Davis weighed in, however, the path 
toward domestic partnership as an end in itself-an alternative open to all-
became much less viable. Reflecting the influence of social-conservative 
opposition to domestic partnership, Davis expressed his resistance to a bill that 
included different-sex couples because such inclusion threatened to minimize 
the importance of marriage by providing a nonmarital choice to those who 
could otherwise marry. 432 His position was especially striking in light of his 
tiebreaking vote on AB 1982433 and his support as a gubernatorial candidate for 
426. Ingram, supra note 421. 
427. See Carl Ingram, Davis Breaks Tie, Backs Domestic Partner Registry, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 1996, atB8. 
428. See Assem. B. 26, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). In 1995 and 1997, domestic 
partnership bills failed to emerge from the assembly. When the state enacted a domestic partnership 
law, twelve California cities had domestic partnership ordinances. See Carl Ingram, Senate OKs 
Benefits for Same-Sex Partners, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at A3. 
429. Assem. B. 26, §§ 3-4. 
4 3 0. Senator Kevin Murray's competing bill also included same-sex and different-sex couples. 
See Mark Gladstone, Davis Likely To Sign Domestic Partners Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A3. 
431. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 1258. 
432. See id. at 1259. 
433. Ingram,supranote427. 
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an inclusive domestic partnership bill.434 Now, for Davis and the political 
constituencies he looked to satisfy, same-sex couples' lack of access to 
marriage distinguished them from other unmarried couples and mediated the 
relationship between domestic partnership and marriage. His press secretary 
declared: "For everybody else ... , there's another process and it's called 
marriage."435 While inclusion of same-sex couples did not threaten marriage 
since those couples could not marry, inclusion of different-sex couples 
detracted from marriage's channeling function. 
While Migden favored an inclusive domestic partnership law, she 
ultimately reached a compromise with Davis: in addition to same-sex couples, 
the bill would include different-sex couples in which both members were over 
sixty-two.436 Accordingly, the final version used the same definition from AB 
2810 (the 1994 bill)-"two adults who have chosen to share one another's lives 
in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring"-but added the 
different-sex age restriction.437 Since older couples often lacked meaningful 
access to marriage, as the earlier task forces documented,438 their inclusion 
solidified the idea of domestic partnership as open to those for whom marriage 
was not a realistic choice. And it added a sympathetic constituency.439 
At the same time that lawmakers enacted a limited domestic partnership 
regime, Christian Right advocates' campaign to pass a voter initiative 
prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages gained steam. The 
Proposition 22 campaign grew out of then-Senator Knight's failed attempts to 
legislate a marriage prohibition.440 The new domestic partnership law lent the 
effort a greater sense of urgency. Even as the campaign claimed that 
Proposition 22 would not affect domestic partnership rights, initiative 
supporters complained that domestic partnership represented a backdoor route 
to altering marriage.441 Senator Knight and other conservative Republican 
lawmakers charged that the domestic partnership law would both weaken the 
institution of marriage and pave the way for same-sex marriage.442 
434. See GRAY DAVIS, CANDIDATE SURVEY ON FAMILY DIVERSITY, DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIP, AND MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION 2 (1998) (on file with author). 
435. Martin Wisckol, Partner Benefit Limited to Gays, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 7, 1999, 
at BI (internal quotation marks omitted). 
436. Id. Migden's chief of staff explained that "these were things that the governor asked that 
she change, and she's just trying to be practical and get something that he will sign." Id. In 2001, 
lawmakers included different-sex couples with one partner over sixty-two. Assem. B. 25, 2001-02 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). 
437. Assem. B. 26 § 2, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
438. See, e.g., COUPLES REPORT, supra note 283, at 31. 
439. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 1259. 
440. See id. at 1260. 
441. See Amy Pyle, State Begins Accepting Gays' Domestic Partner Sign-Ups, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2000, Al. 
442. Ingram, supra note 428. 
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The decade that followed witnessed two successful voter initiatives 
prohibiting marriage for same-sex couples-Proposition 22 in 2000 and 
Proposition 8, the constitutional amendment challenged in Perry, in 2008.443 
Throughout that time, legislators expanded domestic partnership, ultimately 
providing essentially all the state-law rights and benefits of marriage. 444 
Countermovement actors unsuccessfully challenged the domestic partnership 
regime as marriage by another name.445 The formulation of domestic 
partnership as a second-class status for same-sex couples became firmly 
entrenched as LGBT advocates and their allies pushed for marriage while their 
opponents wielded domestic partnership as a substitute to satisfy constitutional 
· 446 reqmrements. 
* * * 
The remainder of this Article explores how Part Ill's account of LGBT 
organizing in California informs the extant scholarly conversation around 
marriage and LGBT advocacy. Marriage-and the legal, political, and cultural 
context that privileged it-shaped work on nonmarital recognition, and 
conversely, work on nonmarital recognition participated in shaping marriage. 
As Part IV argues, the California case study casts doubt on the historical 
underpinnings of some influential critiques of LGBT marriage advocacy. And 
by suggesting the difficulty of escaping the legal and cultural weight of 
marriage, it complicates the broader normative and prescriptive claims 
animated by such critiques. Yet, as Part V claims, the case study also brings to 
light previously unacknowledged LGBT contributions to marriage itself and the 
line between marriage and nonmarriage. In doing so, it shows how earlier 
nonmarital work built the foundation for today's marriage equality 
jurisprudence. 
IV. 
RECONSIDERING THE CASE AGAINST MARRIAGE 
A. The Case Against Marriage (Advocacy) 
Influential family-law and sexuality scholars have articulated compelling 
critiques of marriage's primacy. A legal system that uses marriage to distribute 
rights and benefits leaves unsupported a growing number of dependency 
443. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note JO, at 1257-96. 
444. See CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297.5 (West 2010); Assem. B. 2216, 2001--02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2001); Assem. B. 25 § 3, 2001--02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). For a detailed account, see Grace Ganz 
Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic 
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 
UCLA L. REv. 1555 (2004). 
445. See Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
446. See generally NeJaime, supra note 125. 
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relationships existing outside marriage.447 And privileging sexual affiliations 
that meet the coupled, exclusive, committed norms of marriage limits the space 
for nonnormative relationships.448 Yet rather than explore either the general 
arguments against a system that prioritizes marriage or the substantial 
contributions marriage critics have made, this Part focuses on how some 
scholars have channeled their arguments through a critique of contemporary 
LGBT advocacy.449 
As part of their broader marriage critique, these scholars level powerful 
claims against the LGBT movement's ongoing marriage equality campaign. 
They argue that LGBT advocates legitimate the state's use of marriage in 
extending rights and benefits.45° For instance, Polikoff claims that instead of 
knocking marriage from its pedestal-"a development that would honor all 
relationships"-the LGBT movement "seeks privileges for gay and lesbian 
447. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 123-29; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143 
(1995). For arguments from a more philosophical perspective, see ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING 
MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2012); Claudia Card, Gay Divorce: Thoughts on 
the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 22 HYP A TIA 24 (2007). 
448. See Murray, Marriage as Punishment, supra note 5, at 59--62. 
449. By leveling compelling claims against legal regimes privileging marriage, prominent 
marriage critics not only have made significant theoretical interventions, but also have contributed to 
important legal reforms. Some of the most noteworthy examples have emerged in the family law 
context. Polikoff played an influential role in the development of second-parent adoption, which 
allows for the legal recognition of nonbiological lesbian and gay parents. See Polikoff, supra note 94, 
at 522-27. More broadly, Martha Fineman centered dependency in ways that demonstrated the need 
for greater support for vertical, rather than horizontal, relationships. See FINEMAN, supra note 447, at 
143. And Murray elaborated principles for understanding the networked family, bringing attention to 
caretaking relationships that exist outside of and in addition to traditional parent-child attachments. See 
Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and 
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 (2008). Moreover, these critics have influenced the development of 
legal rules designed to support dependency relationships, rather than promote marriage. Indeed, by 
demonstrating that marriage provides an inappropriate dividing line for many statutory schemes, 
Polikoff's arguments have supported legal innovations in, for example, the contexts of medical 
decisionmaking, family leave, wrongful death, and survivor benefits. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 
126-43, 167-68, 171-72, 195-96, 198. In the sexuality context, scholars including Katherine Franke, 
Janet Halley, and Judith Butler have questioned the politics of recognition more generally, exploring 
the ways in which movements moderate their claims when they turn to the state for legitimacy. See 
Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 229,241 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra 
note 5, at 245; Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY 
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 99 (Robert Wintemute & Mads T0nnesson 
Andemes eds., 2001). In doing so, these scholars have made substantial historical and theoretical 
contributions. For example, Franke's work on post-Civil War regulation of former slaves' marriages 
illuminates the ways in which recognition allows the state to "domesticate" otherwise "more fluid and 
more communal" kinship structures. See Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction 
Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 251, 253 ( 1999). 
450. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 
1535, 1549 (1993); Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 709, 777 (2002). 
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relationships that mirror heterosexual marriage.',451 This, she argues, "is not 
optimal family policy.''452 Under this view, by demanding marriage instead of 
functional family policy, advocates disclaim other families that exist outside of 
marriage.453 For example, Murray argues that the claim that children are 
harmed by the denial of marriage to same-sex couples "marginalizes attempts 
to render legible as 'families' kinship structures that depart from the nuclear 
marital family."454 
Furthermore, these critics maintain that by presenting marriage as the 
family policy solution to the dilemmas that lesbians and gay men confront, 
advocates affirm the neoliberal trend to privatize caretaking responsibilities.455 
In this vein, Murray suggests that "an implicit assumption of the [marriage 
equality] campaign and its strategy is the uncritical acceptance of marriage as 
the de facto social safety net through which the needs of vulnerable individuals 
are accommodated.''456 In this way, advocates bolster what Martha Fineman has 
termed "the sexual family"-"the traditional or nuclear family ... unit with a 
heterosexual, formally celebrated union at its core',457 -as the proper object of 
family recognition and the appropriate target of state support.458 
This family-centered critique relates closely to a sexuality-based critique, 
which maintains that affirming marriage as the privileged site for intimate 
relationships marginalizes nonnormative sexuality and pushes same-sex 
relationships into the confines of heterosexual institutions.459 As Katherine 
Franke explains, the subjects of LGBT advocacy are "same-sex couples, not 
persons who seek nonnormative kinship formations or individuals who engage 
451. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 203; see also Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 198 (2007) ("(A]cknowledgment that state constructions and recognition of 
marriage privilege some family forms over others has caused some family law scholars to question 
whether advocating for same-sex marriage is wise."). 
452. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 203. 
453. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 107; see also Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE 
NATION (Mar. 15, 2004), at 14, 18, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/holy-rnatrimony#. 
454. Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, supra note 5, at 433; see also 
Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra note 5, at 242 (arguing that advocates 
portray "the non-married parent ... as a site of pathology, stigma, and injury to children"). 
455. See Harris, supra note 134, at 1557-58; see also DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: 
ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 60-61 (2011 ); 
Halley, supra note 449, at 110-11. 
456. Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, supra note 5, at 433; see also 
Urvashi Vaid, "Now You Get What You Want, Do You Want More?," 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE IOI, 109 (2013). 
457. FINEMAN,supranote447,at 143. 
458. See Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 
2843 (2008). Through this lens, even attempts to include same-sex and different-sex unmarried, 
intimate couples in alternative recognition regimes "merely reinforce the idea of the sexual family." 
FINEMAN,supranote447,at 143. 
459. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What ls Left After Lawrence 
v. Texas, 23 Soc. TExT 235, 245 (2005); see also Ruthann Robson, Mostly Monogamous Moms?: An 
Essay on the Future of Lesbian Legal Theories and Reforms, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 703, 703-
06 (2000). 
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in nonnormative sex.',46° Cast in assimilationist terms, lesbians and gay men 
gain recognition to the extent they are "like straights.',461 
Armed with these critiques, scholars advance prescriptive claims urging 
LGBT advocates to deemphasize marriage as the remedy to the lack of same-
sex relationship recognition. For instance, Polikoff encourages advocates to 
work toward solutions that help a variety of family relationships rather than 
promote legal rules that reward marriage.462 And Franke argues that "efforts to 
secure marriage equality for same-sex couples must be undertaken, at a 
minimum, in a way that is compatible with efforts to dislodge marriage from its 
normatively superior status as compared with other forms of human 
attachment, commitment, and desire.',463 
These prescriptive claims support broader normative frameworks that 
would abolish, reposition, or significantly minimize marriage in legal regimes 
governing family and sexuality. For example, Polikoffs "valuing-all-families" 
approach would replace marriage with a "civil partnership" system 
characterized by varying rules for different types of families, distinguishing 
those with children from those without.464 Her approach also would supplant 
marriage as the legally salient dividing line and instead connect the specific 
purpose of a law to the relationships the law covers.465 
To support these normative and prescriptive claims, some scholars 
emphasize ideological marriage resistance in pre-Baehr organizing-invoking 
the reading of the movement's trajectory described in Part 11.B. In doing so, 
they distinguish between advocacy against marriage in the 1980s and early 
1990s and current advocacy for marriage. These scholars introduce a predictive 
dimension, suggesting that if LGBT advocates had remained committed to their 
earlier vision, the current landscape would look drastically different. For these 
marriage skeptics, the story of organizing in the mid- l 990s to the present is one 
f . d .. 466 o IIDsse opportunities. 
460. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty o/Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2004); cf Halley, supra note 449, at 100 ("Unmarried adults, and their sex lives, 
would become weirder."). 
461. See Dean Spade, Under the Cover of Gay Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 79, 
84 (2013); see also Ruskola, supra note 459, at 243; Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 
EMORY L.J. 1361, 1374 (2005); Nelson Tebbe et al., Debate: The Argument For Same-Sex Marriage, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 21, 30 (2010) (Gilreath contribution). 
462. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 210-14. 
463. Katherine M. Franke, Longing/or Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008). 
464. See POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 132-33. 
465. See id. at 126. 
466. It is important to note that some influential scholars of the LGBT movement are more 
hesitant to make claims regarding the viability of paths leading away from marriage. For instance, in 
suggesting that the "debate about same-sex marriage might have unfolded differently had the marriage 
skeptics within the LGBT community prevailed and persuaded the movement to pursue a different 
path," Schacter nonetheless recognizes the obstacles to alternative routes. Schacter, supra note I 00, at 
383. 
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Under this view, domestic partnership in particular represented a 
significant opportunity to create true alternatives to marriage. Yet rather than 
dedicate themselves to cultivating domestic partnership and other nonmarital 
innovations, advocates ultimately denigrated such alternatives as second-class 
designations.467 For instance, in 2006, historian John D'Emilio contemplated 
what could have been: 
Had we tried to devise a strategy that took advantage of the force of 
historical trends, we would, as a movement, have been pushing to 
further de-center and de-institutionalize marriage. Once upon a time, 
we did. In the 1980's and early I 990's, imaginative queer activists 
invented such things as "domestic partnership" and "second-parent 
adoption" as ways of recognizing the plethora of family arrangements 
that exist throughout the United States. i\68 
For these marriage skeptics, marriage equality advocacy that developed 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s "represents at best backpedaling from, and at 
worst abandonment of, a vision of family pluralism that once imbued advocacy 
for gay and lesbian families."469 LGBT families were, Kaaryn Gustafson 
argues, "perfectly situated to fight for the recognition of all families rather than 
the mere recognition of marriage.',470 Yet "much of the LGBT rights movement 
has been focused on marriage in the last few years, reinforcing rather than re-
envisioning notions of family."471 As Michael Warner sees it, "the crucial 
founding insights behind several decades' worth of gay and lesbian politics are 
now being forgotten. ,,4n 
Under this view, the LGBT shift from nonmarital to marital advocacy 
constituted not primarily a strategic shift, but a profoundly normative one. 
Warner's summation captures the connection between the historical account 
and its normative implications: "Marriage became the dominant issue in lesbian 
and gay politics in the 1990s, but not before. If marriage is so fundamental to a 
program of rights, why did gay men and lesbians resist it over the twenty-five 
467. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Avoiding a Collision Course in Lesbian and Gay Family 
Advocacy, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 753, 761 (2000); Jeffrey A. Reckling, Dignity, Legal 
Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791, 835, 839 (2010). For a powerful critique 
of domestic partnership from a family-law perspective, see Blwnberg, supra note 444, at 1568 
(explaining that, because of the formality requirement, many cohabiting couples who have fonned 
committed relationships nonetheless receive none of the benefits arising from California's domestic 
partnership law). 
468. John D'Emilio, The Marriage Fight ls Setting Us Back, 13 GAY & LESBIAN REv. 10 
(2006). 
469. Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex 
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 585-86 (2005); see also Vaid, supra note 
456, at 104. 
470. Kaaryn Gustafson, Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion, the New Patriarchy, and the 
Retreat .from Egalitarianism, 5 STAN. J. C.R & C.L. 269, 300 (2009). 
471. Id 
4 72. WARNER, supra note 88, at 91. 
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year period of their most defiant activism?',473 Warner, of course, is suggesting 
that marriage can and should be detached from an LGBT rights project and that 
LGBT advocacy before Baehr provides useful guidance. 
Overall, this historical narrative and its predictive dimensions bolster the 
prescriptive claims resisting the prioritization of marriage in LGBT organizing 
and support the normative frameworks challenging marriage.474 For instance, in 
2006, a number of scholars, including Polikoff, Franke, and D'Emilio, signed a 
joint statement, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, pushing advocates to focus less on 
marriage and more on family diversity. Encouraging activists to reclaim their 
roots, the signatories argued that their position "follows in the best tradition of 
the progressive LGBT movement, which invented alternative legal statuses 
such as domestic partnership and reciprocal beneficiary."475 More recent 
interventions employ a similar logic. For example, in arguing for "relationship 
recognition pluralism," Murray looks to 1980s domestic partnership efforts in 
California as a model for future work.476 She argues that while in recent years 
domestic partnership's "transformative potential was eroded as it was modified 
to replicate marriage in all but name," at this earlier moment it constituted "an 
innovation that sought to challenge marriage's primacy."477 
While many marriage skeptics focus on Baehr and its aftermath, others 
trace changes in LGBT advocacy to distinct but related developments. Murray 
attends specifically to shifts in the levels of government LGBT advocates 
targeted in seeking relationship recognition. She argues that "[t]he 
transformation of domestic partnership from a marriage alternative to a cut-rate 
marriage counterfeit can be explained by its migration from the local level to 
the state level in the late 1990's.',478 Nonetheless, she links state-level advocacy 
aimed at marriage substitutes to the Hawaii litigation, which suddenly made 
marriage seem like a realistic goal.479 
Franke, on the other hand, concentrates less on Baehr and more on 
Lawrence v. Texas,480 the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating 
Texas's anti-sodomy law and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick.481 She connects 
the movement's radicalism to the post-Stonewall era of criminalization, 
expressing "nostalgia for the fantasmatic possibilities that were enabled by 
473. Id. at 87. 
474. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 22, at 132; Franke, supra note 463, at 2686. 
475. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision, Executive Summary 2 (2006) (on 
file with author). 
476. Murray, supra note 125, at 296. 
477. Id at 300. 
478. Id at 296. 
479. See id 
480. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
481. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra note 
5, at 244 (arguing that "the Lawrence decision need not have inaugurated a politics of, or desire for, 
recognition in the gay community''). 
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being an outlaw in the 1970s and I 980s.',482 Franke argues that in leveraging 
Lawrence's decriminalization to achieve legal recognition,483 recent LGBT 
advocacy has "abandoned some of the more radical strategies and goals 
grounded in a politics that sought to destabilize dominant forms of sexuality 
and kinship, rather than seeking to be stabilized by them.',484 In this sense, 
Franke lodges a broader critique ofrecognition, rather than simply marriage.485 
In fact, she notes the difficulty in articulating a recognition project that is not 
defined in reference to marriage.486 
Regardless of which points in the historical narrative they emphasize, 
these marriage critics tend to view the current marriage-focused moment with 
dismay and look fondly at an earlier era-before marriage constituted an 
explicit LGBT movement goal. They attempt to identify and understand how 
and why the movement went astray. As Franke asks, "How did we get to this 
curious place, a place with a politics that would be almost unimaginable to the 
sexual freedom fighters of Stonewall?',487 The California case study provides 
some answers. 
B. Lessons from California 
The case study challenges critics' historical premises by revealing the 
constraints that marriage imposed on advocacy aimed at nonmarital recognition 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. LGBT advocates worked within a larger legal, 
political, and cultural context that prioritized marriage. And a powerful 
movement dedicated to what it termed "traditional family values" further 
constrained advocates' ability to destabilize marriage. While in many ways 
advocates had little choice but to define domestic partnership in relation to 
marriage, prominent advocates themselves also envisioned a marriage regime 
that included same-sex couples. They represented constituents who valued 
marriage and, in the 1980s and early 1990s, rendered domestic partnership 
marriage-like. Accordingly, many advocates viewed domestic partnership 
through a "both/and" rather than "either/or" lens, working both toward an 
inclusive domestic partnership system and laying the groundwork for same-sex 
couples' inclusion in marriage. 
482. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra note 5, at 245. 
483. See Franke, supra note 460, at 1413-14; see also Murray, supra note 125, at 302; 
Murray, Marriage as Punishment,supra note 5, at 59. 
484. Franke, supra note 460, at 1418. 
485. See id; Franke, supra note 463, at 2698, 2701; see also Butler, supra note 449, at 241. 
486. See Franke, supra note 463, at 2689. This constitutes a noteworthy point of departure 
from other critics, who tend to distinguish between progressive nonmarital recognition, on one hand, 
and regressive marital and nonmarital recognition, on the other hand. For Franke, advocacy aimed at 
government recognition in general overlooks more transformative possibilities outside the state. See 
Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, supra note 5, at 245. 
487. Franke, Public Sex, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Afterlife of Homophobia, supra note 5, 
at 158. 
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Looking first to external constraints, the case study exposes marriage's 
regulatory reach and totalizing influence on the legal and cultural environment. 
Even for activists resisting marriage, marriage functioned like a riptide.488 
Advocates were swimming with and against marriage, often at the same time. 
That is, they challenged marriage's role even as they submitted to its pull. 
LGBT advocates' claims did not simply succeed or fail on their own, but were 
met with reactions from a range of relevant actors who shaped the content and 
influenced the viability of those claims. Government actors, including judges 
and lawmakers, privileged marriage in law and policy. Countermovement 
activists, who influenced officials and mobilized voters, sought to both restore 
the centrality of marriage and cut back on LGBT rights. And private 
institutions, including employers and insurers sympathetic to sexual-orientation 
equality, acted on financial incentives to limit the types of nonmarital 
relationships that would qualify for benefits. Overall, then, marriage constituted 
a deeply entrenched legal norm, a powerful but controversial cultural priority, 
and a well-understood limiting principle. Both supportive and hostile responses 
filtered LGBT claims through the lens of marriage, and such responses often 
redirected advocates' energy and constrained potentially more transformative 
visions.489 
With marriage as the dominant legal and cultural framework, nonrnarital 
recognition was constructed in what Ariela Dubler has labeled "the shadow of 
marriage."490 Marriage rendered intimate couples the appropriate targets of 
reform. Those who mapped onto a particular notion of the marital family 
gained support by distinguishing themselves from other relationships that failed 
to fit the marital mold. Furthermore, marriage distinguished same-sex couples 
from their different-sex, unmarried counterparts. This produced an emphasis on 
marriage access over marriage choice in ways that gradually propped up 
marriage as an LGBT movement goal. Indeed, supportive allies frequently cast 
domestic partnership as a compromise solution that avoided the more radical 
possibility of same-sex marriage. 
Accordingly, the power of marriage as a legal and cultural norm 
structured claims, debates, and outcomes regarding family reform such that 
advocates did not-and could not-simply reject marriage. Even if advocates 
hoped otherwise, domestic partnership in many ways solidified, rather than 
resisted, the power of marriage. Ultimately, the case study demonstrates the 
difficulty of counteracting the regulatory force of marriage. By doing so, it 
counsels against normative frameworks that simply reject the powerful role of 
488. I am grateful to Melissa Murray for suggesting this trope. 
489. Cf William N. Eskridge Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 419, 487 (2001) (explaining how law-based, inclusion-focused organizing 
privileges moderate movement visions over more radical ones). 
490. Ariela R Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Constroction 
of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003). 
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marriage and challenges prescriptive claims urging advocates to replicate 
earlier activism. Pre-Baehr efforts-and the results they produced-did not 
exist in the way they are commonly imagined. And resisting the regulatory 
force of marriage is more difficult than often assumed. 
Turning next to internal movement dynamics, the case study demonstrates 
that advocates did not simply accede to marriage's power because of forces 
outside the movement. Many LGBT advocates themselves envisioned a state 
marriage regime that would include same-sex couples. As they sought to make 
marriage less important to the distribution of rights and benefits, they also 
contested same-sex couples' exclusion from marriage~ften indirectly-and 
situated marriage as a status that should include same-sex couples. For 
instance, when Achtenberg represented Hinman in his attempt to secure 
benefits for his same-sex partner, she avoided a direct challenge to California's 
marriage law; in the early 1980s, this was a wise strategic decision. Yet 
Achtenberg highlighted Hinman's desire for marriage and differentiated 
unmarried different-sex couples in ways that situated marriage as a goal of 
LGBT advocacy.491 While her arguments reflected important strategic 
decisions, they also evinced a normative orientation toward marriage that 
departs from contemporary accounts of earlier marriage resistance. Even 
Coleman, one of the most forceful critics of a marriage-centric regime, sought 
marriage for himself and believed marriage should include same-sex couples.492 
Furthermore, the case study shows that advocates acted on behalf of 
LGBT constituents who valued marriage. Indeed, the resonance of the 
recognition frame used to advance and celebrate domestic partnership 
underscores the desire for the status conferred by marriage. Many same-sex 
couples enacted marriage in their legally unrecognized relationships and 
imposed the symbolic elements of marriage onto domestic partnership.493 
Same-sex couples often experienced their exclusion from marriage not simply 
as a family-based harm but as an affront to sexual-orientation equality. For 
many of them, marriage was part of the solution, not part of the problem. Even 
as advocates resisted explicit claims to marriage, they translated constituents' 
push for marriage into claims to nonmarital recognition. 
Accordingly, the California case study suggests that, in some ways, 
today's marriage critics overestimate both the agency of LGBT advocates and 
the pervasiveness of radical politics. In framing advocacy in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, they emphasize marriage critique and resistance. Yet this view 
491. See supra Part ill.B. 
492. See supra Part ill.C. l.a. 
493. Sociologists report that lesbians and gay men experience legal relationship recognition--
and particularly marriage-as social validation and a sign of equality. See KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITTCS OF LoVE AND LAW 116 (2006); Kimberly D. Richman, By 
Any Other Name: The Social and Legal Stakes of Same-Sex Marriage, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 357, 372 
(2010); see also ROSIE HARDING, REGULATING SEXUALITY: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LESBIAN 
AND GAY LIVES 66 (2011). 
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does not fully account for either the strategic constraints advocates faced (and 
continue to face) or the competing normative preferences of both advocates and 
constituents.494 Marriage critics' theoretical contributions shed important light 
on the costs of using marriage to distribute rights and benefits and to regulate 
sexual relationships. Yet in seeking to translate those insights into on-the-
ground legal reform and advocacy models, it is important to attend to the 
constraints imposed by the surrounding legal and cultural environment, as well 
as to the influence of various state actors, private parties, countermovement 
activists, and LGBT constituents who approach marriage and family policy 
with competing goals, values, and motivations. 
V. 
Tow ARD A MORE NUANCED VIEW OF THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 
Even as scholarly critiques of LGBT advocacy tend to overestimate the 
pervasiveness and effectiveness of marriage resistance in earlier organizing, 
they tend to underestimate LGBT advocates' historical impact on marriage 
itself-and its role in organizing familial and sexual relationships. Indeed, even 
the standard account described in Part II.A generally situates movement claims 
to marriage as a development emerging in the mid-1990s in ways that may 
obscure the dialogical relationship between marriage and earlier nonmarital 
work. While the California case study reveals the centrality of marriage in 
nonmarital advocacy, marriage did not merely cast a shadow over nonmarital 
recognition.495 Rather, the case study reveals how the construction of 
nonmarital spaces influenced the changing contours of marriage. In the space 
outside marriage, LGBT advocates contributed to a marital model capable of 
including same-sex couples, whose relationships now appeared marriage-like. 
A. Shaping Marriage Outside Marriage 
An important and growing body of legal scholarship resists the 
conventional assumption that marriage simply defines nonmarital life in a one-
way direction. Instead, it exposes the interactive relationship between marriage 
and nonmarriage.496 As Courtney Cahill argues, "central forms of intimacy and 
494. Eskridge has argued that Polikoff's "critique of same-sex marriage ... romanticizes the 
movement, ... which is not nearly so radical as Polikoff and others envision it." Eskridge, supra note 
100, at 1489; see also William N. Eskridge Jr., The Ideological Structure of the Same-Sex Marriage 
Debate (And Some Postmodern Arguments for Same-Sex Marriage), in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF 
SAME-SEX PARlNERSHIP, supra note 449, at 113, 119 ("[M]ost gay people are not as radical in their 
aspirations as Polikoff and Ettelbrick .... "). 
495. See Franke, supra note 463, at 2697 ("[T]hose who fall within marriage's shadow find 
themselves locked into a social field in which the attachments we take up have meaning already 
determined by the state."). 
496. See Cahill, supra note 9, at 47; Dubler, supra note 9, at 961. In some ways, this tracks 
Brenda Cossman's powerful argument that the same-sex marriage debate on the left "misses the 
messiness, ambivalence and multiplicity of the inclusions and exclusions of citizenship." BRENDA 
COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 
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family," including marriage and parenting, "often take shape in the shadow of 
their marginal counterparts. ,,497 Demonstrating this point in rich detail, Ariela 
Dubler's study of widows' rights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries revealed that "[t]he legal regulation of unmarried women ... played a 
constitutive and contested role in legal constructions of the meaning of 
marriage."498 In other work on single women's claims in the nineteenth 
century, Dubler has shown that beyond marriage's "formal reach," "judges and 
lawmakers forged the meaning of marriage itself."499 Of course, in the period 
Dubler analyzed, nonmarital regulation participated in the construction of 
marriage as a highly gendered institution,5°0 unlike the contemporary model 
shaped by LGBT nonmarital advocacy. Indeed, this contrast underscores the 
dynamic nature of marriage and the way it is actively constructed in nonmarital 
spaces.501 
In the more modem LGBT context, Cahill explains how "domestic 
partnership statutes operate as a vehicle through which the law expresses its 
most aspirational commitments about all relationships."502 Under this view, 
nonmarital recognition elucidates expectations for both married and unmarried 
relationships, even as the requirements formally target only the latter. 503 
Indeed, while the state has increasingly taken what Mary Anne Case has 
labeled a "thin" view of marriage,504 it has more "thickly" defined domestic 
partnership by imposing specific, concrete terms with financial and affective 
requirements. 505 Case inverts the conventional understanding of domestic 
partnership and marriage, showing that marriage may offer more, not less, 
space for flexibility. 506 Yet at the same time, the state may actually elaborate 
160 (2007). While Cossman focuses on the concept of sexual citizenship, the sense of dynamism and 
contingency that she brings to her analysis is consistent with the analysis of marriage and nonmarriage, 
particularly as it relates to LGBT woik, in this Article. 
497. Cahill, supra note 9, at 52. 
498. Dubler, supra note 490, at 1646. 
499. Ariela R. Dubler, "Exceptions to the General Rule": Unmarried Women and the 
"Constitution of the Family," 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 797, 800 (2003). 
500. See id. at 809. 
501. SeeDubler,supranote9, at 1019. 
502. Cahill, supra note 9, at 59. 
503. See id. at 59--60. 
504. See Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have To Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1199, 120~6 (2010) ("[A] thin view of civil marriage makes it a legal shell that 
couples can fill with their own normative meaning and internal structure .... ") (footnote omitted). 
505. See Case, supra note 141, at 1773-74; cf Claudia Card, Against Marriage and 
Motherhood, 11 HYPATIA I, 12 (1996) (noting that "eligibility for the benefits of domestic partnership 
may be more restrictive than marriage"). 
506. See Case, supra note 141, at 1772. Indeed, Case suggests that marriage critics, who are 
"concerned about state interference with and control over the details of adult consensual 
relationships, ... may find that the existing laws governing marriage are not the most worrisome or 
restrictive." See Case, supra note 504, at 1204. 
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the meaning of marriage through the regulation of domestic partnership. 507 That 
is, even when the law takes a "thin" view of marriage, the law of nonmarriage 
may powerfully communicate a "thicker" view. In this way, domestic 
partnership specifies the content of marriage for everyone. 
The California case study brings a social movement perspective to this 
important body of work, showing that not simply the state, but also advocates 
and grassroots constituents themselves shape the content of marriage in the 
spaces outside its borders. Of course, they do so as part of an interactive 
process involving other actors, including opponents. Ultimately, the production 
of marital meaning emanates not only from the margins but also from below, as 
individuals in unrecognized and stigmatized relationships seek rights and 
support. By comparing same-sex relationships to the legal and social 
standard-marriage-advocates highlighted norms that offered points of 
commonality between their unmarried constituents and married couples. LGBT 
advocates' impact on marriage from the outside ultimately allowed them to 
stake claim to the inside. While some surely sought to construct nonrnarriage so 
as to elude marriage, others actively deployed nonmarriage in ways that built 
the case for a reshaped version of marriage-one capable of including same-
sex relationships. 
Same-sex couples became appropriate subjects of nonmarital recognition 
to the extent they resembled-and fulfilled the same functions as-married 
couples. If same-sex couples deserved recognition because they functioned like 
married couples, the specific ways in which they did-romantic affiliation, 
mutual emotional support, and economic interdependence-became important 
to both LGBT identity and the very definition of marriage. In casting same-sex 
relationships as marriage-like for the purpose of securing nonmarital rights, 
LGBT advocates ultimately constructed same-sex couples as marriage-worthy 
and marriage itself as LGBT-inclusive. They did so against the backdrop of a 
broader fight, involving multiple movements, over marriage's meaning and its 
role in organizing sexual and familial relationships. Even as LGBT advocacy 
on domestic partnership in some ways-and counterintuitively-furthered the 
centrality of marriage, it elaborated the content of marriage and consequently 
contributed to a model of marriage capable of including same-sex relationships. 
B. Today's Case for Marriage 
By looking closely at contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence, we 
can see that the specific attributes that justified same-sex couples' inclusion in 
nonmarital recognition now support their inclusion in marriage. When courts 
rule in favor of marriage equality, they articulate a model of marriage that looks 
507. See Katz, supra note 55, at 1269. This is in some ways consistent with an expressive 
account of family law. See Eliz.abeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Ma"iage, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1901, 1929 (2000). 
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in many ways like domestic partnership and that is equally applicable to same-
sex and different-sex relationships. 
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the first state supreme court 
decision opening marriage to same-sex couples, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court declared that "it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of 
the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the 
sine qua non of civil marriage."508 Articulated by the court in 2003, this 
conceptualization grew out of both the mapping of LGBT identity onto marital 
norms and broader changes in marriage itself. Marriage had grown to reflect 
important demographic shifts and legal changes wrought by advocates for a 
variety of social movements, including the LGBT movement. 509 The notion of 
marriage rooted in gender complementarity, procreative sex, and biological 
parenting-a notion that justified same-sex couples' exclusion-no longer 
resonated.510 Understood in these terms, it becomes clear that in important 
ways the earlier era of nonmarital advocacy laid the groundwork for the current 
era of marriage equality advocacy. 
In California, the supreme court conceptualized marriage in a way that 
resonated with years of LGBT advocacy seeking nonmarital recognition. It 
explained in its 2008 Marriage Cases decision that "gay individuals are fully 
capable of entering into the kind of loving and enduring committed 
relationships that may serve as the foundation of a family and of responsibly 
caring for and raising children. " 511 Adult coupling and chosen families, rather 
than biological reproduction and dual-gender parenting, had come to constitute 
not only the foundation of nonmarital status but also of marriage itself.512 
More specifically, the relationship between the emotional and economic 
elements of marriage-a key move in nonmarital recognition-assumes a 
central role in contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence. In finding 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional in a decision that would ultimately become the 
definitive ruling in the case, the district court in Perry declared: "Marriage is 
the state recognition and approval of a couple's choice to live with each other, 
to remain committed to one another and to form a household based on their 
own feelings about one another and to join in an economic partnership and 
support one another and any dependents."513 The court's language mirrored the 
definition of domestic partnership from its earliest articulation. Moreover, in 
striking down Proposition 8 on narrower grounds, the Ninth Circuit-in a 
508. 798 N.E.2d 941,961 (Mass. 2003). 
509. See supra Part I; see also Jeremiah Egger, Note, Glucksberg, Lawrence, and the Decline 
o/Loving's Marriage Precedent, 98 VA. L. REY. 1825 (2012). 
510. See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 1885; see also COSSMAN, supra note 496, at 174. 
51 I. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,420,428 (Cal. 2008). 
512. See COSSMAN, supra note 496, at 174-75; David B. Cruz, Heterosexual Reproductive 
Imperatives, 56 EMORY L.J. 1157, 1167-68 (2007); Hunter, supra note 62, at 1856. 
513. See Peny v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,961 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd 
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Peny, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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decision eventually vacated by the Supreme Court-explained in Perry that 
"because we acknowledge the financial interdependence of those who have 
entered into an 'enduring' relationship," "[w]e allow spouses but not siblings or 
roommates to file taxes jointly."s14 When forced to specify the attributes of 
marriage, the Perry courts named qualities-emotional commitment and 
economic support-that had come to explicitly define domestic partnership and 
linked those qualities as mutually constitutive. 
The Supreme Court dispatched Perry on standing grounds and therefore 
offered little insight into the meaning of marriage and its relationship to same-
sex couples.sis Yet its decision in United States v. Windsor, which struck down 
Section 3 of DOMA and thereby opened federal rights and benefits to married 
same-sex couples, elaborated an understanding of marriage that resonates with 
earlier domestic partnership advocacy.s16 Rather than focus on procreative sex 
and gender differentiation, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion drew on core 
attributes that apply equally to same-sex and different-sex couples. 
Indeed, Justice Alito in dissent noted the contest over the meaning of 
marriage itself. He observed the majority displacing the traditional, "conjugal" 
model of marriage-which he explained is an "intrinsically opposite-sex 
institution"-with a model in which "gender differentiation is not relevant" and 
therefore "the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution [looks like] 
rank discrimination."s 17 Justice Alito labeled this "newer view" the '"consent-
based' vision of marriage, a vision that primarily defines marriage as the 
solemnization of mutual commitment-marked by strong emotional attachment 
and sexual attraction-between two persons_,,sis This articulation of a model of 
marriage capable of including same-sex couples maps neatly onto earlier 
domestic partnership regimes. Justice Alito's delineation of the two visions of 
marriage at stake in Windsor-and in the broader fight for same-sex 
marriage-reveals how the attributes that defined domestic partnership and 
justified same-sex couples' nonmarital recognition ultimately define marriage 
in ways that support same-sex couples' inclusion. 
Looking more closely at Justice Kennedy's conceptualization of marriage, 
we see that he emphasized both marriage's private welfare function-marriage 
as a mechanism to channel mutual obligations and support-and its public 
dimensions-marriage as recognition.s 19 Both of these frames proved crucial in 
pressing and securing domestic partnership in earlier LGBT advocacy. In 
Windsor, Justice Kennedy employed these same frames to describe marriage 
514. Peny v. Brown (Perry II), 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
515. See Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
516. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
517. Id at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
518. Id 
519. See Douglas NeJairne, Windsor's Right To Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 230--31 
(2013). 
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and relate it to same-sex couples. He explained that marriage involves both 
"benefits and responsibilities" as the state uses marriage to distribute "certain 
statutory benefits" and, more importantly, to impose responsibilities on the 
partners.520 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's declaration that same-sex couples 
"would be honored to accept"521 the duties and obligations of marriage reflects 
years of LGBT advocacy demonstrating that same-sex couples form the same 
types of self-sufficient family units as different-sex married couples.522 At the 
same time, his focus on the state acknowledgment and community recognition 
that marriage confers reflects both early appeals to recognition in domestic 
partnership advocacy and the later rejection of domestic partnership as an 
inadequate mode of recognition. 523 While domestic partnership at one point 
sought to bestow "status and dignity"524 on same-sex couples, now it seems 
only full marriage recognition will suffice. 
Windsor of course did not involve a challenge to a nonmarital recognition 
regime like domestic partnership. Still, Justice Kennedy's focus on the 
"stigma"525 perpetrated by DOMA's non-recognition suggests that he may view 
nonmarital substitutes with suspicion.526 Perry, on the other hand, directly 
implicated the question of domestic partnership's constitutional status. Yet 
because the standing issue proved dispositive, the Court did not engage this 
question. Nonetheless, the lower court decisions in Perry demonstrate not only 
that the arguments through which advocates achieved nonmarital recognition 
support arguments for marriage, but also that nonmarital recognition regimes 
divest marriage laws of rationales previously understood to justify the 
exclusion of same-sex couples. 
By extending rights to same-sex couples because they act like married 
couples, domestic partnership in California exposed marriage's raw sexual-
orientation-based distinction and dislodged justifications for that distinction.527 
Given that same-sex couples gained nonmarital rights based on their 
performance of marital norms, courts and legislatures increasingly understood 
same-sex and different-sex couples as similarly situated with regard to 
marriage. In other words, nonmarital recognition ultimately positioned same-
sex couples' exclusion from marriage as, in Justice Alito's terms, "rank 
discrimination. "528 
520. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93. 
521. Id at 2695. 
522. See NeJaime, supra note 519, at 237-39. 
523. See id at 246. 
524. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
525. Id at 2693. 
526. See NeJaime, supra note 519, at 246. 
527. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 PJd 384,435. (Cal. 2008); see also NeJaime, supra note 
3, at 724. 
528. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, rationales rooted in procreation and parenting, which 
historically supported the different-sex requirement in marriage, receded 
precisely because of work regarding nonmarital relationships. Indeed, 
California's domestic partnership statute itself eventually included parental 
presumptions for children born into domestic partnerships. 529 LGBT advocates 
would ultimately emphasize the relationship between marriage and childrearing 
to support same-sex couples' claims to marriage-and Justice Kennedy made 
much of this childrearing aspect of marriage in Windsor. 530 Nonetheless, the 
legal separation of parenting and marriage, which grew out of trends in 
heterosexual family formation but was seized on by LGBT advocates, has 
provided an important legal basis for marriage equality. 
After the California Senate passed the 1975 bill that would become the 
state's Uniform Parentage Act, the bill's author, Senator Anthony Bielenson, 
declared that "parent and child rights would be based on the existence of a 
parent and child relationship rather than solely on the marital status of the 
parents."531 This crack in the legal relationship between marriage and 
parenthood eventually provided openings for LGBT advocates, who sought to 
protect the rights of (unmarried) lesbian and gay parents.532 Ultimately, as the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned in Perry, California's "laws governing parentage, which 
are distinct from its laws governing marriage," provide rights and 
responsibilities to nonmarital parents in ways that erase distinctions based on 
marital status and thereby erode the connection between marriage and parenting 
used to justify marriage's exclusive nature.533 
Similarly, California's favorable treatment of nonbiological parents 
weakened the biological-parenthood rationale for the marriage restriction. 534 
The distinction between parental status and biology stemmed both from trends 
in reproductive technology and from doctrinal innovations, including de facto 
parenthood and parenthood by estoppel. LGBT advocates' efforts to assign 
rights and obligations to nonbiological co-parents leveraged and furthered these 
developments.535 Internalizing these important changes in Perry, the Ninth 
Circuit explained that "in California, the parentage statutes place a premium on 
the 'social relationship,' not the 'biological relationship,' between a parent and 
a child. "536 
529. See CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297.5(d) (West 2010). 
530. Id. at 2694-95 (majority opinion). 
531. Press Release, Senator Anthony C. Beilenson Statement on Senate Bill 347 (Oct. 2, 1975) 
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Even if parenting is no longer exclusively linked to marriage and biology, 
the proponents of laws restricting marriage for same-sex couples argue that 
such laws support an optimal childrearing environment-married, biological 
parents of each sex.537 In rejecting the link between marriage and dual-gender 
childrearing, courts have relied not only on the parental rights of unmarried 
parents, including those in same-sex relationships, but also on the erosion of 
sex stereotypes inside marriage-a shift pushed by women's rights advocates 
and elaborated by LGBT advocates. As the Goodridge court explained, the 
argument based on dual-gender childrearing "hews perilously close to the 
argument, long repudiated by the Legislature and the courts, that men and 
women are so innately and fundamentally different that their respective 'proper 
spheres' can be rigidly and universally delineated."538 And the Perry district 
court connected the legacy of sex-differentiated roles in marriage and the 
family to the prohibition on marriage for same-sex couples.539 Rejection of the 
former supported rejection of the latter. 
Seen in these terms, the fight over the very definition of marriage-and 
the impact of nonmarital advocacy on that fight-reveals itself. Whereas 
social-conservative activists and commentators opposed to same-sex marriage 
fault LGBT advocates for "redefining" marriage, even those supporting 
marriage equality recognize the definitional stakes. Indeed, in casting its 
decision as "a significant change in the definition of marriage,"540 the 
Goodridge court framed marriage as "an evolving paradigm" and 
acknowledged the extent to which its view of marriage diverged from an earlier 
model rooted in procreation and gender differentiation.541 
Of course, this is not simply the product of LGBT work, either inside or 
outside marriage. Rather, this definitional fight relates to broader changes in 
family demographics and legal norms occurring over the latter part of the 
twentieth century and to mobilizations, on both the left and right, around 
marriage, family, and sex.542 Within that broader context, we can locate the 
changing shape of marriage in an earlier era of LGBT organizing, in which 
advocates mapped same-sex relationships onto emerging marital norms in 
537. See Opening Brief for Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants at 77-81, Perry II, 671 F.3d 
1052. On this argument, see Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. 
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order to gain nonmarital support. By working in the space outside marriage and 
in a time before marriage constituted an official movement goal, LGBT 
advocates contributed to the attributes that would come to define marriage for 
everyone. 
CONCLUSION 
Exploring and understanding from where we have come is essential to 
appreciating and comprehending both where we stand and how we move 
forward. The insights that emerge from this Article's case study suggest the 
benefits of recalibrating the normative debate over marriage in ways that attend 
to the immense regulatory power of marriage, the changing meaning of 
marriage, and the specific impact of same-sex couples. 
Understanding the dialogical relationship between marital norms and 
same-sex relationships suggests that further changes may be on the horizon. 543 
Same-sex couples' participation in marriage may continue to direct the 
meaning of marriage away from one rooted in procreative sex and gender 
differentiation and toward one rooted in adult romantic affiliation and mutual 
emotional and economic support. 544 Even if children constitute a central feature 
of marital families, the earlier focus on procreation may be giving way to a 
focus on parenting more generally. 545 Moreover, the delinking of marital sex 
and LGBT childrearing may further complicate social and legal understandings 
of parenthood. 546 This is not to suggest that a world in which same-sex couples 
marry inevitably pushes us in progressive directions. Indeed, the model of both 
domestic partnership and marriage that LGBT advocates helped to construct 
privatizes support in ways that may minimize the push for public 
interventions. 547 And marriage itself may affect the lives of same-sex couples in 
deeply constitutive ways. Nonetheless, at a minimum, this Article's account of 
the relationship between marriage and LGBT advocacy shows that the shifting 
shape of marriage may integrate and advance, rather than simply reject and 
stunt, broader changes relating to family and sexuality. 
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This Article's analysis-and specifically its focus on the mutually 
constitutive relationship between LGBT advocacy and marriage-speaks to 
broader questions in the study of law and social change. A movement's 
trajectory and impact depend not only on the ideological commitments and 
strategic decisions of movement activists but also on the broader institutional 
context in which the movement operates and against which it makes claims. 
That is, our understanding of the relationship between advocacy and social 
change cannot hinge on an analysis of the volitional choices of social 
movement advocates, but rather must attend to the constitutive and disciplining 
impact of the dominant institutions with which the movement interacts. 
Marriage, much like law itself, shaped the available ways to understand and 
articulate LGBT grievances and remedies. Indeed, the very impulse to prioritize 
relationship recognition reflects marriage's power. Of course, dominant 
institutions shape not only the movement's priorities and demands, but also 
responses by those outside the movement. Marriage provided the framework 
through which to articulate both support and opposition to LGBT claims. 
Yet this Article also shows that even as a social movement wrestles with a 
powerful, entrenched institution that changes the movement, the movement 
itself may change that institution. Through LGBT contestation, as well as 
through challenges wrought by other forces, marriage grew more conducive to 
same-sex relationships. And as marriage now slowly moves to include same-
sex couples, we see shifting articulations of marriage's core attributes. 
Nonetheless, these shifts in the content and meaning of marriage may 
accommodate the LGBT movement's claims in ways that assure marriage's 
. d s4s contmue power. 
While this Article's analysis specifically related the interaction between 
LGBT advocacy and marriage to debates in family law and sexuality 
scholarship, the case study could be used to directly engage questions in 
sociolegal theory. The dynamics that this Article uncovers likely exist in other 
movement contexts. Exploring the relationship between law, social movements, 
and legal and cultural institutions not only in the LGBT context but also in 
other settings may ultimately point toward more generalizable theories of law 
and social change. 
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